



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 100386E  
12 September 2018

SCARLET KIM  
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL  
62 BRITTON STREET  
LONDON EC1M 5UY  
GBR

Dear Ms. Kim:

This further responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 13 December 2016 for "access to records relating to the British-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement (now known as the "UKUSA Agreement")." There are no assessable fees for this request.

This is our fifth production in this case. Your request has been processed under the FOIA and four responsive documents are enclosed. The documents total 162 pages and are annotated as NSA FOIA Case 100386 pages 00268 - 00429. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures and 10 documents (64 pages) have been withheld in their entirety.

The withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (b) for foreign government information, (c) for intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, and/or (d) for foreign relations or activities of the U.S., of Section 1.4 and remains classified up to the TOP SECRET level as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security and because of potential harm to our foreign relationships. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).


In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by

FOIA Case: 100386E

statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605).

Please be advised that we continue to work on your request and the review of additional documents responsive to your request, per previous agreement, continues. Documents will be provided on a rolling basis as they are completed.

Sincerely,




*for*

JOHN R. CHAPMAN  
Chief, FOIA/PA Office  
NSA Initial Denial Authority

Encls:  
a/s

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FOI \* 61269 \*

TO DIR	EXREG CONTRC		KCC CONTROL NUMBER
THRU D/DIR, E/DIR, DDP	ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION		EXREG SUSPENSE KCC SUSPENSE ELEMENT SUSPENSE
SUBJECT DIR Desk Note to A/DCP on PM Blair/President Clinton Meeting (TS)			

DISTRIBUTION  
DDI, DDP, DDT, DDO, DDS, N5, N5F, ExReg

SUMMARY

(FOUO) The attached note is at the request of the DIR for background information on the U.S./UK Cryptologic relationship to be forwarded to President Clinton in advance of a 29 May 97 meeting with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.

*BAM has seen & concurs.  
DI provided input.*



This correspondence may be downgraded to: FOUO upon removal of the enclosure(s).

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-11-2018, FOIA Litigation Case #100386

COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE	OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE	
N5	(fu)					
ORIGINATOR	CDO UK	ORG. N5F	PHONE (Secure) 963-3745	DATE PREPARED 5/14/97		

FORM A6796 REV NOV 95 (Supersedes A6796 FEB 94 which is obsolete) NSN: 7540-FM-001-5465

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 123-2; 3Sep91  
Declassify On: OADR; 3Sep91

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
~~TOP SECRET FOUO~~ Case #100386 Page 00268

~~TOP SECRET~~



DIRECTOR

19 May 1997

TO: A/D *Spri*  
SUBJ: Background for President Clinton Meeting with PM Blair (U)

(U) The Director of GCHQ, David Omand, will be briefing UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on the US/UK Cryptologic relationship in preparation for an upcoming session between Blair and President Clinton. The two leaders are scheduled to meet on 29 May in The Hague after the EU/US summit. We offer the attached paper as background for the President's session with the Prime Minister.

*YR*  
*Ken*

KENNETH A. MINIHAN  
Lieutenant General, USAF

cc: EXDIR/CIA  
EXDIR/ICA  
ADC/MS

*Bow*  
*U mentioned U would send background you could use to allow Omand to respond to Blair's questions. David Omand will provide Blair.*

THIS CORRESPONDENCE MAY BE  
DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
THE ENCLOSURE(S).

DERIVED FROM: NSA C33M 123.2  
Dated 3 Sept. 1997  
DECLASSIFY ON: "OADR"  
Date of Source 3 Sept. 1997

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

Background (U)

~~(FOUO)~~ **The U.S.-UK Cryptologic relationship is the oldest and most productive of NSA's foreign partnerships.** It is based on a formal "UKUSA Agreement," which was signed in 1946, and includes numerous supporting agreements signed over the years with NSA's counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This agreement is the basis for comprehensive cooperation on SIGINT and, to a lesser extent, INFOSEC activities. The U.S.-UK Cryptologic Relationship will continue to be broad and deep well into the 21st Century.

Key Elements of Cryptologic Relations (U)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~(TS-CCO)~~ **Under the UKUSA Agreement, each side agrees to share all SIGINT-related information;** the exchange is unrestricted except for those areas that are specifically excluded (e.g. U.S. ONLY information) at the request of either party.

[Redacted]

~~(TS-CCO)~~ **NSA's and GCHQ's intelligence priorities are largely convergent and GCHQ's SIGINT collection and processing capabilities often complement our own.** One vibrant example is

[Redacted]

[Redacted] They have agreed to continue this participation in future, and are currently making arrangements with their government to do so. GCHQ offers resources for advanced collection, processing, and analysis efforts. Some GCHQ [Redacted] exist solely to satisfy NSA tasking. NSA and GCHQ jointly address collection plans to reduce duplication and maximize coverage through joint sites and cross-tasking, despite site closures.

~~(C)~~ **The cryptomathematics exchange with GCHQ is at the heart of our INFOSEC relationship.** GCHQ is NSA's only peer in the field of cryptomathematics and virtually all major advances within the field of cryptography have occurred as a result of our mutual sharing. We enjoy a mutually beneficial exchange at the highest technical level in the design and evaluation of cryptoalgorithms. As NSA supports U.S. Government efforts towards achieving a secure global information infrastructure, GCHQ stands as our most influential foreign partner in advancing INFOSEC policies in the international arena.

~~Handle Via COMINT Channels Only~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Telephone  
EXECUTIVE 1940



BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION  
MAIN NAVY BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MCF.3590.

9th December, 1953.

Captain L.H. Frost,  
National Security Agency,

For some time G.C.H.Q. have made it a practice to use correctly the terms "British" and "United Kingdom". Strictly, therefore, "BRUSA" should be replaced by "UKUSA" and in September last I sought, through you, General Canine's agreement to the introduction of "UKUSA".

I now enclose copy of a minute, D/6202 of 17th November, which my Director has issued to Heads of Departments at G.C.H.Q. and to the Liaison Officer at Ottawa.

  
.....  
John H. Tiltman, Brigadier.

Encl: D/6202.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D/6202.

17th November, 1953.

## TERMINOLOGY - COMMONWEALTH SIGINT CENTRES.

I recently addressed the following to SLO Washington:-

"You are aware that in the past we have often rather loosely used "British" when we ought to have used "United Kingdom (or U.K.)" and that similarly, we have on occasions referred to G.B. and D.S.B. as "Commonwealth Centres" when we ought to have referred to them as "other Commonwealth Centres".

We have recently drilled ourselves out of these errors apart perhaps from occasional lapses, but there remains the well-worn and well-respected term "BRUSA". Mainly as an earnest of our good intentions in our behaviour towards other Commonwealth Sigint authorities, but partly also in the interests of correctness, I should like to start replacing "BRUSA" with "UKUSA" when we mean things involving U.K. and U.S.A., of. "CANUSA". I have hesitated whether to regard such a change as trivial and not worth while but have finally concluded that all things considered it ought on balance to be made.

I do not propose any formal step with U.S. authorities but should like to know whether Director N.S.A. would co-operate in my aim. If so I would propose to issue a note here and send you a copy for him.

Please let me know in due course."

2. Director N.S.A. has agreed. We should therefore now change our habit accordingly.



Director.

Distribution

As for GOIs. Internal distribution  
plus SLO and UKLO.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA Ltr. 2-5-86  
By DEB HLT Date 2-11-86

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of War  
The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorized to direct the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.

HARRY TRUMAN

12 Seal 1975

(S) (U)  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3(h) and (i)  
June 3 '75

Approved for Release by NSA on  
09-11-2018, FOIA Litigation  
Case #100386



~~SECRET~~  
Deputy Director  
for  
Plans and Policy

28 AUG 1985

TO: DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: GCHQ Goals and Objectives

I have attached for your information a copy of the current GCHQ goals and objectives which were provided to us by SUSLOL. You may disseminate this material within your organization as you feel appropriate.

  
GERALD R. YOUNG

Encl:  
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

- DDA
- DDC
- DDO
- DDPP
- DDR
- DDT
- ADIL
- ADT
- ADCS

- cc: DIR
- D/DIR
- C/S
- GC
- IG
- Q3
- Q31

Correspondence may be  
declassified upon  
removal of enclosures

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36



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(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-E.O. 13526

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(b) (3) -E.O. 13526

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

DATE: 19 January 1984

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DDA

SUBJECT: UKUSA Goals and Objectives

TO: DDPP

1. (U) Reference your memorandum, Serial: DDPP-467-83, same subject, dated 30 December 1983, and the enclosure thereto.

2. (S) We do not have any specific comments on the Goals and Objectives contained in the enclosure. We do, however, recommend inclusion of the attached Goal and Objectives dealing with common security concerns and interests. If included, further recommend the attached be listed as Goal X, the rationale being that a broad security goal should precede the more specialized COMSEC/COMPUSEC Goals.

*Louis J. Bonanni*

LOUIS J. BONANNI  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

Encl:  
a/s

cc: M5

Copy to: Q1  
Q3 ←

~~DOWNWARD TO SECRET~~  
~~UPWARD TO SECRET~~  
~~ALL INFORMATION ARE REMOVED~~

~~LAND AND AIR CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-114

NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00289



GOAL X:

Expansion of security cooperation and information exchange to develop/optimize security programs and countermeasures of mutual concern.

OBJECTIVES:

A. Continue and expand exchange of information on personnel security countermeasures, standards and procedures, including: information on polygraph application and experience, adjudication policies/techniques.

B. Obtain timely and reliable data, through efficient collection and other source tasking, on the personnel, physical and technical security threats posed by hostile intelligence capabilities/intentions.

C. Increase coordination and cooperation in the development of physical security procedures, standards and countermeasures.

D. Study and monitor actual/potential terrorist threats to operations and personnel; develop terrorism countermeasures of mutual value.

E. Share security education ideas and techniques.

DIRECTORATE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

*GCHQ List of Plans and Activities  
tied to Goals + Objectives - Sept 1984*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL VII

Third Party SIGINT relationships which optimise their contribution to UKUSA.

OBJECTIVE A

[Redacted]

RELEVANT PLANS AND ACTIONS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

28 Attachment to P/0881PP/8000/5

GOAL VII

Third Party SIGINT relationships which optimise their contribution to UKUSA.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

OBJECTIVE B

[Redacted]

RELEVANT PLANS AND ACTIONS

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL VII

Third Party SIGINT relationships which optimise their contribution to UKUSA.

OBJECTIVE C

[Redacted]

RELEVANT PLANS AND ACTIONS

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

30

Attachment to P/0881PP/8000/5


GOAL VII

Third Party SIGINT relationships which optimise their contribution to UKUSA.

OBJECTIVE D



RELEVANT PLANS AND ACTIONS



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

D41 copy  
D417  
FILE

ACTING CHIEF  
POLICY COORDINATION STAFF

31 October 1972

Dr. Tordella

You may be interested in a quick review of the attached produced by Fred Griffin with Cal's help.

