

Witness: GCHO Witness

Party: 3rd Respondent

Number: 2

Exhibit: GCHO 3

Date: xx/02/17

Case No. IPT/15/110/CH

IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL

Claimant

and

- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
- (2) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
- (3) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS
- (4) SECURITY SERVICE
- (5) SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Respondents

WITNESS STATEMENT OF GCHO WITNESS

1. GCHO WITNESS, Deputy Director in the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Hubble Road, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, GL51 0EX, WILL SAY as follows:

- 1) I am Deputy Director Mission Policy at GCHQ. In that role, I am responsible for drawing up the operational policies that underpin GCHQ's intelligence gathering activities and for ensuring that they are complied with. I have been in this role since 5 January 2015, having previously served as Deputy to my predecessor. I have worked for GCHQ in a variety of roles since 1997.
- 2) I am authorised to make this witness statement on behalf of GCHQ. The contents of this statement are within my own knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. Where matters are not within my own knowledge they are based upon documentation made available to me and from discussions with others within the department.
- 3) Documents referred to as exhibited to this statement are attached as Exhibit 'GCHO 3'.

- 4) Further to paragraph 95 of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal's judgment of 17 October 2016 and paragraph 4 of the Tribunal's order of 31 October 2016, I make this statement in order to:
- exhibit (for the convenience of the Tribunal) relevant sections of policies/handling arrangements relating to the sharing of BPD and BCD;
 - address the question as to whether GCHQ has, since avowal on 11 March 2015, shared bulk personal data ("BPD") (or a sub-set of BPD) with international partners and/or law enforcement agencies ("LEAs"), and if so, what restrictions as to transfer or use/retention were imposed by GCHQ; and
 - address the question as to whether GCHQ has, since avowal on 4 November 2015, shared s.94 bulk communications data ("BCD") (or a sub-set of BCD) with international partners and/or LEAs and if so, what restrictions as to transfer or use/retention were imposed by GCHQ.
- 5) For the avoidance of doubt, this statement addresses the sharing of BPDs and s94 BCDs *en bloc* and any restrictions which have been placed in relation to such sharing. *It does not address situations which might arise were foreign liaison partners able to use/access GCHQ systems in order to run their own targeted queries against repositories holding BPDs and BCDs.*

A. GCHQ'S POLICIES AND HANDLING ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO THE SHARING OF BPD AND BCD

- 6) I exhibit the following as exhibit GCHQ3:
- Paragraph 16 of the Joint SIA BPD policy of Feb 2015;
 - Paragraph 5.2 (4th bullet), paragraphs 6.0-6.7 and paragraphs 8.1 of the cross-SIA BPD OPEN Handling Arrangements of November 2015;
 - Section 9 of the GCHQ CLOSED BPD Handling Arrangements;
 - Paragraphs 4.4.1 to 4.4.6 of the OPEN Handling Arrangements for BCD; and
 - Section 4.4 of the GCHQ CLOSED s94 Handling Arrangements.

[REDACTED]

- 7) *Whilst we can neither confirm nor deny whether the SIA have agreed to share or in fact do share BPD/BCD with either foreign liaison or LEA, were we to do so, we would*
- Follow the principles and approach set out in our respective Handling Arrangements and policy/evidence.*
 - Take into account the nature of the BPD and BCD that was due to be disclosed.*
 - Take into account the nature/remit of the body to which we were considering disclosing the BPD/BCD.*
 - Take into account the approach taken by any other SIAs who may have shared bulk data and have regard to any protocols/understandings that the other agencies may have used/followed.*
 - Depending on the individual circumstance, seek assurances that the BPD/BCD in question would be handled in accordance with RIPA safeguards i.e. that it would be disclosed, copied, distributed and retained only to the minimum extent necessary for the purposes of RIPA in*

the interests of National Security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting Serious Crime, or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK).

[REDACTED]

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

..... GCHQ witness

Dated: 9 February 2017

Case No. IPT/15/110/CH

IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL

Claimant

and

- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
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Respondents

EXHIBIT GCHQ 3

NOTE: REDACTIONS ARE INDICATED [REDACTION] AND GISTS ARE IN BOLD, UNDERLINED AND ITALICS

which it is hosted. These safeguards include (but are not limited to) audits, protective monitoring regimes, line management oversight, training and codes of practice;

- The Agencies will take appropriate disciplinary action against any person identified as abusing or misusing analytical capabilities, BPD, or any information or intelligence derived therefrom.

