<u>ANNEX 3</u>

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the
**Annual Action Programme in favour of the Republic of Lebanon for 2018**

<u>**Action Document**</u>

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| **1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number** | **Promoting the rule of law, enhancing security and countering terrorism in Lebanon** CRIS number: **ENI/2018/041-154**<br>financed under European Neighbourhood Instrument |
| **2. Zone benefiting from the action/location** | Neighbourhood South, **Lebanon** |
| **3. Programming document** | Single Support Framework for European Union (EU) Support to Lebanon (2017-2020) |
| **4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area** | **Promoting the Rule of Law, enhancing security and countering terrorism** (priority sector 3) | DEV. Aid: YES |
| **5. Amounts concerned** | Total estimated cost: EUR 18,000,000<br>Total amount of Union budget contribution **EUR 18,000,000** |
| **6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)** | Project Modality<br>Indirect management with The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), United Nations Development programme (UNDP) and The International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) |
| **7 a) DAC code(s)** | Main DAC code – 15210 - 100% |
| **b) Main Delivery Channel** | 13000, 41000 |

| **8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)** | **General policy objective** | **Not targeted** | **Significant objective** | **Main objective** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Participation development/good governance | ☐ | ☐ | X |

| | | Not targeted | Significant objective | Main objective |
|---|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| | Aid to environment | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Gender equality (including Women In Development) | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Trade Development | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | **RIO Convention markers** | **Not targeted** | **Significant objective** | **Main objective** |
| | Biological diversity | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Combat desertification | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Climate change mitigation | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| | Climate change adaptation | Χ | ☐ | ☐ |
| **9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships** | N/A | | | |
| **10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)** | Main SDG **Goal 16** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, but also promotes progress towards <br><br> Secondary SDG Goal(s) **5** Gender and **7** Affordable and clean energy. | | | |

SUMMARY

Supporting the Lebanese security system's effectiveness and legitimacy is a priority to be addressed in order to foster greater social cohesion and national stability. A sustained security environment in Lebanon will pave the road to increased economic investment and long-term development, and advance Lebanon towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

The Overall Objective of the action is to contribute to the development of a long-term capability of the Lebanese security system to control risk and guarantee the respect of the Rule of Law, thus ensuring greater security for citizens and sustainable stabilisation processes for the country.

Throughout this action the EU aims to reinforce the Security Sector in Lebanon by promoting a culture of co-operation and sharing of information around two critical strategic areas, which are part of the EU-Lebanon partnership priorities and high on political agenda for both EU and Lebanon due to the persistent instability in the region and pervasive terrorist/criminality threat.

**Component 1) Border Security and Management (BS&M):** It aims at assisting national agencies to secure the country's borders (land, airport and sea) while facilitating trade, regular entries and assistance to people in need of international protection. Specifically, the programme shall increase the effectiveness of Lebanon's border management agencies in line

with international and democratic norms through capacity building programmes and provision of equipment.

**Component 2) Counter Terrorism/Prevention of Violent Extremism (CT&PVE):** The component will support implementation of the priorities under the EU-Lebanon Counter Terrorism Road Map by increasing national capacities to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism and organised crime as well as to ensure enhanced judicial procedures in line with the relevant international standards. EU assistance will concentrate on the promotion of intra/inter-agency co-operation and exposure to international practices and international co-operation on security matters.

# 1  CONTEXT

## 1.1  Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

The instability in the whole region is having a destabilising effect on the security situation in Lebanon. Criminal networks increasingly use air and sea routes following tightening control of land borders. Security forces claim on a weekly basis operations to dismantle sleeping terrorist cells and foil their plots. The instability is conducive to recruitment of new militants among the hundred thousands of refugees, facing difficult living conditions in settlements. It is also a catalyser factor for European terrorist fighters searching for ways back to their country of origin and provisional haven in neighbouring places, among them Lebanon.

Undoubtedly, the crisis in Syria has caused a strong influx of people into Lebanon straining the limited resources of the country. Although Lebanon maintains its commitment to host refugees, this does not prevent the movements of Syrians outside Lebanon through smuggling networks. Additionally the existence of Palestinian migration networks is documented and proved by the decline in number in the last census of the Palestinian population in Lebanon.

In North and East regions around Ersal and Akkar borders' control and management is still poor as a result of long-awaited return of the State's sovereignty and geographical constraints (mountainous areas and harsh climate).

Despite all, Lebanon shows a high degree of resilience and remains relatively stable. The Government is committed to the policy of disassociation, to safeguard Lebanon from regional conflicts and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

Lebanon has a relatively well developed security sector with established chain of command, and framework for subordination to civilian government. Since 2014, donors' assistance has tangibly reinforced the capacity of security agencies. Increased co-ordination among security agencies and military courts has prevented terrorist attacks and disrupted the formation of terrorist cells inside of Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) successfully contained and ultimately defeated Daesh and Al Nusra consolidating state authority along Lebanon's Northern and Eastern border. The Army continues to clear mine and cluster bomb contaminated areas and it plans to develop technical capacities in the disposal of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). In the past years the management of land borders has improved, and now Lebanon intends to build naval and air force capacities.

Although the Constitution in Article 95 states the intention to abolish political confessionalism, the composition and balance of powers within the security sector reflect Lebanon's multi-confessional character. The security services are perceived as subject to political and confessional influence, as well as agents of those influences on society. Any support to modernise the security sector in Lebanon has to deal with this deep-rooted reality.

The presence of non-state actor characterizes the security sector in Lebanon. Hezbollah still controls large swathes of Lebanese territory, which are largely beyond the writ of national security actors. To counter the situation, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) co-operates with the LAF in view of extending and consolidating the presence of the Lebanese state across the whole of its national territory and waters.

All the above, typifies the complexity of the security setting in Lebanon and highlights the challenge in the design and implementation of a national security sector reform ensuring a government monopoly on the use of force, respect of the rule of law and rights based approach.

### 1.1.1  Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

Lebanon does not have a National Defence Strategy; the dialogue on the strategy was halted at the end of the term of former President Michel Sleiman, in 2014. The latter had convened national dialogue sessions that gathered the country's leaders, who failed, over a period of eight years, to reach an agreement. In March 2018, President Michel Aoun announced the willingness to resume the dialogue on the country's defence strategy, following the 6 May parliamentary elections; the announcement created speculations on whether the issue would be discussed through national dialogue or by the new government that will emerge from the new Parliament. The long-waited adoption of a national defence strategy would greatly contribute to the safeguard of the country's stability and advance its national interest.