D. D. CROSKERY

Incl:  
a/s

Dayf: INW  
I'd like to have this original back on about 5-6 Dec.  
Thanks.  
This has been done.  
D. D. Croskery  
12/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO: Mr. Harold H. Callahan  
NSAFM, D4

SC-11478/72

FROM: Mr. Fred Griffin

30 October 1972

*Cal: This is the little package I finally  
came up with. There's no news in it for  
you, but I thought you might want  
it for ready reference. Thanks for finding  
the documents for me.*

*Fred*

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

**WARNING**

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

**THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES**

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

SC-11478/72

27 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Historical Note on the UKUSA COMINT Agreement

1. The question occasionally arises as to the governmental levels at which the UKUSA COMINT Agreement was authorized or approved. The attached documents show that the President of the United States authorized an agreement in this field, and that the British Foreign Minister must have been aware of it.

2. Attachment A is a copy of a Presidential Memorandum, dated 12 September 1945, authorizing the continuation of wartime U.S.-British "collaboration in the field of communication intelligence."

3. Attachment B is a copy of an 8 February 1946 page from the notebook which formed the principal basis for the published Diaries of the late Secretary of Defense Forrestal. The account of the meeting contained in this excerpt shows the high levels of the U.S. at which the Agreement was considered, and suggests that Secretary of State Byrnes had discussed the matter with British Foreign Minister Bevin.

4. Attachment C is a copy of the account of the above-mentioned meeting as it appeared in the published Diaries. At the request of the Department of Defense, the editors deleted all references to communications intelligence and Sir Edward Travis. They developed an innocent introductory sentence, omitted the first paragraph, and changed the subtitle from "Communications Intelligence" to "Meeting." (Not pertinent to this discussion, but of some editorial interest, is the deletion of "not" from the sixth line of the original notebook.)

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY 000829

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

-2-

5. The UKUSA Agreement was ultimately signed on 5 March 1946 by Col. Patrick Marr-Johnson, British Army General Staff, for and in behalf of the London Signal Intelligence Board (LSIB), and by Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, GSC, Senior Member, for and in behalf of the State-Army-Navy Communications Board (STANCIB). The parties to the Agreement are described as STANCIB, "(representing the U. S., State, Navy, and War Departments and all other U. S. Communication Intelligence authorities which may function)" and LSIB "(representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, and all other British Empire Communication Intelligence authorities which may function)."

6. Obviously, these parties and signatories were themselves hardly operating at a lofty diplomatic level; however, the documents contained in the Attachments show that they were not working unilaterally or without authority and approval at the highest levels.

(signed) Fred Griffin  
 FRED GRIFFIN  
 Historical Officer  
 Division D

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

*F*  
*CDO U.K.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RAPPORT~~

*3/13/93*  
*11501*  
*has cy.*

DIRECTOR OF POLICY

12 JUL 1993

TO: DDP

THRU: A/DDP\_\_\_\_, N5\_\_\_\_

SUBJ: GCHQ and Policy Implications  
- INFORMATION NOTE

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

1. ~~(S-CCO-NOFORN)~~ You raised a question in the attached E-mail exchange over possible policy implications... Assuming the venture is a cooperative one out of the [redacted] [redacted] We would want to vet any technology GCHQ shares [redacted] and to ensure that a proper division of effort exists between ourselves and GCHQ. [redacted]

2. ~~(TS-CCO-RAPPORT-NOFORN)~~ That said, your question raises a more fundamental issue for consideration, i.e. is the UKUSA [redacted] We have engaged [redacted] to do some [redacted] work and have elected [redacted] We also remain very chary about

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~REPORT~~

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

In contrast, your recent exchange with [Redacted] suggests their willingness to continue to [Redacted]

[Redacted] and GCHQ still makes significant contributions to many of our sensitive activities (in addition to their [Redacted] expertise).

3. ~~(TS NOFORN)~~ [Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Large Redacted Block]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

cc: C/N52

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum  
W045 ACTION 0034-94

DATE: 31 January 1994

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: W045

SUBJECT: NSA Intelligence Exchange with GCHQ ~~(S-NF)~~ - ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: DISTRIBUTION

REF: W045-1054-93, dated 22 November 1993

1. ~~(S-CCO-NF)~~ Based on your input to the above-referenced action and in response to several foreign relations reviews that are currently underway, N52, through DDO, has requested input in their attachment B table format on the NSA Intelligence Exchange with GCHQ. The format is similar to that provided for the 1987 DCI-directed study of SIGINT Relationships with the United Kingdom. A copy of the W input to that study, although somewhat outdated, is attached, as is W's input to P044-142-93, Review of US-UK Exchange Agreement.

2. ~~(S-CCO)~~ In filling out the table, please note that the format for presenting the information denotes two categories: 1) by country, and (2) by topic, as specified in their attachment C. Under type of agreement, use MOU, MOA, DOE, etc., and if you have a copy of the agreement, please provide it to W045. Also provide a POC and the rationale for not providing something both currently and in the future. Please provide all information in bullet form.

3. ~~(S-CCO-NF)~~ Please be extremely sensitive to the fact that NSA is conducting this review and that it is NOFORN. In order to compile the W Group response, input should be given via email to Judy Ward, W045, 963-3401s NLT 17 February 1994.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



CHIEF W045

Encl: a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

- W042 CCRC
- W1
- W2
- W3
- W4

~~COMGRADE TO SECRET HVCCO NOFORN~~  
~~UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE AND~~  
~~PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF COVER~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~  
~~HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
(GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-114 (COMPUTER FACSIMILE))

NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00302

W045

**OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE REGISTRY (DOR)**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION		NUMBER 1-	ORIGINATOR NS2
SUBJECT <i>Review of UKUSA Exchange Agreement</i>		DATE(S) RECEIVED <i>1/27 1/31/94</i>	EXT. CONTROL # <i>NS2-015-94</i>
ACTION TO <i>P04</i>	COPIES TO <i>A, B, G, W, Z</i>	SUSPENSE <i>22 FEB 94</i>	

**DDO ACTION REQUIRED**

SIGNATURE     DECISION     COORDINATION     INITIALS

DDO	
ADDO	
ADDO (MA)	

ACTION OFFICER/ORG/EXTENSION		DATE RECEIVED BY ACTION OFFICER
ACTION TAKEN <input type="checkbox"/> VERBAL <input type="checkbox"/> E-MAIL <input type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN		DATE COMPLETED BY ACTION OFFICER
INTERIM RESPONSE		NO ACTION/RESPONSE REQUIRED
FINAL RESPONSE		ACTION TRANSFERRED TO _____ DATE _____

**NOTE:** This slip must be appended to the completed action and returned to the DOR for review, logging, and forwarding.

DDO

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## memorandum

DATE: 25 January 1994 N52-015-94

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: N52

SUBJECT: Review of UKUSA Exchange Agreement ~~(S-CCO)~~ - ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: DISTRIBUTION

1. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ Request your support in reviewing the UKUSA Exchange Agreement. This information will satisfy the foreign reviews and audits currently underway with Congressional, DoD, and GAO staffs, in addition to providing a comprehensive study of current exchange policies with GCHQ.

2. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ In Nov 1993, DDO initiated an operational review of the UKUSA Exchange Agreement to include a list of what is not currently exchanged with the British, what we should not exchange in the future, and new things that should be exchanged in the future. Attached is a copy of the memo asking each DDO Group to review the agreement (ref Attachment A).

3. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ In Dec 1993, the Country Desk Officer (CDO) for the United Kingdom met with DDO, DDT, and DDI staff elements to discuss the aforementioned effort and explain that N52 was trying to satisfy external audits and reviews of UKUSA as well. Everyone agreed that a full Agency review would be appropriate in light of the complexities involved in providing a full picture of the exchange. By combining efforts, we could eliminate duplication and provide a more comprehensive paper that could be easily updated on a routine basis.

4. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ Attachment B provides a format for presenting the information, denoting 2 categories: (1) by country, and (2) by topic (ref Attachment C for list of topics). For each country and topic, identify exactly what is exchanged in terms of raw traffic, product and technical reports,  technology, etcetera. A similar report was prepared by DDO in 1987 to satisfy a DCI-Directed Study of the US-UK SIGINT relationship; if each group can find their submission to this study, it would make an excellent basis for the working levels to input into Attachment B.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Classified By NSA/CSSM 123-2  
Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required

~~NOFORN~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~~~SECRET~~

NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00304

~~SECRET~~

NS2-015-94

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

5. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ Where possible, request copies of any Memorandums of Understanding or Divisions of Effort between NSA and GCHQ be provided in support of the exchanges [redacted] [redacted] Compartmented exchanges should be included in an annex and referenced as such in its associated country or topic (e.g., [redacted]). Please provide information in an ASCII format so the data can be transferred into a spreadsheet format.

6. ~~(C-CCO/NF)~~ We anticipate periodic meetings to discuss the status as necessary. Given the multiple requirements to respond to Congressional, DoD, and GAO audits, we need your input by 19 Feb 1994. Please direct any questions on this request to [redacted] or [redacted] at 963-3745s.

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

JOHN W. DIRKS  
Director of Foreign Relations

Encls:  
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

DDO  
DDT  
DDI

CC: DDP  
SUSLOL  
N5  
A044  
B042  
G04/FRO  
W045  
Z092  
P044  
T091  
I11

~~NOFORN~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

~~SECRET~~



AK

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

DATE: 18 November 1993

P044-142-93

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: P044

SUBJECT: Review of US-UK Exchange Agreement- ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: DISTRIBUTION

1. ~~(S-CCO/NF)~~ The DDO has tasked the P04 staff to review the US-UK Exchange Agreement. Aware that a) no single document exists in sufficient detail to serve as such an agreement, and that b) to list what IS shared would be extremely expensive in terms of required man-hours, P04 has decided to break the task into three parts:

- Part A: List in sufficient detail those things that are not (to the best of your knowledge) exchanged with the UK today.
- Part B: List in sufficient detail those things that managers and senior technical experts believe may well need to be altered or declared unexchangeable in the near future (5 - 8 years out or less) given certain assumptions about developments affecting US-UK relations. Include an "expert" (manager) POC for each item and 2-3 sentences describing the assumption leading to an alteration or denial of the currently exchangeable subject matter. Inputs should be made in ASCII format on a floppy disk.
- Part C: List those new things that should be exchanged with the UK in the future. Include an "expert" (manager) POC for each item and 2-3 sentences describing the assumption leading to proposed exchange. Inputs should be made in ASCII format on a floppy disk.

2. (U) Task Timeline:

- By Mid-November -- send copy of task to each of the Group Chiefs, and Chiefs P04/P05.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-104

U.S.G.P.O.: 1988 - 201-705-5073  
(COMPUTER FACSIMILE)

~~SECRET~~

- By 30 November -- meet with each of the Group Chiefs for 15 minutes to clarify and answer questions.
- By 15 January 1994 -- firm suspense. All inputs to P0442 for integration and publication.
- By 30 January 1994 -- P044 publishes final report for very restricted distribution.

3. (U) P044 Points of Contact for inputs are [redacted] P0441, 1569s, and/or [redacted] P0442, 4229s.