15. These policy statements apply SIA-wide. Each Agency maintains separate complementary policy and guidance to aid staff in the use of BPD and meeting these policy requirements.

D. Sharing

16. All three Agencies have a common interest in acquiring and interrogating BPD. As a principle, all three Agencies will seek to acquire once and use many times, on grounds of business effectiveness and efficiency. The following policy statements apply to the Agencies:

- When sharing BPD the supplying Agency must be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to share the data with the other Agency/Agencies; and the receiving Agency/Agencies must be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to acquire the data in question. A log of data sharing will be maintained by each agency;
- The sharing of BPD must be authorised in advance by a senior individual within each Agency, and no action to share may be taken without such authorisation;
- [REDACTION]
- BPD must not be shared with non-SIA third parties without prior agreement from the acquiring Agency;
- *Were BPD to be shared with overseas liaison the relevant necessity and proportionality tests for onwards disclosure under the SSA or ISA would have to be met. In the event that one (UK) Agency wished to disclose externally a dataset originally acquired by another Agency, Action-On would have to be sought in advance from the acquiring Agency. Wider legal, political and operational risks would also have to be considered, as appropriate.*
- The Agencies may share applications (which in turn could provide access to another Agency's BPD holdings) as judged appropriate in line with SIA *information policy* on commissioning.

17. These policy statements apply SIA-wide. Each Agency maintains separate complementary policy and guidance to aid staff in the process of sharing BPD and meeting these policy requirements.

E. Retention

18. The Agencies review the necessity and proportionality of the continued retention of BPD. The following policy statements apply to the Agencies:

- Each Agency has a review panel which will review BPD retention by that Agency. In all three Agencies, panels sit once every six months;
- These panels will invite representatives from each of the other Agencies to discuss data sharing (both data and applications granting access to BPD), assist consistency of decision making across Agencies, and provide inter-Agency feedback;

including in particular what intelligence aim is likely to be met and how the data will support that objective.

- ❖ The proportionality of acquiring and retaining the data, including in particular whether there is a less intrusive method of obtaining the data.

When seeking authorisation to load a BPD into an analytical system for use, staff must satisfy themselves as to, and explain:

- ❖ The purpose for which the BPD is required; and
- ❖ The necessity and proportionality of using the BPD.

5.0 Specific Procedures and Safeguards for Use of and Access to Bulk Personal Datasets inside each Intelligence Service

5.1 Each Intelligence Service attaches the highest priority to maintaining data security and protective security standards. Moreover, each Intelligence Service must establish handling procedures so as to ensure that the integrity and confidentiality of the information in the bulk personal dataset held is fully protected, and that there are adequate safeguards in place to minimise the risk of any misuse of such data and, in the event that such misuse occurs, to ensure that appropriate disciplinary action is taken. In particular, each Intelligence Service must apply the following protective security measures:

- Physical security to protect any premises where the information may be accessed;
- IT security to minimise the risk of unauthorised access to IT systems;
- A security vetting regime for personnel which is designed to provide assurance that those who have access to this material are reliable and trustworthy.

5.2 In relation to information in bulk personal datasets held, each Intelligence Service is obliged to put in place the following additional measures:

- Access to the information contained within the bulk personal datasets must be strictly limited to those with an appropriate business requirement to use these data;
- Individuals must only access information within a bulk personal dataset if it is necessary for the performance of one of the statutory functions of the relevant Intelligence Service;
- If individuals access information within a bulk personal dataset with a view to subsequent disclosure of that information, they must only access the relevant information if such disclosure is necessary for the performance of the statutory functions of the relevant Intelligence Service, or for the additional limited purposes described in paragraph 3.1.4 above;
- Before accessing or disclosing information, individuals must also consider whether doing so would be proportionate (as described in paragraphs 4.4 above and 6.3 below). For instance, they must consider whether other, less intrusive methods can be used to achieve the desired outcome;

6.0 Procedures and Safeguards for Disclosure of Bulk Personal Datasets outside the relevant Intelligence Service

6.1 Information in bulk personal datasets held by an Intelligence Service may only be disclosed to persons outside the relevant Service if the following conditions are met:

- that the objective of the disclosure falls within the Service's statutory functions or is for the additional limited purposes set out in sections 2(2)(a) and 4(2)(a) of the ISA 1994 and section 2(2)(a) of the SSA 1989;
- that it is **necessary** to disclose the information in question in order to achieve that objective;
- that the disclosure is **proportionate** to the objective;
- that only as much of the information will be disclosed as is **necessary** to achieve that objective.