Lebanon has ratified some relevant international conventions,[1] which could inform the revision of the statutory counter terrorism (CT) and procedural law and the drafting of a national CT strategy. The endorsement of the CT strategy might take a few years, however the EU is already working on the implementation of the EU-Lebanon roadmap by mainstreaming CT in several programmes such as the Integrated Border Management (IBM) and Justice Programmes.

The 2014-2019 National Action Plan for Human Rights (NAP) was drafted in consultation of all concerned stakeholders including Security Forces and it covers 21 priorities areas.Most of the areas are relevant under this programme such as: the principles of investigation and arrest; the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the prohibition of enforced disappearance; prison and detention facilities reform; freedom of expression, opinion and media; freedom of association; protection from interference with the

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[1]     Lebanon signed the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and II; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol. It ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention against Torture and its Protocol. Only one of the eight fundamental ILO conventions is not ratified by Lebanon, namely the Convention on Freedom of Association. Lebanon acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

right to privacy, and the prohibition of wiretapping; the rights of the most vulnerable groups. The NAP describes areas of weakness and provides recommendations for improvement, by defining compulsory standards to support and protect these rights. The implementation of these standards is entrusted to both the Parliament as the legislative authority, and administrative bodies as the executive authority. The judiciary is expected to support such implementation.

The National Strategy to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) was launched end 2017. It identifies 9 pillars focusing on a long-term approach to education, economic development and good governance. An action plan for its implementation is yet to be developed.

A draft IBM Strategy and action plan and a Chemical, Biological, Radiology and Nuclear (CBRN) Strategy were developed with EU support. Despite the lack of formal approval, all security agencies *de facto* use these strategies as a reference for activities in the related fields and for capacity building purposes.

Recently the LAF, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the General Security (GS) launched their multiannual organisations' strategic plans and the Government of Lebanon made budgetary contributions in view of their implementation. These are first attempts of a transformative reform agenda which has a potential in terms of improving organisations' cost-effectiveness, transparency and accountability, trust-building and community relations. The plans provide needs assessment and gap mapping; however the focus is very much on equipment while results to be achieved could have been better articulated. The plans do not analyse key elements of inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation aiming to improve the efficiency of the national security system.

Surely, these strategies need to be accompanied by clear multi-year implementation plans and co-ordination mechanisms, developing priorities based on affordable costing and guaranteeing accountability of international assistance.


### 1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

Prime Minister Saad Hariri set out his vision to see LAF return to their proper defence role; all internal security responsibilities would be transferred to the ISF (including CT responsibilities); a major game-changing in the distribution of roles and responsibilities could only be achieved by a trust-building approach between competing security actors and enhanced inter-agency co-operation. Thanks to international support, LAF, ISF, General Security and, to a lesser extent, State Security, are increasingly exchanging information and even joining their resources and means to carry out "teamed" operations.

The largest security institution is the **Lebanese Armed Forces** (LAF - 59,000 personnel). The LAF operates as a conventional military force, though it also has a significant role in internal security, a role for which it is not appropriately configured. The LAF continue to enjoy broad national legitimacy thanks to their cross-confessional composition and generally perceived neutrality. **The Military courts** have a specialised criminal jurisdiction on crimes committed in a military facility or involving members of the military forces, but also on crimes against national security, including terrorism-related crimes involving civilians. In April 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee observed that, pending the removal of the jurisdiction of

military courts over civilians, Lebanon is to guarantee the right to a fair trial and equality before courts and tribunals

**The Internal Security Forces** (ISF - 26,000 personnel) fall under the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM). The internal Security Forces are the core of what should be the internal security system and a civilian police force. Since 2009 there have been considerable improvements in the performance of the ISF, including the return on the substantial investments of the EU (since 2007) and other donors in the professionalisation of the ISF; however, support is still needed particularly on criminal investigations techniques and cybersecurity.

Despite the significant confessional divides between LAF (commander is a Christian Maronite) and ISF (mainly Sunni leadership and headed by a Sunni Minister of Interior) there are opportunities for greater co-operation than in the past, particularly on sharing intelligence on terrorist threats which has resulted in the detection and interdiction of planned terrorist activities. This presents a real opportunity to foster incremental advances on how LAF and ISF collaborate also on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) community policing initiatives and on how to co-ordinate and delegate tasks between them in the response to public order and security incidents.

The **Municipal police** (MP) is a relatively small police formally under the authority of the local mayor. The MP is relatively weak and has no judicial role. Its intervention is limited to unarmed patrols within the municipality, mainly tasked with observation. When necessary, the patrols contact the ISF or LAF, who take charge of providing protection and making the arrest.

**The General Directorate of State Security** (GDSS – less than 5,000 staff) co-ordinates with other security services - such as the GS, ISF and Army Intelligence Directorate - on collecting information concerning internal state security, surveillance of Lebanese parties and foreign activists in relation to state security, counter-espionage, preliminary investigations of acts which put at risk internal and external state security. As a full-fledged judiciary police, the GDSS may pursue all types of criminal activities and has even received instruction to contribute to border security considering its presence in all 9 governorates. However, it is not clear whether GDSS will be involved in surveillance of land, air and maritime borders.

At a time of massive pressure due to the Syrian conflict, **General Directorate of the General Security** (GS - 5,000 staff) also plays a critical role in national security and stability, including in border/migration management, but also in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Its primary function is to collect and gather intelligence. General Security is also responsible for monitoring foreign residents by issuing visas and entry permits, residence permits and card stays. It monitors the media by ensuring it does not undermine public order, or an institution or a personality of the Lebanese society.

The **General Directorate of the Lebanese Civil Defence** (CD) is a public emergency medical service of Lebanon that carries out patient transportation, search and rescue activities and fire-fighting response. It is funded and administered by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. The directorate works in conjunction with the Lebanese Red Cross along with other pre-hospital service organisations in the country.

The **Lebanese Customs Administration** (LCA) is responsible for ensuring that all goods and persons entering and exiting Lebanon are in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. The Customs Administration collects and protects a major component of government revenue. The LCA is also in charge of the prevention of smuggling and the clearance of persons, their baggage, cargo, and mail, as well as the provision of accurate international trade statistics.

