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## ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action programme to be financed from the general budget of the Union for Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace for 2019

### Action Document for Counterterrorism

#### ANNUAL PROGRAMME

This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation N° 236/2014.

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	Annual Action Programme 2019- Counterterrorism CRIS number: 2019/041-844 financed under the IcSP.			
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action</b>	The action shall be carried out at the following location: Global			
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) - Multiannual Indicative Programme 2018-2020			
<b>4. SDGs</b>	Primarily SDG 16 " <i>Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</i> ", and SDG 5 " <i>Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</i> "			
<b>5. Sector of intervention/ thematic area</b>	Counterterrorism (CT)	DEV. Assistance: YES/NO		
<b>6. Amounts concerned</b>	Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 22 500 000. This action may be co-financed in joint co-financing with: United Nations Office for Counter- Terrorism (UNOCT) for an amount to be discussed.			
<b>7. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)</b>	Project Modality <b>Direct management</b> through: Grants and Procurement <b>Indirect management</b> with UNOCT as part of the UN Secretariat			
<b>8 a) DAC code(s)</b>	Component 5 STRIVE GCERF: 15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution. Other components: Not applicable.			
<b>b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	Component 1: 41000; 2, 3, 4: 10000; 5: 20000			
<b>9. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x
	Aid to environment	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and Women's and Girl's Empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	x	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>

	Biological diversity	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>10. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships</b>	Not applicable			

## SUMMARY

This action aims at disrupting terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cutting off terrorist funding and bringing terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

### **Component 1: Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data (API/PNR):**

The objective is to build capacities to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences, and other serious crimes, and related travel, by collecting and analysing passenger data, both Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). This global project will target countries most affected by the foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) phenomenon, and will build on the expertise of countries already implementing or having implemented national API/PNR systems.

**Component 2: Law enforcement in Central Asia:** The objective is to improve criminal justice responses to terrorism in Central Asia in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, with a particular focus on developing law enforcement capacities, enhancing judiciary procedures and strengthening regional CT cooperation.

**Component 3: CT CLOSE II.** CT CLOSE I aim to enhance capacities in terms of information collection, analysis and dissemination. CT CLOSE I focuses on technical assistance to strengthen the rule of law function of intelligence bodies in countries in the MENA/Sahel region. CT CLOSE II will enable the acquisition of relevant equipment (mainly IT and other equipment in full compliance with the human-rights-based approach) to selected countries based on the recommendations and technical grounds provided under CLOSE I.

**Component 4: Global Facility on Counter Terrorism Financing (CFT) Anti-Money Laundering (AML).** The objective of this component is to provide assistance to partner countries aimed at supporting efforts to put in place effective AML/CFT frameworks in compliance with EU requirements, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions on AML/CFT

**Component 5: Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).** This action will provide support to GCERF, a multi-stakeholder global fund that works with local partners to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism. As an independent public-private partnership, GCERF directs resources to support initiatives led by, and benefiting, local communities that empower women, girls, boys men and in a larger sense, persons living in vulnerable situations. GCERF focuses on local communities because they suffer the most from violent extremism, and because they are optimally placed to understand and act upon the drivers of violent extremism.

## 1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

### 1.1 Context Description

The EU has been identified terrorism as one of the major threats facing the union and Member States in the European Agenda on Security (2015) and the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016).

The EU recognises that terrorism is both a crime against life and property and a security threat to freedom, security and justice. It follows that counter-terrorism (CT) needs to be anchored in law

enforcement, criminal justice and human rights, but preventing terrorism requires timely access to information and intelligence, meaning that security and intelligence agencies are, alongside law enforcement agencies, crucial to ensuring an effective response. Effective prevention means swift collection, processing, analysis and sharing of information; because terrorism is often a transnational threat, information needs to be shared both within and between nations and multilateral bodies. Improving counter-terrorism requires investment in building capacity and capability, in priority partner countries: as the upsurge in terrorist activity in Europe since 2015 has demonstrated, security threats abroad can have a direct and violent impact on security at home.