[redacted]

Chief, P044

DISTRIBUTION:

- Chief A
- Chief B
- Chief C
- Chief W
- Chief Z
- Chief P04
- Chief P05

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- cc: ADDO  
 ADDO (MA)  
 DCN  
 P0441  
 P0442  
 P0443  
 P0443 [redacted]

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~      ~~NOFORN~~

COUNTRY/TOPIC: \_\_\_\_\_

NSA INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE WITH GCHQ

	CURRENT		NEAR FUTURE - NLT YEAR 2000	
TYPE OF AGREEMENT	WHAT WE RECEIVE	WHAT WE DO NOT PROVIDE (include POC & rationale)	WHAT WE SHOULD PROVIDE	WHAT WE SHOULD NOT PROVIDE (include POC & rationale)

~~SECRET~~


N52-015-94

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

ATTACHMENT C

*US Foreign Intelligence  
Requirements Categories and Priorities*

UKUSA REVIEW TOPICS




~~NOFORN~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

N52-015-94



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~NOFORN~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

~~SECRET~~

Doc ID: 6635988 [redacted] Tue Feb 22 12:46:24 1994

Sender: [redacted]  
Reply-To: [redacted]  
X-Mailer: InterCon TCP/Connect 1.1.2  
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 12:46:01 -0500  
From: [redacted] (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: CRCC / ACRO Relationship  
Content-Length: 390

[redacted] - The CRCC has established a working relationship with the UKLO  
Advanced  
Collection Requirements Organization (ACRO). [redacted] Chief ACRO,  
has agreed to pass all [redacted] requirements (non-time critical) to the CRCC  
for  
W Group review. The CRCC has agreed to do the same with all W Group (non-  
time critical) requirements.

If you need more info, please let me know. [redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

DATE: 30 December 1983

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DDPP

Serial: DDPP-467-83

Q11, 1121s

SUBJECT: UKUSA Joint Goals and Objectives

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

TO: DISTRIBUTION (SRB Membership)

1. (S) I enclose for your review, the proposed set of joint UKUSA Goals and Objectives which were negotiated in London on 6 and 7 December. We also developed a covering memorandum which clarifies points of mutual interest, especially support to military commanders. We endeavored to develop and state those Goals and Objectives which are of mutual benefit and would enhance our joint capabilities. Objectives of singular national interest or purpose were excluded.

2. (S) The proposed UKUSA Goals and Objectives are being offered for review by NSA and GCHQ corporate management. Request your comments and/or concurrence no later than 18 January 1984. It is my intention to provide a staffed set of UKUSA Goals and Objectives for the Director's approval upon his return to NSA on 24 January.



P. W. DILLINGHAM, JR.  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Deputy Director  
for  
Plans and Policy

Encl:  
a/s

DISTRIBUTION

DIR            DDT  
D/DIR        DDX  
DDA           ADIL  
DDC           ADT  
DDO           Ch, C  
DDP           CC  
DDPR        IG  
DDR

~~Classified By NSA/CSSM 123-2~~  
~~Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required~~

~~DOWNGRADE TO Secret      HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~  
~~UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES    HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

**SECRET**

NSA FOIA CASE 100386 Page 00312  
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-114

from: Sir Mervyn - Director of Plans

DICK WLL



~~SECRET~~

Government Communications Headquarters

Oakley Cheltenham Glos GL52 5AJ

Telephone Cheltenham 21491 ext 2828

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

D/8307DQ/1404/41

14 December 1983

Rear Admiral P W Dillingham, JR  
DDPP  
NSA

*Dear Pat,*

UKUSA GOALS & OBJECTIVES

1. I attach (4 copies) of the final draft version of the UKUSA Goals and Objectives, together with a covering minute, which emerged from our joint endeavours at Palmer Street last week. You will see there are three main changes to the draft we considered together in my office on Friday:-

- a. The NSA amendments to the covering note have been incorporated and in particular, with the assistance of SUSLO, paragraph 3. has been substantially expanded to reflect the full flavour of our discussion on this issue.
- b. Roman Numerals have been used to designate Goals and Alphabetic capitals to designate Objectives.
- c. The sequence of Goals has been re-ordered to give prominence to the essentials of the UKUSA relationship as Goal I and the COMSEC/COMPUSEC Goals grouped together at the end of the list.

2. I will now set in train the process of securing the concurrence of the GCHQ top management and Director GCHQ in the attachments to this letter as I know you intend to do reciprocally on your side. Once this process has been completed, we shall be in good shape for further consideration and progress at the April Planning Conference.

3. May I repeat here what I said at the conclusion of our Palmer Street sessions. The fact that we discharged our remit both comprehensively and on schedule was gratifying enough in itself; that we were able to do so in so co-operative, not to say convivial, spirit made it a doubly worthwhile and memorable occasion. Our best wishes to [redacted] and [redacted]

4. I am dropping copies of this letter and the attachments to [redacted] and [redacted]

*Yours ever,*

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

ENCLs.



~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


D/3401GS/1404/41

14 December 1983

UKUSA JOINT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

- References: a. D/8101DQ/1404/41 of 15 November 1983 (from Director GCHQ to Director NSA).
- b. Letter of 23 November 1983 (from DDPP NSA to DP GCHQ).

1. A meeting was held at GCHQ, Palmer Street, on 6 and 7 December 1983 to consider the GCHQ and NSA first drafts of Joint NSA/GCHQ Goals and Objectives (attachments to references a. and b. respectively) with the aim of producing an agreed single set. The 2 Agencies were represented as follows:



2. It was agreed that the principal objective of the meeting was to produce a common set of joint Goals and Objectives for Directors NSA and GCHQ. Production of UKUSA Goals and Objectives is seen as a focal point to strengthen the NSA/GCHQ relationship. The next stage of development would be at the UKUSA Planning Conference in April 1984 where Goals and Objectives would be a specific Agenda item. The question was raised of whether the Planning Conference, as a Sigint forum, could discuss the purely COMSEC/COMPUSEC items [ ]

[ ] It was concluded that the appropriate forum should be decided by DDC and DC in the course of future discussions. It was agreed that this limitation would not exist in the formulation of the Goals and Objectives.

3. Support to military commanders was discussed as an issue of critical importance both in its own right and as an area where a joint UKUSA approach to Goals and Objectives and to subsequent planning and coordination was essential. There was some clarification of the terms 'strategic', 'tactical' and 'localised' as used in the drafts and the differences between the roles of NSA and GCHQ in relation to their respective tactical Sigint assets that led to different terms being used. It was accepted that 'tactical' in the NSA draft equated to 'localised' in the GCHQ draft. Several instances, UK and US, were discussed which demonstrated the essential interplay between strategic and localised support. It was recognised that the aim should be to create a transparent system/mechanism which would enable information from whatever source, US or UK, strategic or tactical, to be disseminated to all users including force commanders as quickly and directly as possible. This would call for a clear understanding of tactical user needs, use of common terminology, compatibility of data formats and equipment and provision of requisite communications facilities.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

2

D/3401GS/1404/41

4. The meeting went on to carry out a detailed examination of the 2 drafts. It was agreed that Goals and Objectives which were national in character, and not appropriate for joint action, would be set aside. The Objectives were worded as action statements to support their respective Goals. COMSEC and COMPUSEC Goals were also developed and included with those Sigint. The agreed single version of Goals and Objectives forms the attachment to the present record.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL I:

A cooperative relationship which maximises the jointness of UKUSA current and future efforts while preserving the essential national characteristics.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ NSA FOIA Case 190386 Page 00316


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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL II:

A SIGINT capability which ensures strategic warning, limits surprise and develops timely information on international activities inimical to the interests of UKUSA.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~  
NSA FOIA Case #00386 Page 00317

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

3

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL III:

SIGINT support responsive to UK, US and Allied national-level and localised (such as tactical) requirements in which all users have confidence.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00318

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


4

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL IV:

A flexible and efficient UKUSA collection and processing capability able to respond to changes in requirement and target.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798  
 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00319  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

5

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL V:

Readability upon demand of a higher proportion than in the early 1980's of all foreign cryptographic systems and of certain foreign computer systems.

OBJECTIVES:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798  
 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ NSA FOIA Case 100886 Page 00320

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

6 Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL VI:

A UKUSA SIGINT information dissemination process which meets customer requirements while maintaining production and processing security and the need-to-know principle.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~  
NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00321



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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


7

Attachment to D/3385GS/8000/5

GOAL VII:

Third Party SIGINT relationships which optimise their contribution to UKUSA.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL VIII:

A survivable UKUSA cryptologic capability to ensure at least minimum support to agreed appropriate Government authorities in any foreseeable contingency.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL IX:

A contribution from the R & D and Engineering organisations which maximizes the realisation of UKUSA goals.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

10

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL X:

[Redacted]

OBJECTIVES:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

C. Develop a threat-related policy for meeting requirements for the protection of sensitive, but unclassified US and UK information, aiming for adequate protection [Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00325


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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

GOAL XI:

An effective COMSEC program that secures classified information, protects unclassified sensitive information and is responsive to the needs of UKUSA and the Allies.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ NSR FOIA Case 100286 Page 00326

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
12

Attachment to D/3401GS/1404/41

GOAL XII:

An effective COMPUSEC programme that protects sensitive information in computers and is responsive to the needs of UKUSA and Allies.

OBJECTIVES:



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DDPP [redacted] 17 Sec W #

I asked [redacted] (James Suklo and Z) to research the Commonwealth issue for me.

You may find this useful some time.

Don't you just love "annexure"?

[redacted]

DDPP [redacted] J/12/12

ADDDP H/O

copies to Q3/24 of all this plus [redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

Attachment to: J/1660JP/8013/4

Who signed what?

1. The UKUSA agreement was signed for the UK and the U.S. on 5 March 1946.
2. A Commonwealth conference (UK/CAN.AUS/NZ) held in February/March 1946 served to make CAN/AUS/NZ aware in broad terms of the agreement and of how CAN/AUS/NZ were seen as fitting into the scheme of things (benefits and obligations). A record agreed by the participants was produced; it was intended that it should be ratified by the Governments of those participating; some never got round to it, but all complied with it thereafter.
3. Canada had, from the outset, been accepted as having, by reason of geography, a special position. This was acknowledged in Clause 6 of the UKUSA agreement. Canada had probably hoped to be a third signatory of the UKUSA agreement: this had not happened, and by 1947 they were pressing the U.S. to conclude a CANUSA agreement within the framework of North American Defence arrangements (in addition to their already accepted position as one of the participating Dominions). The text of the UKUSA agreement was not provided to the Canadians, but it was clearly used by the U.S. as a model for the CANUSA agreement. The latter was sent in draft to LSIB in April 1949 by the U.S. and Canada jointly. The latter was sent in draft to LSIB in April 1949 by the U.S. and Canada jointly. The main difference as against the UKUSA agreement lay in the principles governing exchange (more limiting in the CANUSA case). LSIB saw no objection to the draft, and a final version was presumably signed in 1949.
4. The U.S. from early on had not been happy about the looseness of the definition of the position of the Dominions, particularly in terms of how they had access to what. In response to this unease a late 1947 UK/U.S. conference produced findings which became Appendix J to the UKUSA agreement, formally adopted in January 1948.
5. The first tripartite conference (UK/US/DSB) was held in September 1953. As a result, the UK and U.S. revised Appendix J, and an Annexure (J1) was added which summarised the conclusions of the conference. The final version came into force as a UK/U.S. document on 4 August 1955. It was then sent for information to CAN/AUS/NZ and the last two were asked to subscribe to Annexure J1, which would thus become a formal agreement for them. This they did, NZ in January 1956 and Australia in May 1956. (NB: Appendix J was revised again in 1961). (NB: of course DSB was at that time the F.E. Commonwealth Centre involving UK/AUS/NZ, not an AUS centre).