In the Lebanese security scene there are also other significant players, though informal and external to the security apparatus: Hezbollah avails itself of a military force (25,000 fighters and a significant arsenal of weapons) and the 12 Palestinian camps distributed over the Lebanese territory are a harbour for armed movements since these zones constitute security islets that escape the State's control.

In the absence of a peace agreement with Israel and the settling of the Shebaa farms issue, the Lebanese government did not deploy along the Blue Line. It is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that continues to ensure control and stability in the area.

Involvement of **Civil Society** Organisations (CSOs) in the security sector is not developed or systematized in Lebanon although more and more non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are engaging in specific aspects of the Security Sector Reform (SSR), such as protection missions, prison reform, rights of marginalised groups, gender-based violence (GBV). The Lebanese CSOs environment is very much oriented to service delivery and awareness raising while their monitoring and oversight role remains marginal.

Lebanon still lacks a consistent national framework that could consolidate co-operative mechanisms for CSOs on SSR, and CSOs continue to be challenged by the security officials on expertise credibility, leading to a fragmented landscape.

### 1.1.3  Priority areas for support/problem analysis

The Lebanese security agencies are acting in a very complex and evolving context which require the building of new competences and capacities for a co-ordinated response in safeguarding the security of the State and the people.

Agencies' mandates and delimitation of responsibilities are not clear and thus tensions between security institutions are unavoidable, especially when analysing security threats and investigating the same crimes. The co-ordination pattern and the chain of responsibility are uncertain and ambiguous, which has a negative impact on the institutions' accountability and the sector's overall effectiveness, resulting in competition and duplication of tasks. This situation has adverse outcomes, particularly regarding sharing of information, collaboration during field interventions, crime scene management, collection, preservation and transportation of physical evidence. The increase of terrorism cases in Lebanon brought additional substantive and structural challenges to the military courts in charge of terrorism cases.

For an efficient security system, national co-ordination mechanisms need to be in place to promote internal and inter-agency co-ordination and a collaborative working environment. To be effective, security field operations require a high degree of co-ordination, agencies responsiveness and clarity in command chains. Additionally international co-ordination and co-operation is to be developed to prevent and counter the spread of the terrorist threat, beyond the Lebanese borders. Intelligence information sharing is to be reinforced to avoid a

negative impact on risks assessment processes and finally on the delivery capacity of security agencies in fighting criminal networks, cross borders crimes and trafficking in human beings.

Through previous EU support, the concept of Integrated Border Management has been implemented in Lebanon. An IBM Strategy, Action Plan and Contingency Plans for Emergency Situations at Borders have been drafted and the national capacity building developed. Inter-agency co-operation, previously inexistent, is steadily improving. EU assistance has certainly strengthened the capacity of Lebanon's border management agencies to fulfil their functions and enabled the creation of a small but very well-qualified pool of national trainers, who are currently providing basic document security training to other border staff. As a tangible result, the number of forged documents detected by Lebanese authorities has increased.

Despite these steps, much remains to be done as border agencies are not yet ready to facilitate regular exchange of information (they do not even share alerts) and the role of the Border Control Committee (BCC) remains purely advisory. Border management is to be reinforced in view of the presence of criminal networks which are increasingly using air and sea borders following tightening controls of land borders.

Following the most recent war at the North-Eastern borders with Syria, the LAF have started spreading and establishing facilities at those borders. There is a need to reinforce LAF ability to timely provide capable units for field operations by ameliorating the logistic component throughout the Lebanese territory in general and at the North – Eastern borders in particular.

In May 2017 the UN Committee against Torture raised concerns about reports on excessive use of force by law enforcement officers and member of the LAF; use of torture and ill-treatment against suspects in custody; allegations of harassment; and cases of arbitrary and incommunicado detention. Complaints of torture and ill-treatment are rarely investigated, prosecuted and sanctioned, which creates a climate of impunity.

 The UN Human Rights Committee expressed concerns about the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians, including children; lack of independence and impartiality of military courts judges; allegations of violation of fair trial and fundamental safeguards, including torture, forced confessions, arbitrary sentencing, limited right of appeal.

The programme will also support the empowerment of Civil Society, including whenever possible media, universities and think tanks, as well as simple citizens, to independently monitor the security sector and engage in a policy dialogue in a constructive and professional way.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

| Risks | Risk level (H/M/L) | Mitigating measures |
|---|---|---|
| Weak Intelligence information impacts on risks assessment processes and finally on the fight against criminal networks, cross borders crimes and trafficking in human beings. | H | EU assistance will promote inter-agency co-ordination and the development of a culture of working together, in addition to providing needed technical training and |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | increased risk analysis capacity |
| Weak political engagement on sensitive issues such as trafficking in human beings and respect of human rights | M | Increased policy and political dialogue. Engagement of other international actors including the UN system |
| Overcrowding of assistance on security sector support and reluctance of donors to share often sensitive information can: generate competition among donors; impact on efficient donors' co-ordination and co-operation; affect beneficiaries' absorption capacity. | H | Both HQ and the EU Delegation will encourage a coherent EU approach as regards assistance in the security sector  Beneficiaries will be encouraged to play a more proactive role in external assistance co-ordination |
| EU assistance might be slow in reacting to beneficiaries' needs since new Security threats - including terrorism - are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and complex. | M | EU assistance will be designed in a flexible way and synergies among different instruments will be monitored and if necessary reinforced |
| Use of private company/external consultants implementing EU security sector support might raise beneficiaries 'concerns in terms of trust and confidence in sharing sensitive information. | M | The EU will promote peer-to-peer opportunities for Capacity Building of Lebanese counterparts, by putting them in connection with relevant EU Member States agencies and/or International organisations. |
| Security actors benefiting from EU assistance may act in a biased, discriminatory or abusive way towards the population | M | The rights-based approach, the involvement of CSOs and targeted training sessions will promote rule of law and human rights. EU assistance will be continuously monitored and the EU Delegation will maintain a regular policy/sectoral dialogue with the Lebanese authorities and counterparts concerned. Should grave violations not be properly addressed, the EU might consider suspending or withdrawing support, even partially. |

**Assumptions**

- There is no sudden deterioration of the situation in the country and of the regional political and security situation.
- Lebanon's internal political situation does not affect the willingness of security system stakeholders to discuss and implement institutional changes required for an improved performance of state security providers.
- The Government of Lebanon remains committed to developing and implementing a national IBM and CT policies' framework.
- Security agencies continues to develop a co-operative attitude
- The situation in the North-East remains sufficiently stable to allow for project activities

# 3  LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

## 3.1  Lessons learnt

The recently-concluded "Thematic evaluation of EU support for Security Sector reform in Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries (2010-2016)" has indicated that ongoing IBM interventions are aligned with EU policy objectives in Lebanon and are consistent with the long-term policy goal of the EU-Lebanese partnership to assist "Lebanon's development as a stable, democratic, politically open and economically strong neighbour of the EU".