When will disclosure be necessary?

6.2 In order to meet the 'necessity' requirement in relation to disclosure, staff must be satisfied that disclosure of the bulk personal dataset is 'really needed' for the purpose of discharging a statutory function of that Intelligence Service.

The disclosure must also be "proportionate"

6.3 The disclosure of the bulk personal dataset must also be **proportionate** to the purpose in question. In order to meet the 'proportionality' requirement, staff must be satisfied that the level of interference with the individual's right to privacy is justified by the benefit to the discharge of the Intelligence Service's statutory functions which is expected as a result of disclosing the data and the importance of the objective to be achieved. Staff must consider whether there is a reasonable alternative that will still meet the proposed objective - i.e. which involves less intrusion. For example, this could mean disclosure of individual pieces of data or of a subset of data rather than of the whole bulk personal dataset.

6.4 Before disclosing any bulk personal data, staff must take reasonable steps to ensure that the intended recipient organisation has and will maintain satisfactory arrangements for safeguarding the confidentiality of the data and ensuring that it is securely handled, or that they have received satisfactory assurances from the intended recipient organisation with respect to such arrangements.

6.5 These conditions must be met for all disclosure, including between the Intelligence Services.

6.6 These conditions for disclosure apply equally to the disclosure of an entire bulk personal dataset, a subset of the dataset, or an individual piece of data from the dataset.

6.7 Disclosure of the whole (or a subset) of a bulk personal dataset is subject to internal authorisation procedures in addition to those that apply to an item of data. The authorisation process requires an application to a senior manager designated for the purpose, describing the dataset it is proposed to disclose (in whole or in part) and setting out the operational and legal justification for the proposed disclosure along with the other information specified in paragraph 4.7, and whether any caveats or restrictions should be applied to the proposed disclosure. This is so that the senior manager can then consider the factors in paragraph 6.1, with operational, legal and

policy advice taken as appropriate. In difficult cases, the relevant Intelligence Service may seek guidance or a decision from the Secretary of State.

When seeking to disclose the whole (or a subset) of a BPD, staff must be satisfied that disclosure is:

- ❖ Justified on the basis of the relevant statutory disclosure gateway.
- ❖ Determined to be necessary and proportionate to the objective.
- ❖ Limited to only as much information as will achieve the objective.
- ❖ Authorised by a senior manager or, in difficult case, the Secretary of State.

7.0 Review of Retention and Deletion

7.1 Each Intelligence Service must regularly review the operational and legal justification for its continued retention and use of each bulk personal dataset. Where the continued retention of any such data no longer meets the tests of necessity and proportionality, all copies of it held within the relevant Intelligence Service must be deleted or destroyed.

7.2 The retention and review process requires consideration of the following factors:

- The operational and legal justification for continued retention, including its necessity and proportionality;
- Whether such information could be obtained elsewhere through less intrusive means;
- An assessment of the value and examples of use;
- Frequency of acquisition;
- The level of intrusion into privacy;
- The extent of political, corporate, or reputational risk;
- Whether any caveats or restrictions should be applied to continued retention.

For the purposes of retention, review and deletion of BPD-sets, each Intelligence Service must:

- ❖ Regularly review the justification for continued retention and use, including its necessity and proportionality.
- ❖ Delete a BPD after a decision is made that retention or use of it is no longer necessary or proportionate.

8.0 Other management controls within the Intelligence Services

8.1 The acquisition, retention and disclosure of a bulk personal dataset is subject to scrutiny in each Intelligence Service by an Internal Review Panel, whose function is to ensure that each bulk personal dataset has been properly acquired, that any disclosure is properly justified, that its retention remains necessary for the proper

discharge of the relevant Service's statutory functions, and is proportionate to achieving that objective.

8.2 The Review Panel in each Intelligence Service meets at six-monthly intervals and are comprised of senior representatives from Information Governance/Compliance, Operational and Legal teams.

8.3 Use of bulk personal data by staff is monitored by the relevant audit team in each Intelligence Service in order to detect misuse or identify activity that may give rise to security concerns. Any such identified activity initiates a formal investigation process in which legal, policy and HR (Human Resources) input will be requested where appropriate. Failure to provide a valid justification for a search may result in disciplinary action, which in the most serious cases could lead to dismissal and/or the possibility of prosecution.