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~



DIRECTOR OF PLANS

3 November 1983

TO: DDPP

SUBJECT: UKUSA Goals and Objectives

Attached for your information and review is a paper provided to me last evening by [redacted]. A copy has formally been provided to the DIR. It attempts to provide the GCHQ response to the generation of common UKUSA Goals and Objectives. Interestingly, in our discussion, [redacted] did not recognize that the set of Goals and Objectives that we had provided to them was intended to be just that, rather than simple statements of subjects. Accordingly, I assume that we had not intended to develop anything further to send over in advance of the meeting but, rather, use what has been done to generate something at the table.


(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*True (8)*



Encl:  
a/s

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-11-2018, FOIA Litigation Case #100386





~~SECRET~~

Government Communications Headquarters

Oakley Cheltenham Glos GL52 5AJ

Telephone Cheltenham 21491 ext

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~ B/7906DQ/1404/41  
24 October 1983

Lieutenant General Lincoln D Faurer USAF  
Director  
National Security Agency  
Washington

References:

- a) GCHQ suggested subjects for use in developing UKUSA Goals and Objectives (attached to D/7754DQ/1404/41 of 5 October 1983)
- b) NSA suggested subjects for use in developing UKUSA Goals and Objectives (dated 29 September but available to GCHQ as Attachment A to SUSL0L-108-83 of 5 October)
- c) NSA's own Goals and Objectives (dated 13 May but available to GCHQ as attachments to SUSL0L-102-83 of 5 August)

We are now engaged, in GCHQ, in drawing up our first draft of UKUSA Goals and Objectives and we aim to get these to you by the middle of November. Before completing this draft, however, we thought that it would be a good idea to compare references (a) and (b) and reconcile those two lists if we could. Happily, I think that it is not too difficult a task, and I hope that you might find it useful for NSA to work from Attachment A to this letter as a consolidated list of subject headings for the G and O exercise. (Attachment B to this letter takes the original NSA list, reference (b), and shows how we perceive the relationship of that list to the GCHQ list).

2. As I see it, having finalised a set of UKUSA Goals and Objectives, we shall then be at a point when more specific sub-objectives will need to be evolved between us and when consideration will need to be given to what resources are or should be invested to achieve our mutually agreed Goals and Objectives. As part of this process a determination of priorities will then be required and I am sure you would agree that this will need to precede a decision by either or both of us actually to commit resources in fulfillment of a particular Goal. In a worst case (and I hope there will not be many of these), one or both of us may be compelled to conclude that, for the present at least, inadequate resources can be devoted to achieving a particular Goal or its associated Objectives. Such a conclusion would of course in no way affect the validity of that particular Goal, but would serve to guide us towards an eventual adjustment of resources.

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Attachment A to D/7906 DQ/1404/41

CONSOLIDATED NSA/GCHQ LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR DEVELOPING INTO UKUSA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

- A. SIGINT Warning Capability
- B. SIGINT Responsiveness to National Theatre and Tactical User Requirements
- C. SIGINT Collection
- D. SIGINT Data Handling
- E. SIGINT Cryptanalytic and Exploitation Capability
- F. SIGINT
- G. SIGINT Dissemination
- H. UKUSA Relationships with Second and Third Parties
- I.
- J. COMSEC/COMPUSEC Programs, Plans and Policy
- K. UKUSA Operation and Co-operation in war
- L. R/D/Engineering contributions to UKUSA SIGINT and COMSEC/CCMPUSEC
- M. Management of the UKUSA SIGINT and COMSEC Enterprises

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 796
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (a)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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Attachment B to D/7906DQ/1404/41

NSA'S SUGGESTED SUBJECTS FOR USE IN DEVELOPING UKUSA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, AND HOW THEY RELATE TO THE LIST AT ATTACHMENT A (BASED ON REFERENCE a.)

- A. Improve the connectivity, availability and survivability of the SI communications network, to include UKUSA data exchange networks. [see D of Attachment A]
- B. Enhance cryptologic capabilities stressing cryptanalytic research, with continued collaboration and sharing of results. [see E of Attachment A]
- C. Improve dissemination of SIGINT to users in peace and war in forms which are easy to use. [see (B and) G of Attachment A]
- D. Develop procedures to rapidly transition the SIGINT system from peace to war. [see K of Attachment A]
- E. Establish systematic bilateral reviews of ongoing programs to assure continued need and prevent unwitting duplication. [see M of Attachment A]
- F. Stimulate computer development to keep pace with processing needs. [see D, E and L of Attachment A]
- G. Refine probability-of-success assessment techniques to more accurately support predictive planning and programming. [see M of Attachment A]
- H. Fully utilize community technical assets in both nations through information sharing fora. [see L (and M) of Attachment A]

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~~SECRET~~~~HANDLE COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

Attachment B to D/7906DQ/1404/41

- I. Expand automatic selection, forwarding, and receipt of product. [see G of Attachment A]
- J. Develop a viable approach for automation that facilitates user selectivity. [not sure about this, but probably see G of Attachment A]
- K. Develop a strategy for COMSEC interoperability among allies. [see J of Attachment A]
- L. Establish a set of consistent COMSEC/COMPUSEC policies for UKUSA use. [see J of Attachment A]
- M. Develop a bilateral COMSEC assessment program. [see J of Attachment A]
- N. Develop a survivable UKUSA cryptologic system to ensure full support to NCAs under any contingency. [see (B and) K of Attachment A]
- O. Develop a method to collect and exploit  in the 1990s at a reasonable cost. [see C of Attachment A]
- P. Promote the development of Third Party SIGINT relationships to optimize their contributions to UKUSA interests, particularly contributions that bolster Third Party dependability and reduce unwarranted duplication with UKUSA efforts. [see H of Attachment A]
- Q. Consult on methods by which UKUSA may pace its collection and processing capabilities to the increasingly sophisticated demands of the signal environments of the future. [see C and M of Attachment A]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 792
(b) (3)-50 USC 2024 (i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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Attachment B to D/7906DQ/1404/41

R. View UKUSA national capabilities, and to the extent feasible the contributions of Third Parties, for the purpose of providing increased support to national and international (NATO) forces. [see G and K of Attachment A]

There are three items (A, F, I) in Attachment A which find no reflection in the above; all were inspired by NSA's own Goals and Objectives (reference c.).

A(warning) and I [redacted] are surely important Goals.

F [redacted] is rather specific to be a Goal and could be demoted to the status of an objective, but it is likely to be such an important activity that we would certainly be happy for it to be retained as a UKUSA Goal, just as it is an NSA Goal.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-13 USC 398  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3624 (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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**British Embassy**  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384  
Telex International 64224(WUI)/248308(RCA)/440015(ITT)  
Telephone (202) 462-1340

*h*  
D/DIRNSA

Your reference

Our reference


MOP/7091/57/2

Date

5 October 1983

UKUSA GOALS AND OBJECTIONS

1. Attached is a copy of a list of UKUSA Goals and Objections which GCHQ will shortly propose formally to NSA for discussion.
2. It is expected that Director GCHQ will propose to Director NSA that the Joint Working Group should meet in Cheltenham about mid November.



SUKLO

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*Copy to Exec  
G1  
SIC*

COPIES TO:

- DDPP
- Q1 EXEC
- Q3
- Q EXEC



SUGGESTED LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR DEVELOPING INTO UKUSA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

- A. SIGINT Warning Capability
- B. SIGINT Responsiveness to User Requirements
- C. SIGINT Collection
- D. SIGINT Data Handling System
- E. SIGINT Cryptographic Capability
- F. SIGINT
- G. SIGINT Dissemination
- H. UKUSA Relationships with Second and Third Parties
- I.
- J. COMSEC/COMPUSEC Programs, Plans and Policy
- K. UKUSA Co-operation in War
- L. R/D/Engineering contributions to UKUSA SIGINT and COMSEC/COMPUSEC
- M. UKUSA Management System

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

✓



**United Kingdom**

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

**Basis of Current Relationship:**

- Presidential authorization, 1945.
- UKUSA COMINT agreement of 1946, follow-on MOUs, DOEs, and policy statements.
- Wide ranging and extensive exchange in all areas.

**Sponsoring Agency:**

- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Its organization and duties are aligned very much like those of NSA. GCHQ is subordinate to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**Resources:**

[Redacted]

**Nature of Intelligence Exchanged:**

- Products of the following operations relating to foreign communications are exchanged:
  - Collection of traffic
  - Acquisition of communication documents and equipment
  - Traffic analysis
  - Cryptanalysis
  - [Redacted] translation.....
  - Acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment
- Information concerning methods and techniques involved in the above.
- The exchange is unrestricted on all work except that specifically excluded (NOFORN) at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. Exceptions are kept to a minimum.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

**Initiatives:**

[Redacted]

**Benefit to the US:**

- The UK has sites at strategic locations for collection that otherwise would be unavailable to the US.
- The relationship is virtually a full partnership, with combined working parties, joint operations, the exchange of liaison officers, and assignment of analysts to integrated billets.
- Combined US-UK planning and operations make the best of the resources of all parties.

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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

SSCI Questions for the Record - Question 54: United Kingdom

**Basis of Current Relationship:**

- Presidential authorization, 1945.
- UKUSA COMINT agreement of 1946, follow-on MOUs, DOEs, and policy statements.
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the sponsoring agency. Its organization and duties are aligned very much like those of NSA. GCHQ is subordinate to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- The exchange is wide ranging and extensive in all areas.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

**Resources/funding:**

- No direct monetary cost.

[Redacted]

**Staffing arrangements:**

[Redacted]

**Location and capabilities of sites:**

[Redacted]

**Nature of Intelligence Exchanged:**

- Products of the following operations relating to foreign communications are exchanged:
  - Collection of traffic
  - Acquisition of communication documents and equipment
  - Traffic analysis
  - Cryptanalysis
  - [Redacted] translation
  - Acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment
- Information concerning methods and techniques involved in the above.
- The exchange is unrestricted on all work except that specifically excluded (NOFORN) at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. Exceptions are kept to a minimum.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

- Current initiatives include:

[Redacted]

**Benefit to the US:**

- The UK has sites at strategic locations for collection that otherwise would be unavailable to the US.

- The relationship is virtually a full partnership, with combined working parties, joint operations, the exchange of liaison officers, and assignment of analysts to integrated billets.

- Combined US-UK planning and operations make the best of the resources of all parties.

- Continues to provide a comprehensive exchange of SIGINT which is still mutually beneficial.