### ***Component 1: API/PNR***

Members of terrorist groups and other transnational organised crime groups continue to take advantage of porous borders across the globe, with returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) adding complexity to border security and management. Air travel has increased the connectivity of the world and is projected to double over the next 20 years, with air carriers in all regions of the globe facing increasingly complex responsibility for air passenger travel. Collecting, processing and sharing passenger data is therefore essential to the identification, detection and interception of FTFs and other high-risk passengers, including those that are otherwise unknown to authorities, both before and after international travel. According to the IATA API/PNR World Tracker, 76 countries are using API, while 28 are using PNR as of March 2019. Most of these countries lack a full knowledge of the use of passenger data to identify and detect FTFs and other criminals, as well as the necessary steps required to develop and implement API/PNR capability. A particular challenge is the cost and complexity of creating an effective and secure system to receive and process passenger data.

The UN has developed the goTravel system, a software for the handling of API/PNR data based on the Travel Information Portal (TRIP) software solution. TRIP, developed by The Netherlands under EU funding, is currently used as a single window for the provision and analysis of API data by the Dutch Passenger Information Unit (PIU). The Dutch Government had provided the TRIP IT system, as well as limited training and installation support to requesting EU Member States before transferring the ownership to the United Nations.

### ***Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA***

Located in proximity to the Middle East and with its largely Islamic backdrop, Central Asia (CA) remains susceptible for returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and FTFs seeking new areas of potential influence. Following the territorial defeat of the ISIL caliphate, a share of the large number of CA FTFs (estimates vary from 2,000-4,000<sup>1</sup>) may shift their focus towards CA. In addition, the risk of spill-over effects from the worsening militant threat in Afghanistan cannot be excluded along the 2,200 km shared border. In recent years, the nascent terrorist threat has increased its salience, though mainly outside the region (including Europe). This includes the Atatürk Airport attacks, the Istanbul nightclub shooting, the Saint Petersburg Metro bombing, the Stockholm truck attack, and the New York City truck attack (adding up to 113 deaths and approx. 400 wounded). Recently a number of terrorist offences have occurred within the CA region. In August 2018, 4 Western tourists were killed in an ISIL-inspired attack in southern Tajikistan, and in November 2018, 21 convicts (of which 12 FTFs) were reportedly killed during an ISIL-instigated prison riot in Khujan, Tajikistan. Certain secular governments of CA have reacted with increasingly repressive policies in order to counter the threat (aimed e.g. at religious practises), sparking concerns about lack of respect for human rights, gender equality and minority's rights. If terrorist organisations successfully exploit the impacts from repressive policies and religious susceptibility in the region, the nascent terrorist threat may become more prevalent in the future. In line with the Council Con-

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Concept-Note\\_Open\\_briefing\\_on\\_Central\\_Asia\\_2Jul18.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Concept-Note_Open_briefing_on_Central_Asia_2Jul18.pdf) and <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-21.pdf>

clusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia (June 2017) the EU is committed to support CA countries with building institutional capacities on law enforcement and CT that are compliant with international human rights standards.

### ***Component 3: CT CLOSE II***

In implementing effective counterterrorism strategies, many States have recognized the benefits of a collaborative and cooperative relationship between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Underscoring the critical role that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement information can play in the prevention of terrorism, Good Practice 6 of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector (Rabat Memorandum) encourages States to enact rule of law-based measures to protect the sources and collection methods of such information in terrorism cases.

It is, therefore, important for law enforcement/criminal justice organisations, and security and intelligence agencies, to cooperate with each other, and with counterparts overseas – as has been recognised by the United Nations in UNSCR 2322 (2016), which aims to strengthen cooperation on CT between judicial, law enforcement and intelligence organisations.

The most successful CT responses involve genuine partnership and collaboration, rather than transactional exchanges of information. Such partnerships require structures, protocols, ways of working and organisational cultures that facilitate cooperation and collaboration. It is imperative that these are compliant with national and international laws, including human rights law and gender equality.

### ***Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML***

Fighting money laundering and terrorist financing contributes to global security, integrity of the financial system and sustainable growth. Laws to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism are designed to prevent the financial market from being misused for these purposes.

Flows of illicit money can damage the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector, and threaten the internal market of the Union as well as international development.

Furthermore, the misuse of the financial system to channel illicit or even lawful money into terrorist purposes poses a clear risk to the integrity, proper functioning, reputation and stability of the financial system. The nexus between organised crime and terrorism and the links between criminal and terrorist groups constitute an increasing security threat to the Union. Preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing is an integral part of any strategy addressing that threat.