8.4 All reports on audit investigations are made available to the Intelligence Services Commissioner for scrutiny (see paragraph 10 below).

8.5 Staff within each Intelligence Service will keep their senior leadership (at Director level or above) apprised as appropriate of the relevant Service's bulk personal data holdings and operations.

For the purposes of management control:

- ❖ A Review Panel in each Intelligence Service must meet at six-monthly intervals to review that Intelligence Service's BPD holdings.
- ❖ Staff must keep senior leadership (Director level or above) apprised of BPD holdings and operations.

9.0 Ministerial Oversight

9.1 Each Intelligence Service will report as appropriate on its bulk personal data holdings and operations to the relevant Secretary of State (the Home Secretary in the case of the Security Service, and the Foreign Secretary in the case of SIS and GCHQ).

10.0 Oversight by the Intelligence Services Commissioner

10.1 The acquisition, use, retention and disclosure of bulk personal datasets by the Intelligence Services, and the management controls and safeguards against misuse they put in place, will be overseen by the Intelligence Services Commissioner on a regular six-monthly basis, or as may be otherwise agreed between the Commissioner and the relevant Intelligence Service, except where the oversight of such data already falls within the statutory remit of the Interception of Communications Commissioner.

Note: The Prime Minister's section 59A RIPA direction was issued on 11 March 2015. Paragraph 3 of this makes it clear that the Commissioner's oversight extends not only to the practical operation of the Arrangements, but also to the adequacy of the Arrangements themselves.

10.2 The Intelligence Services must ensure that they can demonstrate to the appropriate Commissioner that proper judgements have been made on the necessity

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7.8 In the case of systems containing operational data, specific details of individuals' activities while accessing the system are logged and are subject to audit. Such logs contain details of who was accessing the system, when, and what they did while logged in. Users are also required to provide a Necessity & Proportionality Statement ("N&P Statement") for conducting an analytical search of the data in the system; an N&P Statement consists of a statement of the operational purpose of the search and an explanation of its necessity and proportionality. These justifications are also logged and are subject to periodic audits of their legitimacy and adequacy.

7.9 GCHQ's Legal and Policy training includes a section on N&P Statements. More detailed guidance on how to formulate legitimate and adequate justifications is available to all staff via links from GCHQ's Compliance Guide.

8. Experimental Use

8.1 Use of bulk personal data for an experimental purpose, e.g. development of a novel analytical technique or testing a new IT system, potentially entails an elevated level of risk to the security of the data, increased corporate risk and an additional interference with the right to privacy.

8.2 Any proposed experimental use of a bulk personal dataset must be authorised in advance by the relevant GCHQ senior officials. A request for authorisation will be made, using the relevant section of the dataset's BPD form. It will describe the proposed activity and explain why it is necessary and proportionate to use bulk personal data for this purpose. It will also include an assessment of the impact the experimental use is expected to have on the risks and interference mentioned above.

8.3 The Authoriser will consider the necessity and proportionality of the proposed use, in particular whether it is genuinely necessary to use bulk personal data for this purpose, given its intrusiveness and the degree of corporate risk involved.

8.4 If the request to use the bulk personal dataset for the proposed experimental purpose is approved, the Authoriser may, at his/her discretion, set conditions or restrictions on its use. If the request is rejected, the dataset must not be used for that purpose. The decision and any conditions or restrictions must be recorded on the dataset's BPD form.

9. Disclosure

9.1 Where the results of bulk personal data analysis are disclosed to partner or customer organisations, this must be done via standard reporting mechanisms, which ensure release of GCHQ intelligence in a secure, accountable, legally compliant manner.

9.2 If disclosure of a bulk personal dataset, or a substantial part of it, to a partner organisation is contemplated, whether at GCHQ's or the partner's initiative, the procedures below must be followed:

9.3 Another SIA Agency:

9.3.1 If the proposed recipient of the dataset is another SIA Agency, that Agency will (as with any other operational data) formally request transfer of the data via the "Inter-Agency Sharing" (IAS) process. As with authorisation to acquire a bulk personal dataset, this disclosure request will be considered and authorised (or rejected) by relevant GCHQ senior officials. The Authoriser's decision and the reasons for it will be recorded on the dataset's BPD form, as well as on the IAS request form.