It confirmed the relevance of EU crucial support in the thematic areas of IBM and CT/CVE, two sectors of assistance that are welcomed by Lebanese beneficiaries given the high degree of instability and multiple security threats that Lebanon has encountered. All beneficiaries indicated the need for more EU assistance in the future and complementarity with EU Member States support to ensure the needed tactical training and equipment that cannot be covered by the EU assistance.

The evaluation reported that the EU has the greatest visibility and value added where there is a convergence of EU, Member States and beneficiary security interests, such as, in the case of Lebanon, the thematic area of IBM, where Member States contribute with a large volume of bilateral assistance. The EU Delegation was instrumental in streamlining some of the bilateral States' support (i.e. from Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, Romania and Poland) so as to be complementary to what the EU was supporting, reduce duplication, improve efficiency and provide a higher added value to the beneficiaries.

Previous EU co-operation programmes highlighted that intra/inter-agency co-operation and exposure to international practises has been more effective under EU funded sectoral programmes such as the IBM and CBRN defence, rather than within programmes targeting the isolated capacity-building of a specific agency (i.e. LAF, GDSS or ISF). Undoubtedly, security agencies are more willing to enter into joint training agreements, collaborate and co-operate while tackling practical aspects on subjects that are of common interest and where they experience directly the benefit of open channels of communication and a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities. Considering the above, in this new phase it is proposed to work on thematic areas.

Despite substantial technical assistance provided for the development of policies and legislation, the country continues to suffer from poor implementation and enforcement of laws and policies. This is to a large extent due to weak or non-existing regulatory/fiscal impact assessments of proposed laws and policies, poor inter-ministerial co-ordination and external (public) stakeholder consultation. Prior to supporting the beneficiaries with drafting of strategic documents and legislation, this Action will support them with 'options analysis', regulatory impact assessment, concept papers, estimation of implementation costs, etc. in full respect of all national procedures for policy development.

Additionally, past co-operation signalled the need to ensure the timely procurement of equipment to valuably complement the technical expertise component, thus a flexible implementation framework will be privileged to respond timely to emerging needs.
Based on previous positive experiences, the programme will favour a twinning approach with relevant EU Member State agencies to allow for sharing of knowledge among peers, creating

synergies and supporting the establishment of sustainable international co-operation networks, particularly with the EU.

## 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor co-ordination

In order to incrementally scale up the EU's commitment in Integrated Border Management and in the implementation of the EU-Lebanon CT Roadmap, opportunities for synergies and complementarity will be constantly explored during the preparation and implementation of the projects under this programme. The EU has been providing support to the security sector in Lebanon through a series of Regional Programmes focusing on strategic criminal intelligence, countering terrorism - including the Foreign Terrorist Fighters phenomenon - organised crime, trafficking and smuggling, disaster prevention and preparedness, Border Security and monitoring of drugs market. The Commission started in June 2018 a project to improve the security of Beirut International airport which is a critical infrastructure and border post from a CT perspective[2]. Furthermore, the Commission finances the regional "Counter-terrorism partnership" programme under which the European Law Enforcement Agency CEPOL provides trainings on cybersecurity to selected security agencies in Lebanon[3]. The Commission is also contributing to the greater deployment of the LAF Model Regiment in the South. The Twinning and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instruments have been mobilised to complement the long-term EU assistance. Finally synergies, exchange of information and possibly of best practises will be sought with interventions under the Justice Programme, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Migration budget lines and with relevant ongoing regional programmes, namely *CyberSouth – Co-operation on cybercrime in the Southern Neighbourhood Region, Interpol South, EU4Border Security, Countering radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Sahel –Maghreb Region, Supporting Rule of law compliant investigation and prosecutions in the Maghreb region, EuroMed Police IV; Strengthening the legal regime against Foreign Terrorist Fighters in MENA and Western Balkans; Countering the finance of Terrorism-Anti Money Laundering in MENA region and Asia.*

The EU is part of the International Support Group for Lebanon set up in 2013 to co-ordinate international support to Lebanon on improving the country's security and stability, and, in particular supporting LAF's capacity to defend the country. Country-level co-ordination with the relevant stakeholders and donors is organised through the following fora: Informal Security and Rule of Law donors' co-ordination meeting; meeting among EU Member States' CT experts, EU Member States' Defence Attachés meetings, EU Member States' Immigration Liaison Officers. Additionally, exchanges take place on an *ad hoc* basis with concerned stakeholders.

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[2] ICSP/2018/041-319 "Support to the Lebanese Authorities in securing the Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport against illicit trafficking and the threat of terrorism"

[3] ICSP/2017/040-706 "Counter-Terrorism Training and Strengthening Community Resilience against Violent Extremism"

In the context of the Rome II Conference[4], both the Army and the Police recently developed their multi-annual Development Plans for the period 2018-2022, which do not only set the frame for targeted international assistance but also represent a valuable opportunity for donor co-ordination, particularly in view of the important pledges made by France, United States of America, Turkey, Cyprus, Japan, United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada.

The actions under this programme will develop synergies and build on lessons learnt under two projects that started recently to target the role of CSOs in the security sector and, in particular, the ENI project "*Promoting stability in Lebanon through community engagement and dialogue*" aiming at:

a) Strengthening dialogue mechanisms between security actors, communities and civil society in line with human rights, gender and rule of law principles;

b) Using research and advocacy to improve understanding of security dynamics and conflict drivers; and

c) Piloting initiatives aimed at building trust and addressing sources of instability.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) project "*Civil Military Relations in Arab States (CIMIRAS)*" seeks to build civilian expertise and engagement in security affairs, in four Arab States (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia) by:

a) Providing civilians (e.g. Defence Ministry staff or parliamentary staff, etc.) with a better understanding of defence issues in order to develop meaningful civilian oversight;

b) Building civilian expertise and strengthening their line of work;

c) Creating an Arab-speaking civilian expertise in defence/security sector issues able to approach the various stakeholders in new ways.