[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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UK SIGINT SITES



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


*Due to GC 58  
ref to 1938, etc.,  
should we keep  
this in our  
historical file?  
yei*

\*\*\*\*\* ACTION \*\*\*\*\*  
DDPP  
\*\*\*\*\* INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
D/DIR C/S FILE DIR  
\*\*\*\*\* NOTE \*\*\*\*\*

ACTION CHANGED TO DDPP ON 25 FEB 86 //BW//  
\*\*\*\*\*  
ZCZCSMP6330MUA7048ZAA599  
RR YEKAAH  
DE YORNZK #0543 0560419  
ZNY MMNSH  
ZKZK RR XDD DE  
R 250215Z FEB 86

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



FM GCSB  
TO GCHQ  
DIRNSA  
INFO NZLO(W)  
ZEM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ COMINT CHANNELS

QQQQ  
GCHQ PERSONAL FOR SIR PETER MARYCHURCH  
DIRNSA PERSONAL FOR LT GEN W E ODOM  
CITE: DIR-011-86  
WW-035-86

SUBJ: UKUSA - 40TH ANNIVERSARY  
FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES I HAVE, COINCIDENTALLY, BEEN REVIEWING THE EARLY SIGINT EFFORT IN NEW ZEALAND AND I HAVE NOTED THAT A REQUEST FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IN 1938 SAW THE START OF SIGINT IN NEW ZEALAND IN PREPARATION FOR WORLD WAR II. DURING THE WAR YEARS THE NEW ZEALAND STATIONS, BOTH WITHIN NEW ZEALAND AND IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS. IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY APPROVED A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR-TIME EFFORT IN ASSOCIATION WITH OUR TWO MAJOR UKUSA PARTNERS (AND, OF COURSE, DSD AND CSE). WHILE THE NEW ZEALAND SIGINT EFFORT HAS EXTENDED OVER ALMOST 50 YEARS THE SCALE OF THIS EFFORT HAS, NEVER, UNTIL MORE RECENT TIMES, REACHED THE LEVEL OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF THOSE WHO HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO PLAY THEIR PART. BUT ANY SMALL PART THAT THE GCSB AND IT PREDECESSORS MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY HAS BEEN LARGELY DUE TO THE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT WHICH HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO US BY GCHQ AND NSA. THE GCSB HAS BEEN, AND IS, PROUD TO HAVE ENJOYED ITS CLOSE ASSOCIATION, BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL, WITH YOU BOTH. ON THE OCCASION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF UKUSA WE EXTEND TO YOU BOTH OUR CONGRATULATIONS FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PERSONAL FOR \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PERSONAL FOR \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

THROUGH THIS UNIQUE ASSOCIATION OVER THESE PAST 40 YEARS AND WE WISH  
YOU BOTH CONTINUING SUCCESS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

COLIN M HANSON  
DIRECTOR, GCSB  
#0543 NNNN

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PERSONAL FOR \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of War  
The Secretary of the Navy


The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorized to direct the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.

/s/ Harry S. Truman

12 September 1945

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

## BRITISH-U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

5 MARCH 1946

### OUTLINE OF

## BRITISH-U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement
2. Scope of the Agreement
3. Extent of the Agreement - Products
4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques
5. Third Parties to the Agreement
6. The Dominions
7. Channels between U.S. and British Empire Agencies
8. Dissemination and Security
9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial
10. Previous Agreements
11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement
12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

#### 1. Parties to the Agreement

The following agreement is made between the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (representing the U.S. State, Navy, and War Departments and all other U.S. Communication Intelligence (see footnote #1) authorities which may function) and the London Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, and all other British Empire (see footnote #2) Communication Intelligence authorities which may function).

#### 2. Scope of the Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication



Intelligence matters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence Agencies in both countries.

### 3. Extent of the Agreement - Products

a. The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications: (see footnote #3)

1. collection of traffic
2. acquisition of communication documents and equipment
3. traffic analysis
4. cryptanalysis
5. decryption and translation
6. acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment

b. Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

### 4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

- a. The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a).
- b. Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken, except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum.

### 5. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties (see footnote #4) on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except in accordance with the following understanding:

- a. It will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.
- b. Each party will seek the agreement of the other to any action with third parties, and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.
- c. The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.
- d. Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.



(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

## 6. The Dominions

- a. While the Dominions are not parties to this agreement, they will not be regarded as third parties.
- b. The London SIGINT Board will, however, keep the U.S. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with any Dominion Agencies.
- c. STANCIB will make no arrangements with any Dominion Agency other than Canadian except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.
- d. As regards Canada, STANCIB will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of the London SIGINT Board.
- e. It will be conditional on any Dominion agencies with whom collaboration takes place that they abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of this agreement and to the arrangements laid down in paragraph 7.

## 7. Channels Between U.S. and British Empire Agencies

- a. STANCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any British Empire agency except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.
- b. The London SIGINT Board will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U.S. agency except through, or with the prior approval of, STANCIB.

## 8. Dissemination and Security

Communication Intelligence and Secret or above technical matters connected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U.S. recipients only as approved by STANCIB; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients other than Canadian only as approved by the London SIGINT Board; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either STANCIB or the London SIGINT Board; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board.

## 9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial

STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

## 10. Previous Agreements

This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between British and U.S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

## 11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement

This agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should

[Redacted]

either consider its interests best served by such action.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB.

For and in behalf of the  
London Signal Intelligence  
Board

For and in behalf of the  
State-Army-Navy Communication  
Intelligence Board

\_\_\_\_\_  
Patrick Marr-Johnson  
Colonel, British Army  
General Staff

\_\_\_\_\_  
Hoyt S. Vandenberg  
Lieutenant General, GSC  
Senior Member

5 March 1946

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this agreement Communication Intelligence is understood to comprise all processes involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of information derived from the communications of other nations.

<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this agreement British Empire is understood to mean all British territory other than the Dominions.

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this agreement foreign communications are understood to mean all communications of the government or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include [Redacted] communications of a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, or economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognized by the U.S. or the British Empire, excluding only the U.S., the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout this agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals of authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 795  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Back to SUSLOL Main Page](#)

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~~DERIVED FROM NSA/CSS MANUAL 129-2~~  
~~DATED 24 FEB 1999~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~SECRET~~

# Second Party SIGINT Arrangements



Canada

United Kingdom


Australia

New Zealand

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# *Second Party SIGINT Deployment*



(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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# United Kingdom

## Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

### RESOURCES

People

Civ:

Mil:

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Sites:

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

### TARGETS

[Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

### KEY OFFICIALS

Mr. John Adye  
Director, GCHQ

[Redacted]

SUKLO

Initiatives:

[Redacted]

Issues:

[Redacted]


Representation:

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SUSLOL

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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# United Kingdom

## Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

### Basis of Relationship:

1946 UKUSA (Canada, Australia, New Zealand)  
USCID DIR 12, April 1954 (overt COMINT; liaison)

### Changes:

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

# Canada

## Communications Security Establishment (CSE)

### RESOURCES

People

Civ:

Mil:

Sites:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

### TARGETS

CIS

[Redacted]


### KEY OFFICIALS

Mr. Stewart Woolner  
Chief, CSE

[Redacted]

CANSLO

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



Initiatives:

Representation:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SUSLOO

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## *Canada*

### *Communications Security Establishment (CSE)*

#### *Basis of Relationship:*

*1946 UKUSA (Canada, Australia, New Zealand)*

*1949 CANUSA Agreement*

*USCID DIR 12, April 1954 (overt COMINT, liaison)*

#### *Changes:*

*Nothing significant*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~Handle Via COMINT Channels Only~~

~~SECRET~~

# Australia Defense Signals Directorate (DSD)

## RESOURCES

People

Civ: [Redacted]

Mil: [Redacted]

Sites: [Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

## TARGETS

[Redacted]


(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

## KEY OFFICIALS

Mr. Garry Marshall  
Director, DSD

[Redacted]

AUSLO



Initiatives: [Redacted]

Representation: [Redacted] SUSLOC

~~SECRET~~  
Handle With COMINT Channels Only

~~SECRET~~

*Australia*  
*Defense Signals Directorate (DSD)*

*Basis of Relationship:*

- 1946 UKUSA (Canada, Australia, New Zealand)*
- 1953 Melbourne Tripartite Conference*
- USCID DIR 12, April 1954 (overt COMINT, liaison)*

*Changes:*

*Nothing significant*

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

# New Zealand

## Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)

### RESOURCES

People: [Redacted]

Sites: [Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

### TARGETS

[Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36


### KEY OFFICIALS

Mr. Ray Parker  
Director, GCSB

[Redacted]

NZLO

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



Representation: [Redacted]

Initiative: [Redacted]

SUSIOC

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Handle Via COMINT Channels Only

~~SECRET~~

## *New Zealand*

*Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)*

### *Basis of Relationship:*

*1946 UKUSA (Canada, Australia, New Zealand)*

*USCID DIR 12 April 1954 (overt COMINT; liaison)*

*Australia controlled until 1977 (GCSB formed)*

*White House guidance/limitation - 1985*

### *Changes:*

*White House limitations since 1985 (5 eyes)*

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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY**  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: N5P/039/99

22 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GCHQ/AZ, CSE, DSD, GCSB

SUBJECT: (U) Elimination of COMINT Codewords- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) The Signals Intelligence Security Regulation (SISR), approved in June by D/DCI, authorized the elimination of codewords. The National SIGINT Committee issued a message on 12 October announcing the immediate termination of the requirement to use the codewords on newly created or modified documents. Attached is NSA's internal guidance on the elimination of codewords. Although this guidance takes effect immediately for hard copy documents, codewords should continue to be used for software applications presently requiring codewords until the software has been updated. Since all electrical reporting dissemination is software dependent, there will be no impact on our current electrical reporting policies. The requirements for software updates to bring us in full compliance with the SISR will be determined after Y2K work is completed. No immediate changes will be made to any systems on which our Second Party Partners are reliant. We will work closely with you over the next few months to make the transition period as smooth as possible. One possibility we are considering is the formation of a 5-Party working group on software applications to facilitate the implementation of this requirement for electrical systems and ensure the continued strength of the SIGINT connectivity between our nations.

(U) NSA's internal guidance follows:

-----  
(U) Implementation Guidance for the Elimination of Codewords

(U) On 12 October 1999, the National SIGINT Committee issued an announcement eliminating the need to use the COMINT codewords UMBRA, SPOKE and MORAY and the TALENT KEYHOLE codeword ZARF. The text of the announcement read as follows:

1. (U) Effective immediately, the need to use codewords UMBRA, SPOKE, MORAY and ZARF and the terms COMINT CATEGORY I, II, and III is terminated. This change was authorized by the approval of the Signals Intelligence Security Regulation (SISR) in May 1999. Any COMINT information formerly protected by the codewords UMBRA, SPOKE or MORAY should now be protected as COMINT. Any TALENT KEYHOLE information formerly protected as ZARF should now be protected as TALENT KEYHOLE. The elimination of these codewords should begin immediately.

2. (U) Information formerly classified as TOP SECRET UMBRA, TOP SECRET SPOKE or TOP SECRET MORAY will now be classified TOP SECRET COMINT. Using the new Intelligence Community markings, the portion or paragraph markings for such information will be (TS//SI). Information formerly classified as SECRET SPOKE or SECRET MORAY will now be classified SECRET COMINT. The portion or paragraph markings for such information will be (S//SI).