OFFICIAL

6 of 10

OFFICIAL

[REDACTED]

9.4 Other organisations:

9.4.1 For any other organisation, whether another UK partner or a foreign partner, the dataset's Requester or Endorser will submit a request for authorisation to disclose, by means of the dataset's BPD form. Again, such requests will be considered by relevant GCHQ senior officials.

9.5 All requests for authorisation to disclose must provide a persuasive justification for the proposed disclosure, in terms of:

- its necessity and proportionality, and
- the intelligence or other operational benefit that is expected to accrue to GCHQ and the UK from the disclosure.

9.6 The Authoriser will consider:

- the content of the dataset: the nature of the personal information it contains, its intrusiveness and sensitivity;
- the nature and extent of the corporate risk the disclosure would entail;
- the necessity and proportionality of the disclosure, including whether it is genuinely necessary and proportionate to disclose the whole dataset, or whether a subset will meet the need;
- whether any caveats or restrictions should be applied; and
- the receiving organisation's arrangements for safeguarding, using and deleting the data – GCHQ will seek additional reassurances from the receiving organisation in this regard, if the Authoriser deems it necessary.

[REDACTED]

10. Continued Retention

10.1 The ongoing retention of every bulk personal dataset is reviewed at least every 24 months by the Bulk Personal Data Retention Review Panel (the Panel).

10.2 The Panel consists of relevant senior GCHQ officials.

10.3 Representatives from MI5 and SIS are normally invited to observe and contribute to discussions.

10.4 The Panel meets every 6 months, typically in March and September, to consider the datasets due for review and to review the functioning of the bulk personal dataset life-cycle management processes. Discussions, decisions and actions are minuted.

10.5 If a dataset's Requester and Endorser consider that a convincing case can be made to justify the continued retention and exploitation of that dataset, they must submit a retention request to the Panel by means of the dataset's BPD form. If they do not believe a convincing case can be made, they must arrange for the deletion of the dataset as soon as they reach this conclusion.

10.6 In the request, they must justify the interference with the right to privacy caused by GCHQ's continued retention and exploitation of the dataset. They must set out why it is genuinely necessary and proportionate to continue to retain and use the data. This rationale must be supported by concrete evidence, including specific examples, where possible, of the

OFFICIAL

7 of 10

and vetting regime for staff.

- ❖ Limit access to those with appropriate business requirement.
- ❖ Justify access to BCD on the grounds of necessity and proportionality, taking into consideration collateral intrusion and other less intrusive methods of deriving the same intelligence dividend.
- ❖ Ensure staff are appropriately trained, aware of audit functions and warned of disciplinary procedures resulting from misuse.

4.4 Disclosure

4.4.1 The disclosure of BCD must be carefully managed to ensure that it only takes place when it is justified on the basis of the relevant statutory disclosure gateway. The disclosure of an entire bulk communications dataset, or a subset, outside the Intelligence Service may only be authorised by a Senior Official² or the Secretary of State.

4.4.2 Disclosure of individual items of BCD outside the relevant Intelligence Service may only be made if the following conditions are met:

- that the objective of the disclosure falls within the Service's statutory functions or is for the additional limited purposes set out in sections 2(2)(a) and 4(2)(a) of the ISA 1994 and section 2(2)(a) of the SSA 1989;
- that it is necessary to disclose the information in question in order to achieve that objective;
- that the disclosure is proportionate to the objective;
- that only as much of the information will be disclosed as is necessary to achieve that objective.

When will disclosure be necessary?

4.4.3 In order to meet the 'necessity' requirement in relation to disclosure, staff in the relevant Intelligence Service and (as the case may be) the Secretary of State must be satisfied that disclosure of the BCD is 'really needed' for the purpose of discharging a statutory function of that Intelligence Service.

The disclosure must also be "proportionate"

4.4.4 The disclosure of the BCD must also be proportionate to the purpose in question. In order to meet the 'proportionality' requirement, staff in the relevant Intelligence Service and (as the case may be) the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the level of interference with the right to privacy of individuals whose communications data is being disclosed, both in relation to subjects of intelligence interest and in relation to other individuals who may be of no intelligence interest, is justified by the benefit to the discharge of the Intelligence Service's statutory functions which is expected as a result of disclosing the data and the importance of the objective to be achieved. Staff must consider whether there is a reasonable alternative that will still meet the proposed objective - i.e. which involves less intrusion. For example, this could mean disclosure of individual pieces of

² Equivalent to a member of the Senior Civil Service.

communications data or of a subset of the bulk communications data rather than of the whole bulk communications dataset.