### 3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The programme will be implemented following a rule of law and rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights. The five working principles below will be applied at all stages of implementation: Legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights; Participation and access to the decision-making process; Non-discrimination and equal access to justice; Accountability and respect of the rule of lax; Transparency and access to information.

Rule of law and human rights are mainstreamed in the EU assistance to the security and justice systems and agencies benefitting from specific training. The international community encourages security agencies to continue to develop and implement codes of conduct as important steps towards increased accountability and respect for human rights. Security institutions strive to increase the participation of women in all levels of decision-making in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.

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[4]      https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2018/03/il-sostegno-alle-forze-di-sicurezza.html

Additionally, the project will advocate for a stronger presence of well-trained female staff during security operations in order to guarantee the full respect of societal and religious norms, without compromising with security requirements. Attention will be paid to ensuring that the CT Strategy will be properly engendered and that Pillar 5 (Gender Equality and Empowering Women) of the National Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Strategy is duly taken into account and women are empowered in protecting themselves and their families against all forms of violence and exploitation.

## 4   DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

EU assistance will support two main axes:

### Component 1) Border Security and Management – BS&M

The action will build on results achieved under the previous two phases and will continue assisting national agencies on the rights-based approach in securing the country's borders (land, airport and sea) while facilitating trade, regular entries and assistance to people in need of international protection. The action will increase the effectiveness of Lebanon's border management agencies in line with international and democratic norms through capacity building programmes and provision of equipment. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)'s operational capacity will be reinforced to step-up control of the North-Eastern borders by improving shelters, communications and living conditions of regiments at the borders and key LAF bases. The programme will include Civilian-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) actions promoting engagement between border agencies and local communities, including implementing small-scale support aiming to improve security for vulnerable communities in border areas at high risk of instability.

In 2018, the LAF plans to upgrade the Border Control Committee (BCC) that co-ordinates border management activities. The Committee will be transformed into a fully-fledged Border Directorate, which will unify all Land Border Regiments, Coastal and Air Surveillance. The EU is well positioned to provide continued assistance in terms of strategy development and capacity building to the new directorate.

The action will continue reinforcing security agencies' border management co-ordination capabilities and promoting a rights-based approach, particularly in managing the influx of people in need of international protection. EU assistance will seek opportunities for development of operations at the Beirut Airport and in main seaports (Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon) which are the main entry points for commercial exchanges. The programme will also increase awareness and encourage dialogue on Trafficking in Human Beings to promote the implementation of Law 164 of 2011.

The security and well-being of the LAF personnel in the North-Eastern regions will be supported through the upgrade of LAF facilities using sustainable energy solutions, as per LAF Sustainable Energy Strategy prepared by the EU-funded CEDRO project and endorsed by the Minister of Defence and the LAF Commander in 2017.

The programme will be closely co-ordinated with upcoming projects under the IcSP on airport security as well as regional programmes – particularly the *EU4Border Security* - and activities of the European Border and Coast Guards Agency (EBCGA).

**Component 2) Counter Terrorism/Prevention of Violent Extremism (CT&PVE)**

The action will support implementation of the priorities under the EU-Lebanon Counter Terrorism Road Map and develop national capacities to better understand and respond to the threats of terrorism and organised crime as well as to ensure enhanced judicial procedures and judicial and law enforcement cooperation in line with international standards.

Specifically, the action will:

a) accompany reforms by supporting the development and implementation of a national Counter terrorism strategy and action plans in compliance with the relevant international instruments, ensuring the alignment on data protection legislation and institutional framework; b) reinforce the operational capacities of security agencies and Military Courts to build evidence-based investigations; to counter any case of torture or ill-treatment; and support vulnerable individuals appearing before the Court; and c) promote effective co-operation between relevant actors, including at international level.

The action may also support Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) activities where these complement activities under the Justice Programme and follow the priorities in the recently adopted national PVE strategy and its upcoming implementation plan. Support will include equipment and refurbishment works, based on a needs assessment and relevance under the programme priorities.

In order to enhance national capacity, the action proposes to assist on the establishment of a CT multi-agency co-ordination system, including operation rooms, shared risk analysis and early warning to improve national and international co-operation on terrorist risks.

## 4.1 Objectives/results

The **Overall Objective** of the action is to contribute to the development of a long-term capability of the Lebanese security system to control risks and guarantee the respect of the Rule of Law and human rights, thus ensuring greater security for citizens and sustainable stabilisation processes for the country.

The Specific Objectives of the action are split by component as follows:

**Component 1) Border Security and Management – BS&M**

**Specific objective 1** – To assist the Lebanese authorities to secure the country's borders while ensuring trade exchange, regular entries and assistance to people in need of international protection.

Expected results:

**(R1) Advanced national and international co-operation and co-ordination on rights-based border management:** Improved co-operation and co-ordination functions among border agencies and other relevant stakeholders, through solid and long-term strategic planning, which leads to a more effective and efficient use of human, material and financial resources.

**(R2) Enhanced institutional capacities of border agencies in border controls:** Lebanon's

operational and strategic border management capabilities are further developed through a sustainable process of training and other forms of skills/knowledge transfer which promotes Human Rights in border governance measures and border activities. Lebanon's basic border management infrastructures, with particular attention to the North-Eastern borders, are developed and upgraded to promote security.

**(R3) Improved facilitation of legal crossing and cross-border trade:** Lebanon's operational and strategic capabilities in facilitating legal border crossing and cross border trade are developed through a sustainable process of training for the respective agencies, as well as through a process of knowledge exchange between these agencies and likeminded institutions in EU Member States. Lebanon's basic legal crossings' (land, air and seaports) infrastructures are developed and upgraded to facilitate effective mechanisms to ensure facilitation of people and goods across borders.

## Component 2) Counter Terrorism/Prevention of Violent Extremism (CT&PVE)

**Specific objective 2:** To reinforce national capacity to better understand, prevent and react to the threats of terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation while promoting rule of law and a rights-based approach.

Expected results:

**(R1) Strengthened legal framework against terrorism in line with relevant international standards:** A national CT strategy which might encompass cyber security would boost the reform of the Lebanese CT legislative and regulatory framework, which remains dispersed and uncodified. Lebanon has ratified some relevant international conventions which could inform the revision of the statutory CT law and procedural law in view of ensuring a rights-based approach when defining exceptional investigation and prosecution measures, collection of evidentiary rules; and establish a proper investigation and assistance regimes for victims/witnesses of acts of terrorism.