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

3. (U) Information formerly classified as TOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE ZARF will now be classified TOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE. The portion or paragraph markings for such information will be (TS//TK).

4. (U) It is understood that certain software applications will continue to require use of the codewords until software changes can be made and that all applications cannot be changed simultaneously. Information which continues to use codewords will continue to be protected within the COMINT and/or TK compartments.

5. (U) The COMINT categories GAMMA, VRK and ECI are not eliminated by this change.

6. (U) This change applies to newly created and modified information, to include electronic files. Previously-created documents do not need to be remarked.

(U) The impact of this announcement is as follows:

1. (U) Codewords should now be eliminated on hard copy documents such as correspondence, COMSEC or INFOSEC documents, Inspector General reports, General Counsel documents, training materials, professionalization papers, PERSUMs, EPAs, Staff Processing Forms, memos, budget documents, and histories. This also applies to other media such as Web page banners, e-mail, viewgraphs, videotapes, etc. Note that this applies to newly created or modified documents only. Older documents do not need to be remarked unless they are being modified.

2. (U) For software applications presently requiring codewords, codewords should continue to be used until the software has been updated. Requirements for these updates will be determined after Y2K work is completed. Some SIGINT reporting tools and databases will fall into this category. P06 will issue guidance before any changes are made to SIGINT reporting. No updates to reporting applications are required at this time.

3. (U) The standard Agency Web page banners on WEBWORLD are being updated to reflect the elimination of the codewords. The codewords will be eliminated automatically for banners being referenced from:

[Redacted] ..... (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

As a reminder, any hardcoded text containing the affected classification designators in HTML source files (such as in "ALT" tags for images, or other content labelling) will also need to be updated by the Web page designer. Note that only the banner images on the img.www.nsa server will be updated centrally.

4. (U) The classification banners for INTELINK also are being revised to reflect the elimination of codewords.

5. (U) Codewords should be eliminated from the Security Control Marking line for e-mail messages sent on NSANet.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The e-mail marking policy has been maintained at

[redacted]

[and] has been updated to reflect this change in policy. Further guidance will be issued on changes to CLASSIFY for those using Microsoft Outlook mail.

6. (U) The codewords have been eliminated from the Intelligence Community's Register of Authorized Classification and Control Markings and the supplemental Implementation Manual maintained on INTELINK on the CMS/CAPCO Web page at:

[redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

7. (U) The version of the register which includes portion markings and is maintained on NSANet at:

[redacted]

also has been updated.

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) SIGINT Exchange Designators will not be eliminated because of this change in policy.

(U) As background, the SISR is an official publication of the National SIGINT Committee. The National SIGINT Committee's mission is to advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and DIRNSA on SIGINT issues which may cover the range from policy, budget, collection, forwarding, processing, analysis and reporting. The SISR provides the policy and guidance on the handling and processing of SIGINT information. The SISR is available on Intelink at:

[redacted]

or on NSANet at:

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The SISR was approved in May 1999. One of the major changes resulting from the approval of the SISR was the elimination of the codewords UMBRA, SPOKE, MORAY and ZARF. The decision to eliminate the codewords was made in response to a strong consensus within the Intelligence Community, as well as among our Second Party partners that the systems which we had constructed to classify, compartment, categorize and caveat intelligence had been so complicated and cumbersome that they were impeding rather than facilitating the handling of intelligence.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Questions on the above guidance, the elimination of  
COMINT codewords, or on the SISR should be directed to [redacted]  
Chief, Information Security Policy, in this office, 963-4582s.

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*for* JOANN H. GRUBE  
Director of Policy

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Exchange Principles of  
THE UKUSA AGREEMENT


TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY  
COMINT CHANNELS ONLY  
COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

COMINT "RESULTS"

1. RAW TRAFFIC

2. COMINT

3. OTHER TECHNICAL MATTER



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

COMINT "METHODS & TECHNIQUES"

ACTIVITIES PRIORITIES  
FACILITIES



all methods &  
techniques

NON-COMINT "COLLATERAL MATERIAL"

~~TOP SECRET~~ (110) P1503  
COPY #1

~~TOP SECRET~~

BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

5 March 1946

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\* \* \*  
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TOP SECRET

BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

5 March 1946

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OUTLINE OF  
BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement
2. Scope of the Agreement
3. Extent of the Agreement - Products
4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques
5. Third Parties to the Agreement
6. The Dominions
7. Channels between U. S. and British Empire Agencies
8. Dissemination and Security
9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial
10. Previous Agreements
11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement
12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

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~~TOP SECRET~~

BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement.

The following agreement is made between the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (representing the U. S. State, Navy, and War Departments and all other U. S. Communication Intelligence authorities which may function) and the London Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, and all other British Empire<sup>2</sup> Communication Intelligence authorities which may function).

2. Scope of the Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication Intelligence matters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence agencies in both countries.

<sup>1</sup>Throughout this agreement Communication Intelligence is understood to comprise all processes involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of information derived from the communications of other nations.

<sup>2</sup>For the purposes of this agreement British Empire is understood to mean all British territory other than the Dominions.

\* to be supplied by the UK

TOP SECRET

3. Extent of the Agreement - Products

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications:

- (1) collection of traffic
- (2) acquisition of communication documents and equipment
- (3) traffic analysis
- (4) cryptanalysis
- (5) decryption and translation
- (6) acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment

<sup>3</sup>Throughout this agreement foreign communications are understood to mean all communications of the government or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include  communications of a foreign country, which may contain information of military, political, or economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognized by the U. S. or the British Empire, excluding only the U. S., the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Empire.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

4



~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a).

(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken, except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum.

5. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties<sup>4</sup> on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except in accordance with the following understanding:

<sup>4</sup>Throughout this agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(a) It will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.

(b) Each party will seek the agreement of the other to any action with third parties, and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.

(c) The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.

(d) Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.

6. The Dominions

(a) While the Dominions are not parties to this agreement, they will not be regarded as third parties.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will, however, keep the U. S. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with any Dominion agencies.

(c) STANCIB will make no arrangements with any Dominion agency other than Canadian except through, or with the prior approval of; the London SIGINT Board.

(d) As regards Canada, STANCIB will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of the London SIGINT Board.

(e) It will be conditional on any Dominion agencies with whom collaboration takes place that

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~~TOP SECRET~~

they abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of this agreement and to the arrangements laid down in paragraph 7.

7. Channels Between U. S. and British Empire Agencies

(a) STANCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any British Empire agency except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U. S. agency except through, or with the prior approval of, STANCIB.

8. Dissemination and Security

Communication Intelligence and Secret or above technical matters connected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U. S. recipients only as approved by STANCIB; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients other than Canadian only as approved by the London SIGINT Board; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either STANCIB or the London SIGINT Board; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board.

9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial

STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

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10. Previous Agreements

This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between British and U. S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement

This agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should either consider its interests best served by such action.

12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB.

For and in behalf of the  
London Signal Intelligence Board:

For and in behalf of the,  
State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board:

Patrick Marr-Johnson  
Colonel, British Army  
General Staff

Roy S. Vanderberg  
Lieutenant General, GSC  
Senior Member

5 March 1946

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED WORKING PAPER~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

... subject only to the proviso contained in paras 3(b) and 4(b) ...

[3(b) ... specifically excluded ... with the agreement of the other ... no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.]

[4(b) ... upon notification of the other party ... include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient to convey its significance.]

~~CLASSIFIED WORKING PAPER~~

~~CLASSIFIED WORKING PAPER~~

1. The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the current state of the art in the field of cryptanalysis, with particular emphasis on the techniques described in the preceding sections.

2. The document is intended for use as a reference by personnel engaged in the study and development of cryptographic systems, and by those responsible for the security of such systems.

3. The information contained herein is the property of the United States Government and is to be controlled in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950.

4. The information contained herein is to be controlled in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950.



5. The information contained herein is to be controlled in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950, and Executive Order 11652, dated August 14, 1950.

C/A  
ACTIVITY


6. Coordination and Exchange of Information on Cryptanalytic and Associated Techniques (in EL with Divisions and/or 222, etc)

7. The purpose of this section is to provide a summary of the current state of the art in the field of cryptanalysis, with particular emphasis on the techniques described in the preceding sections.

8. The document is intended for use as a reference by personnel engaged in the study and development of cryptographic systems, and by those responsible for the security of such systems.



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


**PROXY**

Exchange of COMINT and Co-ordination in Translation (Jun 51)

**COUNTER**

Exchange of Collateral Material (Oct 53)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~CLASSIFIED WORKING PAPER~~

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TRAFFIC

Exchange of Raw Material and Standardization of Raw Material Alloys  
(Jun 51)

[Redacted]

The following information was obtained from a review of the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and is being furnished to you for your information. It is to be understood that this information is being furnished to you in confidence and is not to be disseminated outside your office.

Reference is made to the report of the Office of Naval Intelligence, dated June 1951, regarding the exchange of raw material and standardization of raw material alloys.

The report indicates that the exchange of raw material and standardization of raw material alloys is being conducted between the United States and the United Kingdom.

The report further indicates that the exchange of raw material and standardization of raw material alloys is being conducted between the United States and the United Kingdom.

The report also indicates that the exchange of raw material and standardization of raw material alloys is being conducted between the United States and the United Kingdom.

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December 1985

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DESCRIPTION OF  
SIGINT RELATIONS BETWEEN NSA AND GCHQ (U)

Approved for Release by NSA on  
09-11-2018, FOIA Litigation Case #100386

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS  
CONTAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

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~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

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~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS
- III. BACKGROUND
- IV. VALUE OF RELATIONSHIP
- V. PROBLEMS
- VI. AREAS OF COOPERATION/EXCHANGE

- ANNEX A UKUSA AGREEMENT
- B LISTING OF APPENDICES TO UKUSA AGREEMENT
- C DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT
- D PRINCIPAL UK CRYPTOLOGIC INSTALLATIONS
- E U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC SITES IN THE UK

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
I. INTRODUCTION

The following is a review of the NSA-GCHQ SIGINT relationship including an assessment of the present value of the exchange and identifiable problems. This review is intended to serve as a basis for determining our plans for the conduct of this relationship in the future, for any improvements/changes regarding control and accountability of the existing exchange, as well as developing proposals for additional contributions which should be made by each party. (U)

II. FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS

- There is a heavy flow of raw intercept, technical analytic results, and SIGINT product between NSA and GCHQ, to include direct distribution of product by each party to both country users. ~~(S-CCO)~~

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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### III. BACKGROUND

#### - General

The SIGINT collaboration with the UK began in 1941 and was formalized in the UKUSA Agreement of 1946 (enclosed in Annex A). It has developed into one of virtually full partnership and interdependence, to include combined working parties, joint operations, the exchange of liaison and assignment of analysts to integrated posts. In addition, Divisions of Effort (DOE) and/or understandings between NSA and GCHQ are undertaken to respond to existing requirements. Each country makes unique contributions, and while the U.S. has moved far ahead in total resources committed and in technology development, the contribution of the UK continues to be of great value. ~~(TS-CCO)~~