4.4.5 Before disclosing any BCD, staff must take reasonable steps to ensure that the intended recipient organisation has and will maintain satisfactory arrangements for safeguarding the confidentiality of the data and ensuring that it is securely handled, or that they have received satisfactory assurances from the intended recipient organisation with respect to such arrangements.

4.4.6 These conditions must be met for all disclosure, including between the Intelligence Services and apply equally in making the decision to disclose an entire BCD, a subset of BCD, or an individual piece of data from the dataset.

Disclosure of BCD must be:

- ❖ **Justified on the basis of the relevant statutory disclosure gateway;**
- ❖ **Assessed to be necessary and proportionate to the objective;**
- ❖ **Limited to only as much information as will achieve the objective;**
- ❖ **Authorised by a Senior Official or Secretary of State (entire BCD or a subset).**

4.5 Review of Ongoing Acquisition and Retention, and Deletion

4.5.1 Each Intelligence Service must regularly review, i.e. at intervals of no less than six months, the operational and legal justification for its continued retention and use of BCD. This should be managed through a review panel comprised of senior representatives from Information Governance/Compliance, Operational and Legal teams.

4.5.2 The retention and review process requires consideration of:

- An assessment of the value and use of the dataset during the period under review and in a historical context;
- the operational and legal justification for ongoing acquisition, continued retention, including its necessity and proportionality;
- The extent of use and specific examples to illustrate the benefits;
- The level of actual and collateral intrusion posed by retention and exploitation;
- The extent of corporate, legal, reputational or political risk;
- Whether such information could be acquired elsewhere through less intrusive means.

4.5.3 Should the review process find that there remains an ongoing case for acquiring and retaining BCD, a formal review will be submitted at intervals of no less than six months for consideration by the relevant Secretary of State. In the event that the Intelligence Service or Secretary of State no longer deem it to be necessary and proportionate to acquire and retain the BCD, the Secretary of State will cancel the relevant Section 94 Direction and instruct the CNP concerned to cease supply. The relevant Intelligence Service must then task the technical team[s] responsible for Retention and Deletion with a view to ensuring that any retained data is destroyed and notify the Interception of Communications Commissioner accordingly. Confirmation of completed deletion must be recorded with the relevant Information Governance/Compliance team.

[REDACTED]

4.3.15 All records of searches and queries, together with the accompanying N&P statements, are centrally logged and are subject to periodic audits of their legitimacy and adequacy. Records relating to section 94 data and related communications data may be inspected by the Interception of Communications Commissioner.

4.4 Authorisation of Disclosure

4.4.1 Where the results of analysing section 94 data are disclosed to partner or customer organisations, this must be done via standard intelligence reporting mechanisms, which ensure that GCHQ intelligence is released in a secure, accountable and legally compliant manner.

4.4.2 If disclosure of a complete section 94 dataset, or a substantial part of it, to a partner organisation is contemplated, whether at GCHQ's or the partner's initiative, the procedures below must be followed.

4.4.3 If the proposed recipient of the dataset is another SIA Agency, that Agency will (as with any other operational data) formally request transfer of the data via the "Inter-Agency Sharing" (IAS) process. As with authorisation to acquire section 94 data, this disclosure request will be considered and authorised (or rejected) by the relevant GCHQ senior officials. The Authoriser's decision and the reasons for it will be recorded on the IAS form.

[REDACTED]

4.4.6 All requests for authorisation to disclose must provide a persuasive justification for the proposed disclosure, in terms of:

- its necessity and proportionality, and
- the intelligence benefit or other operational benefit that is expected to accrue to GCHQ and the UK from the disclosure.

4.4.7 The Authoriser will consider:

- the content of the dataset; the nature of any personal information it contains, its intrusiveness and sensitivity;
- the nature and extent of the corporate risk the disclosure would entail;
- the necessity and proportionality of the disclosure, including whether it is genuinely necessary and proportionate to disclose the whole dataset, or whether a subset will meet the need;
- whether any caveats or restrictions should be applied; and
- the receiving organisation's arrangements for safeguarding, using and deleting the data – GCHQ will seek additional reassurances from the receiving organisation in this regard, if the Authoriser deems it necessary.

[REDACTED]

4.5 Data Retention, Review and Deletion

[REDACTED]

4.5.3 A Review Panel conducts a comprehensive review of GCHQ's section 94 data, and of the directions used to acquire the data, at six-monthly intervals. The review determines

[REDACTED]