**(R2) Enhanced protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks including cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks:** A first step to enhance the capacity of protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks is to develop a cyber and CBRN protection strategy. While progress is made in the CBRN field, Lebanon is yet to develop and implement a cyber-security strategy to promote and enhance national and international co-operation and co-ordination in the sector and improve a cyber-security awareness culture. Lebanon also needs to ensure that the concept of cybercrime is interpreted in a consistent manner with freedom of expression and the respect of privacy and that the principle of legality, proportionality and necessity are applied for surveillance activities and collection of personal and metadata; adopt personal data protection rules for law enforcement and judicial authorities, in line with international and EU standards (Police Directive; Europol Regulation), that provide for the possibility for Lebanon to develop international operational cooperation on law enforcement and criminal justice..

**(R3) Rights-Based Approach is applied by criminal justice and law enforcement officials at the Military Court:** The increase of terrorism cases in Lebanon brought additional substantive and structural challenges to the military courts in charge of terrorism cases. Main practitioners express concerns about: the mandate of the courts to prosecute civilians; the

rehabilitation and specialisation of judges; the majority of confession-based sentences; neglected victims' rights; weak witness protection; appearance of juveniles before the court; as well as unreasoned judgements, which are also highlighted by criminal justice officials who themselves are serving at the court. Efforts will be deployed in order to develop the capacities of officials serving at the military courts to accomplish their duties in line with international human rights standards and the rule of law. EU support will enhance the co-operation and information sharing between the Military Courts prosecutors/investigation judges with their relevant interlocutors in investigation units of ISF, LAF, GS and SS. Furthermore, in view of complementing Result 2, training will be provided on investigating terrorist cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure through the use of special investigation techniques. The implementation of the criminal justice component of the PVE strategy is to be boosted, since it encompasses the criminal justice response to prevent and counter terrorism while respecting human rights and the rule of law.

Up to 10% of the total envelope of the programme will support, under both components, the capacity building of civil society organisations on security sector reform matters and facilitate discussions between them and security actors, in order to tangibly promote the role of civil society actors to function as watchdog and valuably engage in the policy dialogue.

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG Goal 16 *Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels*, but also promotes progress towards Goal 5 *Gender* and Goal 7 *Affordable and clean energy*. This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this programme.

## 4.2 Main activities

The list of activities by component is purely indicative, targeted activities will be implemented in view of achieving the programme results:

### Component 1) Border Security and Management – BS&M

Main activities:

- Assistance and support to inclusive and evidence-based strategic and action planning, capacity building activities on border management and international assistance for people in need, provision of rights-based approach training, including on data and information sharing mechanisms and on the principle of *non-refoulement* to any person at risk of being tortured in the State of destination;

- Promotion of migrants rights to reduce the risk that regular and/or irregular migrants could experience discrimination and unlawful profiling, disproportionate interference with the right to privacy, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, dangerous interception practices, and prolonged or arbitrary detention.

- Support in the establishment and operationalisation of central operations rooms and co-ordination entities (i.e. LAF Border Control Directorate); exchange of expertise and experiences on border management; exposure to comparative regional and international experiences on IBM and models of inter-agency co-operation.

- Provision of needed equipment and infrastructure, with attention to efficient energy systems.

## **Component 2) Counter Terrorism/Prevention of Violent Extremism (CT&PVE)**

Main activities:

- Identification of relevant national stakeholders;

- Awareness activities on a national counter terrorism strategy;

- Exposure to comparative regional and international experiences on CT Strategy and models of inter-agency co-operation;

- Assistance and support to inclusive and evidence-based revision of the legal framework and drafting of proposals for strengthening the legal framework on the fight against terrorism in compliance with the relevant international instruments;

- Assistance on the establishment of a national counter terrorism committee and drafting of an inclusive and evidence-based counter terrorism strategy;

- Assistance on drafting a cybersecurity strategy and defining training curricula on information security, freedom of expression, respect of privacy and international standards for surveillance activities and collection of personal and metadata;

- Assistance on drafting and implementing (including by supporting the relevant institutional framework as well as capacity building) legislation on personal data protection consistent with EU legislation (notably the Police Directive and the data protection requirements set out in the Europol Regulation) in order to facilitate inter-agency and international law enforcement cooperation (including with Europol and Eurojust);

- Promotion of the adoption of modern and rights-based regulations to ensure the cyber safety of systems provision of training to security agencies staff and criminal justice officials at the Military courts, including on data and information sharing mechanisms and requests for international legal assistance and extradition, training on evidence-based investigations, and on no-coercive investigatory techniques, training on identifying and documenting cases of torture and ill-treatment in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol;

- Raising awareness of military courts to refuse as evidence confessions obtained under torture; awareness on legal status for witnesses and victims of acts of terrorism in criminal proceedings, assistance on the adoption of alternative measures to detention; exchange of expertise and experiences on security of critical infrastructure; provision of necessary equipment and infrastructure support.

In order to promote sustainability, the action will ensure that training information is sent to the Civil Service Bureau (CSB) which is the institution centrally responsible for the training of civil servants and in charge, *inter alia*, of training needs assessment and training policies.

Under both components, the programme will strengthen the CSOs' role in performing independent monitoring functions and promoting policy dialogue through co-learning

activities on SSR, such as organisation of workshops, roundtables, training, and conferences for the relevant stakeholders (senior security personnel, civil servants, parliamentarians, media, civil society organisations, academics, policy-makers) on selected SSR issues such as: governance, management and reform of the security system; public security and the responsiveness of security providers to citizens' needs and expectations; benefits for the security system of implementing transparency, accountability and oversight mechanisms.

## 4.3    Intervention logic

As per the Logical Framework in annex, the intervention aims to contribute to the development of a long-term capability of the Lebanese security system to control risks and guarantee the respect of the Rule of Law and respect of human rights, thus ensuring greater security for citizens and sustainable stabilisation processes for the country.

Against the risks that may stem from the deterioration of the security situation and from the political sensitivity of security issues, it is assumed that    Lebanon's    internal    political situation does not prevent the proper implementation of the action while institutional stakeholders show ownership of, and commitment to, the process.