#### - UKUSA Agreement and Appendices

The UKUSA Agreement, dated 5 March 1946, has twelve short paragraphs and was so generally written that, with the exception of a few proper nouns, no changes to it have been made. It was signed by a UK representative of the London Signals Intelligence Board and the U.S. Senior Member of the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (a predecessor organization which evolved to be the present National Foreign Intelligence Board). The principles remain intact, allowing for a full and interdependent partnership. In effect, the basic agreement allows for the exchange of all COMINT results including end product and pertinent collateral data from each partner for targets worldwide, unless specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party. It also makes provision for restricting exchange of select materials when it is of special interest to either party, but notes that such exceptions should be kept to an absolute minimum. Over the years this has been the case. Additionally, the agreement makes provision for obtaining agreement between the two partners for COMINT relationships established with Third Parties and to ensure that materials received from such Third Party arrangements are made available to GCHQ and NSA. Provision was made to give special consideration to COMINT agencies of British Dominions (e.g., what are now Canada, Australia, New Zealand and to not consider them as Third Parties). Over the years numerous appendices have been added to cover specific areas of widening interest and ever-increasing sophistication. The Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement address such items as principles of security and dissemination, principles of relationships with Third Parties, standardization of intercept formats, common classification and categorization criteria,

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
exchange of material obtained through clandestine or covert sources, and principles of UKUSA collaboration with commonwealth countries. (A listing of each appendix with an explanatory comment is included as Annex B.) ~~(TS-CCO)~~

- Liaison

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

In accordance with Appendix I of the UKUSA Agreement, NSA and GCHQ maintain a liaison officer in each other's country to facilitate SIGINT collaboration. In the UK, the U.S. officer is the Special U.S. Liaison Officer, London (SUSLOL) and in Washington the UK officer is the Senior UK Liaison Officer, Washington, D.C. (SUKLOW). SUSLOL represents the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) as well as NSA in all SIGINT relationships with the UK. The liaison staffs for each center

constitute qualified people who can liaise with the major key components of each agency as well as the major operational production groups, a cryptanalytic expert, and necessary administrative and communications support personnel. SUSLOL and SUKLOW and their respective staffs perform the official interaction between the two national centers, as well as provide SIGINT support to their national embassies.



~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- Integrated Analysts

NSA and GCHQ have assigned cryptologic specialists into each other's HQ operational elements for purposes of combined operations on select target problems, expanding experience and training, and for contributing unique special talent or skill. This provides almost complete access to materials [redacted] by these integrated analysts in the areas where they are assigned. [redacted]

[redacted]

- Combined Operations

[redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Other Areas of Combined Operations or Integrated Operations

The United States and UK have SIGINT personnel assigned to various select field sites of each other. These include the following:

<u>Site</u>		<u>Number of People Assigned</u>		<u>Comment</u>
<u>UK</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	

- Exchange of Visitors

A great number of visits are exchanged between the National SIGINT HQ of each party representing various levels of personnel from the Directorate down. These visits take on different forms, e.g., analyst-to-analyst discussions, conferences, periodic meetings, management/planning reviews

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
and consultations, Directorate level policy decisions.



- Major Conference Exchanges

There are many conferences held between NSA and GCHQ which cover a multitude of topics. Most are held on an annual basis and usually alternate meeting places between the two centers. The more significant conferences include the following:

<u>Conference</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Program Management & Review	Senior Management participation
Joint Management Review	Senior Management (at Deputy Director level) participation




(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-16 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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
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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



- Communications Tie-ins


Other than CRITICOMM and mail correspondence, GCHQ and NSA have various means for communications with each other. There are several OPSCOMM circuits between the two centers.



- Computer Tie-ins/Accessibility


(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

GCHQ has direct access to various NSA computer systems.



- Technology Exchange

There is select technology exchange between both centers,




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
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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



IV. VALUE OF RELATIONSHIP

- The value of this relationship is high and allows for a much fuller SIGINT effort than is possible with only U.S. resources. ~~(S-CCO)~~



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


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
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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

- GCHQ is a contributor to our cryptanalytic efforts,



V. PROBLEMS



(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

VI. AREAS OF COOPERATION/EXCHANGE

- The GCHQ-NSA SIGINT exchange involves a sharing of a wide variety of targets worldwide, ranging from military activities to [Redacted] terrorist activities, and [Redacted] It involves all facets of SIGINT, i.e., COMINT, ELINT, AND FISINT. This arrangement includes the exchange of material (raw intercept, analytic, product) on [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- There are many MOA's and MOU's between the partners; however, a significant amount of division of effort is accomplished without any formal DOE or MOU and has evolved through cooperation engendered by personal contact and exchange. An understanding is created on each target of mutual interest in terms of collection, processing and reporting. [Redacted]


[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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- See Annex C for a more specific description of the division of effort between the two parties. (U)

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- ANNEXES: A UKUSA AGREEMENT OF 1946 ~~(S)~~
- B LISTING OF APPENDICES TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT ~~(S)~~
- C DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT (U)
- D PRINCIPAL UK CRYPTOLOGIC INSTALLATIONS ~~(S)~~
- E U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC SITES IN THE UK ~~(S)~~

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ANNEX A

BRITISH - U.S. COMMUNICATIONS  
INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT ~~(S)~~

5 MARCH 1946

(UKUSA AGREEMENT)

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BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

5 March 1946

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OUTLINE OF  
BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement
2. Scope of the Agreement
3. Extent of the Agreement - Products
4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques
5. Third Parties to the Agreement
6. The Dominions
7. Channels between U. S. and British Empire Agencies
8. Dissemination and Security
9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial
10. Previous Agreements
11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement
12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

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BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement.

The following agreement is made between the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (representing the U. S. State, Navy, and War Departments and all other U. S. Communication Intelligence<sup>1</sup> authorities which may function) and the London Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, and all other British Empire<sup>2</sup> Communication Intelligence authorities which may function).

2. Scope of the Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication Intelligence matters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence agencies in both countries.

<sup>1</sup>Throughout this agreement Communication Intelligence is understood to comprise all processes involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of information derived from the communications of other nations.

<sup>2</sup>For the purposes of this agreement British Empire is understood to mean all British territory other than the Dominions.

\* to be supplied by the UK

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3. Extent of the Agreement - Products

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications:

- (1) collection of traffic
- (2) acquisition of communication documents and equipment
- (3) traffic analysis
- (4) cryptanalysis
- (5) decryption and translation
- (6) acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment

---

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this agreement foreign communications are understood to mean all communications of the government or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include commercial communications of a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, or economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognized by the U. S. or the British Empire, excluding only the U. S., the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Empire.

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(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a).

(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken, except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum.

5. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties<sup>4</sup> on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except in accordance with the following understanding:

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<sup>4</sup>Throughout this agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.

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(a) It will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.

(b) Each party will seek the agreement of the other to any action with third parties, and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.

(c) The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.

(d) Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.

#### 6. The Dominions

(a) While the Dominions are not parties to this agreement, they will not be regarded as third parties.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will, however, keep the U. S. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with any Dominion agencies.

(c) STANCIE will make no arrangements with any Dominion agency other than Canadian except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.

(d) As regards Canada, STANCIE will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of the London SIGINT Board.

(e) It will be conditional on any Dominion agencies with whom collaboration takes place that

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they abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of this agreement and to the arrangements laid down in paragraph 7.

7. Channels Between U. S. and British Empire Agencies

(a) STANCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any British Empire agency except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U. S. agency except through, or with the prior approval of, STANCIB.

8. Dissemination and Security

Communication Intelligence and Secret or above technical matters connected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U. S. recipients only as approved by STANCIB; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients other than Canadian only as approved by the London SIGINT Board; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either STANCIB or the London SIGINT Board; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board.

9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial

STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

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10. Previous Agreements

This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between British and U. S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement

This agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should either consider its interests best served by such action.

12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB.

For and in behalf of the  
London Signal Intelligence Board:

For and in behalf of the,  
State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board:

Patrick Marr-Johnson  
Colonel, British Army  
General Staff

Hoyt S. Vandenberg  
Lieutenant General, CSC  
Senior Member

5 March 1946

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ANNEX B

A DESCRIPTION OF THE APPENDICES  
TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT ~~(S)~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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A DESCRIPTION  
OF  
THE APPENDICES TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT

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UKUSA AGREEMENT APPENDICES THAT MAY BE AMENDED  
ONLY BY BOARD AGREEMENT

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

- APPENDIX A - TERMS TO BE USED
- APPENDIX B - PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION
- APPENDIX G - EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL AND COMINT MATERIAL  
OBTAINED
- APPENDIX H - COMMUNICATIONS
- APPENDIX I - LIAISON AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE
- APPENDIX J - PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH  
COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.K.
- APPENDIX N - ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RE-LOCATION OF COMINT UNITS
- APPENDIX O - SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN  
SPECIFIED U.S. AND U.K. COMINT UNITS
- APPENDIX P - COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES AFFECTING UKUSA  
RELATIONSHIPS
- APPENDIX Q - ORGANIZATION OF U.S.-BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE  
COLLABORATION IN WAR

APPENDICES WHICH THE DIRECTORS, NSA AND GCHQ, MAY  
CHANGE OR INTERPRET BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT

- APPENDIX C - DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS
- APPENDIX D - CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC  
ANALYSIS MATERIAL
- APPENDIX E - CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON,  
CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES
- APPENDIX F - EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND CO-ORDINATION  
IN TRANSLATION
- APPENDIX K - COLLABORATION IN THE RUSSIAN INTERNAL PLAIN TEXT FIELD
- APPENDIX L - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES,  
PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
- APPENDIX M - EXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL AND STANDARDIZATION OF RAW  
MATERIAL FORMAT

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INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES

A listing of arrangements which govern the collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. COMINT Agencies, including statements of exchange, liaison, standardization, allocation of resources, telecommunication, courier, review of Appendices.

APPENDIX A - TERMS TO BE USED

A definitive listing of terms placed in the context of the Agreement.

APPENDIX B - PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

Defines a number of terms peculiar to the SIGINT agreements; specifies the considerations for assigning COMINT to categories; establishes basic security principles governing collection, access, dissemination and transmission under all conditions of world climate.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B1 - THE ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES

This annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of sub-categories, (b) the assignment of COMINT to categories and sub-categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to categories and sub-categories, and (d) the application of codewords to categories and sub-categories. It does not accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT, but along with the criteria described in Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current mutually agreed lists to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT categories and sub-categories.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B2 - SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COMINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

This section defines exposed areas, risky situations, dangerous situations, and hazardous activities. It sets up safeguards for controlling the assignment of personnel to hazardous activities and provides safeguards for the conduct of COMINT operations in exposed areas or in risky or dangerous situations.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 - CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING OF INFORMATION RELATED TO COMINT OR COMINT ACTIVITIES

This annexure establishes minimum standards with respect to the handling and classification of information which is neither COMINT nor that contained in technical material or documents that reveal actual or prognosticated success or effort concerning the production of COMINT,

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not reveals directly or by implication the existence or nature of COMINT or of COMINT activities

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX A - TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN THE SAME PROTECTION AS COMINT

Lists the information which is neither COMINT nor "technical material" and which must be accorded the same protection of the classification and codeword of the highest category of COMINT to which it relates.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX B - TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE HANDLED VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

This Annex prescribes the classification and handling procedures for information that does not require codeword protection, but which relates to COMINT or COMINT activities.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX C - TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

Discusses the types of information pertaining to COMINT which requires neither codeword protection nor the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" and will be classified and handled in accordance with U.S. or U.K. governmental security regulations in effect for information unconnected with COMINT or COMINT activities.