As Integrated Border Management and Counter-terrorism constitute thematic pillars of the Lebanese security sector, it is expected that the concrete output (provision of expertise and supply of equipment) will lead to a reinforcement of Lebanese security agencies' operational capacities while fostering inter-agency co-operation, rule of law and the respect of human rights according to international standards.

In the long-term, the action will promote Lebanon's stability and resilience while contributing to foster the legitimacy of the security agencies and thereby to reinforce the role of the State as the sole legitimate security provider.

Both components will integrate support to improve the capacity of civil society organisations on security sector reform matters and facilitate discussions between them and security actors, in order to tangibly promote the role of civil society actors to function as watchdog and valuably engage in the policy dialogue. About 10% of the budget under each component will be reserved to CSOs support as a combined element of implemented actions.

It will be ensured that EU support to the security sector is in compliance with/contributes to the promotion, protection and enforcement of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and is consistent with the EU's human rights policies. The programme foresees Government's commitment to adhere to the principles of transparency and dialogue on engaging the public participation in the security sector reform/development-related discussions, through a consultation process. The rights-based approach, the involvement of CSOs and targeted training sessions on respect of international standards, rule of law and Human rights will counter the risk that security actors benefiting from EU assistance may act in a biased, discriminatory or abusive way towards the population. Additionally, EU assistance will be continuously monitored and the EUD will maintain a regular policy/sectoral dialogue with the Lebanese authorities and counterparts concerned, beyond the activities addressed by the projects. Should grave violations not be properly addressed by the national authorities to bringing these to an end, the EU might consider suspending or withdrawing support, even partially.

## 5 IMPLEMENTATION

For both components the proposed implementation modality is indirect management with the pillar-assessed International organisations International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for component 1. Component 2 will be implemented by the Fundacion Internacional y para Iberoamerica de Administracion y Politicas Publicas (FIIAPP). Procurement in direct management is indicated as an alternative option to 5.3.1.4 for the implementation of Component 2 – CT&PVE

### 5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

### 5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### 5.3 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures[5].

#### 5.3.1.1 Procurement (direct management) ADD

Procurement in direct management is indicated as an alternative option to 5.3.1.4 for the implementation of Component 2 – CT&PVE.

| Subject in generic terms, if possible | Type (works, supplies, services) | Indicative number of contracts | Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reinforcement of national capacities to assess and react to threats of terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation. | Services, Supplies | 2 | 3rd 2019 (Services) and 1st 2020 |

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[5] www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

| | | | (Supplies) |
|---|---|---|---|

### 5.3.1.2 Indirect management with an international organisation

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This implementation entails the implementation of Component 1) Border Security and Management – BS&M in promoting border management (land, airport and sea borders) by national agencies while facilitating trade, regular entries and assistance to people in need of international protection. This implementation is justified because:

- The action requires a specific technical competence and specialisation. ICMPD is the primary international agency by which the EU approach to Integrated Border Management, as described in the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Co-operation (developed by ICMPD) are propagated in EU neighbourhood countries. ICMPD brings the full range of border management, customs, border policing and border security competencies necessary to fulfil the requirement of this action;
- The action is the continuation of the assistance already provided by the EU on IBM issues in Lebanon. The current support is provided by ICMPD to the full satisfaction of all stakeholders. This has allowed ICMPD to build a strong basis of trust and partnership with Lebanese partner authorities (notably GS, Customs, ISF and CD). In the current crisis context, a disruption to the current action which would result from the transfer of this action to another beneficiary would severely restrict effective implementation and damage the delivery of the required results.
- The ICMPD has been able to mobilise EU MS expertise and favour exchange visits in EU MS creating a sustainable environment for longstanding co-operation between peer agencies.
- The ICMPD is also ensuring a close co-ordination with other donors supporting the IBM Lebanon programme and, in particular, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland; it also developed a working relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States to promote complementarity of interventions and coherence of approaches.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: launching the procurement process for services and supplies, grants awards, contracting, payments and recovery orders. The entrusted entity might sub-delegate certain activities to other organisations specialised on certain aspects of the intervention. Appropriate provisions will be included in the contribution agreement.

The Commission authorises that the costs incurred by the entrusted entity may be recognised as eligible as of 31 December 2018 because it is necessary to ensure continuity of EU support and avoid gaps in the assistance and established collaboration with the national entities.

### 5.3.1.3 Indirect management with an international organisation

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with UNDP. This implementation entails complementary assistance to the implementation of a part of

Component 1) Border Security and Management – BS&M aiming to improve the security and well-being of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel in the North-Eastern regions through the upgrade of LAF facilities using sustainable energy solutions.

This implementation is justified because:

- Under the European Union-funded CEDRO Project, UNDP has established effective working relations with LAF on the preparation of the "Sustainable Energy Strategy of the LAF" - which this intervention is based on - aiming to reduce LAF greenhouse gas emissions by boosting renewable energy and energy efficiency measures across various buildings and LAF facilities, including at the borders
- UNDP can count on LAF's trust and strong collaboration on the implementation of an action that requires access to military areas (border posts and military bases). UNDP has already been granted access to military sites for survey purposes.
- UNDP can mobilize high technical expertise for the training of LAF staff and ensure the installation of equipment. Additionally, UNDP has a longstanding collaboration with the LAF Engineer regiment whose staff will be trained to ensure the sustainability of the intervention.
- UNDP can mobilise Arab-speaking trainers to the benefit of cost-effective technical training modules (i.e. maintenance of equipment).

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: launching procurement process for services and supplies, contracting and payments. The entrusted entity might sub-delegate certain activities to other organisations specialised on certain aspects of the intervention. Appropriate provisions will be included in the contribution agreement.

In case the aforementioned activities of this component cannot be implemented by UNDP as entrusted entity, due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control, it will be replaced by ICMPD according to the modalities set out in section in 5.3.1.2.

### 5.3.1.4 Indirect management with a Member State agency

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with *Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas* (FIIAPP). This implementation entails Component 2) CT&PVE assistance in reinforcing the national capacities to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation. This implementation is justified because FIIAPP guarantees the technical knowledge alongside with the understanding of the regional context, while having an established co-operation with the Lebanese counterparts, particularly in the area of prisons and training on counter terrorism.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: launching the procurement process for services and supplies, grants awards, contracting, payments and recovery orders. The entrusted entity might sub-delegate certain activities to other organisations specialised on certain aspects of the intervention. Appropriate provisions will be included in the contribution agreement.