APPENDIX C - DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS

Outlines the ITA case numbering system for describing intercept targets in all fields other than International Commercial, for which a separate system is noted.

APPENDIX D - CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

Provides guidelines for the exchange of T/A materials and for coordination of intercept control to minimize duplication.

APPENDIX D ANNEXURE D1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1950 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX D



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APPENDIX E - COORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON, CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

A statement of the principles governing coordination of, and exchange of information on, cryptanalysis and associated techniques, including standardization of system nomenclature, status of tasks, allocation of tasks methods techniques and technical products, crypto intelligence and transfer of devices and apparatus.

APPENDIX E ANNEXURE 1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX E

Consists of arrangements for informal allocation of cryptanalytic tasks, short reference titling or system nomenclature, how to propose a title and preparation of System Identification Sheets, preparation of the Master File and preparation of the Quarterly Status Report.

APPENDIX F - EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION IN TRANSLATION

Provides guidance as to standardization on format and content of translations and for editorial comment on COMINT which is exchanged.

APPENDIX G - EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL AND COMINT MATERIAL OBTAINED BY CLandestine or Covert Operations

Provides additional guidance beyond that in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement on the handling or exchange of collateral materials and COMINT materials obtained clandestine or covert sources.

APPENDIX H - COMMUNICATIONS

Provides general guidance as to telecommunications required, installation, maintenance and operation of terminals, provision of equipment, cryptographic aids, courier or bag routes, microfilm and communications liaison.

APPENDIX H ANNEXURE 1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1953 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX H

Discusses the requirements for:

1. U.S. Stations and Units located or relocated in the U.K.
2. Communication arrangements for stations and units located or relocated in the U.K.
3. U.S. Stations abroad relocated to British controlled territory and British Stations abroad relocated to U.S. controlled territory.

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- 4. Trans-Atlantic Facilities
- 5. Trans-Pacific Facilities
- 6. Other combined communication Nets and Links (Existing and Planned)

APPENDIX I - LIAISON AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE

Provides for liaison personnel, channels for requests on exchange of materials, and assistance to liaison personnel by the host country.

APPENDIX J - PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.K.

This appendix records the general principles governing UKUSA COMINT collaboration with Commonwealth countries other than the U.K.

APPENDIX J ANNEXURE J1 - UKUSA ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Self-explanatory.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

APPENDIX K - COLLABORATION IN THE [REDACTED] PLAIN TEXT FIELD

Provides for guidelines on intercept priority, traffic exchange, product exchange and forecast of output based on [REDACTED] plain text as [REDACTED]

APPENDIX K ANNEXURE K1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX K

Consists of exhibits to the appendix showing a specimen priority list, a specimen intercept record, a forecast of plain text reports, and other formats pertinent to Appendix K.

APPENDIX L - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Provides for a comprehensive Annual Technical Report concerning (a) all intercept facilities installed and available for use at intercept and D/F stations whether or not such facilities are in use and (b) details of numbers and types and descriptions of intercept equipment under contract and/or in production, together with probable delivery dates.

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APPENDIX L ANNEXURE L1 - RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM - UNITED STATES - CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR SITE SURVEYS, 1953

This section sets up objectives and general principles of operation in making site surveys in the northern area (north of the 55th parallel).

APPENDIX M - EXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL AND STANDARDIZATION OF RAW MATERIAL FORMAT

Sets up procedures and a standard format for use in the exchange of raw material.

APPENDIX M ANNEXURE M1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX M

Consists of exhibits to the Appendix, showing formats or layout for various kinds of raw traffic.

APPENDIX N - ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RELOCATION OF COMINT UNITS

This section describes conditions and situations under which emergency relocation of either or both U.S. and U.K. COMINT units is desirable and specifies the responsibilities of the several parties if such an event takes place.

APPENDIX N ANNEXURE N1 - RELOCATION OF U.S. AND U.K. COMINT UNITS - PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

Discusses responsibility for providing necessary equipment to the various units which might have to be relocated on an emergency basis.

APPENDIX N ANNEXURE N2 - NOTES ON U.S. AND U.K. COMINT UNITS ALREADY LOCATED IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE OTHER PARTY OR ALREADY SCHEDULED TO BE SO LOCATED

A listing of the various U.S. and U.K. COMINT Units located on territory controlled by the other party.

APPENDIX O - SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN SPECIFIED U.S. AND U.K. COMINT UNITS

Self-explanatory.

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APPENDIX O ANNEXURE O1 - ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN GCHQ; AIR  
MILITARY W/F SECTION, CHEADLE; AND THE U.S. 10TH RADIO SQUADRON MORRIS  
(NOW USA-51, CHICKSAWDS)

Provides for liaison and exchange of personnel, coordination of interception and exchange of intercepted traffic between the 10th RSM and Chedale and the 10 RSM and GCHQ.

APPENDIX P - COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES AFFECTING UKUSA  
RELATIONSHIPS

Basic principles governing COMINT arrangements by the U.K. and U.S. with Third Parties.

APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P1 - DEFINITIONS

Definitions of terms used in Appendix P.

APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P2 - INTERNATIONAL COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALLIED  
COMMAND EUROPE

A statement of principles governing the international, as distinguished from the purely UKUSA, COMINT support to be provided to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) in both peace and war.

APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P3 - INTERNATIONAL COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALLIED  
COMMAND ATLANTIC

A statement of principles governing the international, as distinguished from the purely COMUSMACV, COMINT support to be provided to Allied Command Atlantic (ACIAAF) in both peace and war.

APPENDIX Q - ORGANIZATION OF U.S. - BRITISH COMSECURITY INTELLIGENCE  
COLLABORATION IN WAR

A statement of principles to govern COMINT collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. in case of war.

APPENDIX Q ANNEXURE Q1 - COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL  
COMSEC SERVICES

This annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for implementation of the principles of collaboration in a wartime situation and the formation of the Combined Center Europe (CCE).



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APPENDIX Q, SIGNATURE Q2 - PRINCIPLES OF WARTIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT  
CENTERS OF THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

Describes steps to be taken in the event of hostilities involving U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to ensure the greatest possible contribution to prosecuting the war consistent with security, including planned overseas National COMINT Centers.

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ANNEX C

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DETAILS OF UKUSA  
DIVISION OF EFFORT ~~(S)~~

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS  
CONTAIN CODEWORDS MATERIAL~~

~~US/UK EYES ONLY~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~


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
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(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

ANNEX C


DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT (U)



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(b) (3)-18 USC 793  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


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


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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36





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
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
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
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(b) (1)  
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(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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ANNEX D


PRINCIPAL UK CRYPTOLOGIC INSTALLATIONS ~~(S)~~

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
(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



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U.K. SIGINT DEPLOYMENT

The U.K. SIGINT deployment has major concentrations of resources and personnel at the following locations:



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(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 795  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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ANNEX E


U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC SITES IN THE UK ~~(S)~~

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(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP INVENTORY

**Country:** United Kingdom

**Service:** Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Cryptonym or Cover Designator:** None

**Sponsoring Agency:** Government Communications Headquarters  
(GCHQ)

**Agency Approving Level:** Director

**Location and Description of Activity:**

GCHQ is located on Priory Road in Cheltenham, England. The agency is a complex of buildings somewhat smaller than NSA. The organization and duties are aligned very much like those of NSA.

**Date Initiated:** 5 March 1946.

**Expiration Date:** None.

The agreement may be amended or terminated (in whole or part) any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party.

**Resources Required:**

[Redacted box]

**Nature of Intelligence Exchanged:**

Products of the following operations relating to foreign communications are exchanged:

- Collection of traffic
- Acquisition of communication documents and equipment
- Traffic analysis
- Cryptanalysis
- [Redacted] translation
- Acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment

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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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Information concerning methods and techniques involved in the above.

The exchange is unrestricted on all work except that specifically excluded (NOFORN) at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. Exceptions are kept to a minimum.

**Date of Material Change or Termination:** N/A

**Coordination:**

The agreement was made between the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (representing the US State, Navy, and War Departments and all other US Communications Intelligence authorities and the London Signal Intelligence Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, and all other British Communication Intelligence authorities. The agreement became effective on the date signed by both parties, 5 March 1946.

**Points of Contact:**

NSA Headquarters - Office of Foreign Relations (Q3)  
US Embassy - Special US Liaison Officer London (SUSLOL)  
GCHQ - Special US Liaison Officer (SUSLOL-CHÉLT)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

**Evaluation of Intelligence Product:**

[Redacted]

**Statement of Net Benefit to the US:**

The UK has sites at strategic locations for collection that otherwise would be unavailable to the US. The relationship is virtually a full partnership, with combined working parties, joint operations, the exchange of liaison officers, and assignment of analysts to integrated billets. Combined US-UK planning and operations make the best of the resources of all parties.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

**Special Considerations:**

The GCHQ budget has not been cut as badly as NSA's. Although [Redacted] other areas and concerns will be important in the coming years. The close relationship of NSA and GCHQ will become more useful as burden sharing divisions of effort are required to maximize intelligence collection.

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**Written Agreements:**

The British-US Communications Intelligence Agreement (referred to as the UKUSA Agreement) of March 1946 remains the governing document. Memoranda of Understanding have been issued (and rescinded) though the years to treat specific events or assets, thereby keeping the relationship fluid and current.

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**FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS INVENTORY**

Agency Submitting Report: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Abbreviation)

Date of Report: \_\_\_\_\_

Country: (spelled out)

Service:

Cryptonym or Cover Designation:

Sponsoring Agency:

Agency Approving Level:

Location and Description of Activity:

Date Initiated:

Expiration Date:

Resources Required: (Personnel and Funds)

Nature of Intelligence Exchanged: (if appropriate) Include amount, type, format, passed to the foreign service as well as a brief indication of oral or written product received from liaison service. Exchange information should also include such matters as technical assistance or other quid pro quos.

Date of Material Change or Termination:

Coordination: (When, Where and With Whom was the arrangement coordinated)

Points of contact: (Field and HQS element knowledgeable of arrangement)

Evaluation of Intelligence Product:

Statement of Net Benefit to the US: (As an integral element of the Net Benefit statement, please include pertinent data on related considerations such as burden sharing, operational support provided by host service, collection facilities, and so on.)

Special Considerations: Are there special reasons for this relationship? Does it have particular policy implications? (If this submission deals with a major change in an ongoing activity, please identify the change and the rationale therefore.)

Written Agreements: (If there is a written protocol covering the relationship, please provide a copy, or specify what each party is obligated to provide under the agreement.)