The entrusted Member State Agency is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment. The Commission's authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom)[6] and long-lasting problem-free co-operation, FIIAPP can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.3.1.1.

### 5.3.1.5 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

In case Component 2 – CT&PVE – of this programme cannot be implemented by FIIAPP as entrusted entity, due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control, it will be replaced by the below alternative implementation modality in direct management.

| Subject in generic terms, if possible | Type (works, supplies, services) | Indicative number of contracts | Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reinforcement of national capacities to assess and react to threats of terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation. | Services, Supplies | 2 | 3rd 2019 (Services) and 1st 2020 (Supplies) |

## 5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall be subject to the following provisions.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

## 5.5 Indicative budget

| Components | EU contribution (amount in EUR) |
|---|---|
| | |

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[6] Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities

| | |
|---|---|
| **Component 1)** Border Security and Management – BS&M composed of | |
| Indirect management with ICMPD and UNDP | **11,000,000** |
| **Component 2)** Counter Terrorism/Prevention of Violent Extremism (CT&PVE) composed of | |
| Indirect management with FIIAPP | **7,000,000** |
| 5.8 – Evaluation, 5.10 - Audit | will be covered by another Decision |
| Totals | **18,000,000\*** |
| *About 10% of the budget will be reserved to CSOs support as a combined element of implemented actions | |

## 5.6   Organisational set-up and responsibilities

A Steering Committee shall be set up for each project to oversee and validate the overall direction and policy of the project. It will also provide guidance for the programme's activities and review project achievements as well as discuss strategic issues to ensure its overall coherency. The project's steering committee shall meet twice a year. The Implementing partner/Consultant will assist it by fulfilling a technical secretariat function together with the technical and operational counterparts directly involved in the programme's implementation.

The project's steering committee shall be made up of:

- representatives from the relevant beneficiary agencies / organisations and from all the departments directly involved in the programme's activities

- representatives from the relevant line Ministries

- a representative of the Head of Delegation and other representatives of the EU (the Contracting Authority).

Representatives of supervisory or control bodies with a regular statutory involvement in the programme may also participate in such meetings as observers. Representatives of those EU Member States that maintain a close co-operation with the specific beneficiary authorities in domains related to this programme may also be invited on an *ad hoc* basis.

## 5.7   Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of the implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means

envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action's implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## 5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the importance of the action, a mid-term and a final evaluation(s) will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission or via an implementing partner.

The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for learning purposes, in particular with respect to efficiency and effectiveness to promote meaningful impact of EU assistance.

The final evaluation it will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account, in particular, the fact that EU engagement in the security sector support might continue.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 1 month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and *inter alia* provide them with all the necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## 5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## 5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and contribution agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

**APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY) [7]**

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing Decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

| Results chain | Indicators | Baselines (incl. reference year) | Targets (incl. reference year) | Sources and means of verification | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Overall objective: Impact** | | | | | |
| To contribute to the development of a long-term capability of the Lebanese security system to control risks and guarantee the respect of the rule of law and respect of human rights, thus ensuring greater security for citizens and sustainable stabilisation processes for the country. | State security institutions more effective in enforcing the rule of law in full respect of citizens' rights | | | Statistics on crime | Relative political stability in Lebanon and the region. |
| | | | | Analysis and media reports on public order events or crises | Lebanon's internal political situation does not affect the willingness of security system stakeholders to discuss and implement institutional changes required for an improved performance of state security providers. |
| | Security institutions enjoy a higher legitimacy among the population in carrying out their law enforcement tasks | | | Surveys conducted by the programme. | |
| | | | | Public perception surveys | |
| | Increased transparency and accountability of the Lebanese Security System. | | | National Strategies on IBM and CT | |

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7      Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with '*' and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with '**'.

| Specific objective(s): Outcome(s) | |
|---|---|
| 1. To assist Lebanese authorities to secure country's borders while ensuring trade exchange, regular entries and assistance to people in need of international protection. | Adoption/implementation of the relevant inclusive and evidence-based Joint National Strategies and action plans |
| | Number of expulsion towards countries where the individuals concerned could face execution, torture or ill-treatment upon return |
| | Establishment of a CT multi-agency co-ordination system and operation rooms |
| | Increased professionalism of law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate terrorist offences |
| | Exchange between non state actors and Security/ Criminal Justice agencies on relevant topics |
| 2. To reinforce the national capacities to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation while promoting the rule of law and a rights based approach. | Citizen's Perception on security/justice services delivery |

| Outputs | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 Advanced national and international co-operation and co-ordination on rights-based border management | IBM Strategy, IBM Action and Contingency plans | IBM Strategy, IBM Action and Contingency plans are drafted | IBM Strategy, IBM Action and Contingency plans are approved and implemented. | Statistics on crime | GoL commitment to develop and implement a national IBM policies framework. |
| | Joint assessments/co-ordinated response to security threats (including preventive and mitigating measures) by border agencies | No of joint risks analysis units available | Joint risk analysis units operational | Analysis and media reports on public order events or crises | Security agencies continues to develop co-operative attitude |
| | | | | Surveys conducted by the programme. | |
| | | | | Public perception surveys | |
| 1.2 Enhanced institutional capacities of border agencies in border controls | No of LAF border facilities using sustainable energy options | LAF is not using renewable energy sources | At least 3 LAF facilities use sustainable energy | National Strategies on IBM and CT | Situation in the North-East remains sufficiently stable to allow for project activities |
| | Protective measure against interference of rights to privacy and family life during border management screening and control. | Reported cases of no respect of privacy and individual rights | Improved public perception of the quality of services provided at the borders | Project reports | |
| | Reinforced CSOs role to follow-up on transparency, accountability and oversights Security Sector issues | | | Evaluation and monitoring reports | |
| | N of co-learning opportunities on SS actions | | | Reports from CSOs and International bodies (i.e UN, ICRC) | |
| | | | | Media reports over security sector related topics | |
| | | | | Lists of participants to workshops / conferences, training, etc. | |
| | | | | Minutes of consultation forums. | |
| 1.3 Improved facilitation of legal crossing and cross-border trade. | Goods clearance time | Long waiting time for goods clearance | Improvement in goods clearance time | | GoL commitment to develop and implement a national CT policy and legal framework. |
| | Secure border | Secure border | Secure border management system | | Security agencies continue to develop cooperative attitude |

[29]