### ***Component 5: STRIVE GCERF***

The spread of violent extremism (VE) over recent years poses a significant threat to the international community's efforts in promoting peace and security, as well as undermining progress made towards fostering sustainable development and upholding human rights. The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms, be they political, religious, and nationalist or other, is not a new phenomenon. However, the rise of violent extremist groups and their widespread messages of intolerance have fostered a renewed concern amongst policy makers and practitioners on the importance of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Mitigating the appeal of violent extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world.

## **1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)**

In 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted with the aim of "combating terrorism globally, while respecting human rights". The strategy is based on four pillars'- prevent, protect, pursue and respond- which, collectively, should reduce the risk from terrorism

Terrorism is one of the major threats facing the Union and Member States as highlighted in the European Agenda on Security (2015) and in the **Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign**



**and Security Policy**<sup>2</sup> (2016) which stress the importance of bringing together the internal and external dimensions of terrorism. The Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counterterrorism adopted in June 2017 highlighted the need to further develop cooperation with EU's neighbourhood and other regions on countering terrorism and violent extremism. The need for enhanced international cooperation on countering terrorism and violent extremism is also emphasised in the **European Council Conclusions of 9 February 2015**<sup>3</sup>. This is further reinforced in the **Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism released in June 2017**<sup>4</sup>, which lays out clear guidance on how counterterrorism and P/CVE should be embedded across EU Strategies and policies. In 2005, the **EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy**<sup>5</sup> was adopted with the aim of "combating terrorism globally, while respecting human rights". The strategy is based on four pillars - prevent, protect, pursue and respond - which, collectively, should reduce the risk from terrorism to a manageable level.

The basis for the EU's Prevent work is the **EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism**<sup>6</sup>, which was most recently revised in June 2017. The revised strategy identifies priority areas for EU action, both within and outside of the EU. It calls for a joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and to build community resilience to radicalisation.

EU work in the area of prevention is aligned with the **2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG)**<sup>7</sup> which calls for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures but also systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups.

The proposed actions are aligned to the **SDG 5** "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls" and **16** "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" and to the **EU Gender Action Plan**<sup>8</sup>. They also support the implementation of **UNSC resolution 1325 (2000)**<sup>9</sup>, which stresses the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping and of **UNSC resolution 2242 (2015)**<sup>10</sup>, which addresses a number of substantive areas, including a commitment to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism and greater consultations with women's organizations affected by this violence. STRIVE GCERF also contributes to the implementation of **UNSC resolution 2178 (2014)**<sup>11</sup> which encouraged States to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors to among others, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism and supports the implementation of landmark **UNSC resolution 2250 (2014)**<sup>12</sup> on Youth, Peace and Security.

**Directive (EU) 2016/681**<sup>13</sup> of 27 April 2016 sets out the EU legislative framework on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The Directive, which applies primarily to extra-EU flights,

<sup>2</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

<sup>3</sup><https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/09/council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23999/st10384en17-conclusions-on-eu-external-action-on-counter-terrorism.pdf>

<sup>5</sup><https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>

<sup>6</sup><https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015IP0410&from=EN>

<sup>7</sup>[https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/plan\\_action.pdf](https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/plan_action.pdf)

<sup>8</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/150921\\_final\\_swd\\_gap.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/150921_final_swd_gap.pdf)

<sup>9</sup><http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/>

<sup>10</sup><https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12076.doc.htm>

<sup>11</sup><https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>

<sup>12</sup><https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm>

<sup>13</sup><https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2ba036c2-11bd-11e6-ba9a-01aa75ed71a1>

provides for the establishment of national PIUs responsible for the collection, storage and processing of the PNR data transferred by air carriers. It requires Member States to exchange all relevant PNR data with PIUs of other EU Member States and (on a case-by case basis) with third countries, regulates the use of collected data and provides for the necessary data protection safeguards. The Commission will review the current EU's external PNR policy to address the increasing third country requests in a clear and coherent way.

### **1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the partner country/region**

#### ***Component 1: API-PNR***

This intervention supports the effective implementation by partner countries (prioritising countries most affected by the FTF phenomenon) of the **UN Security Council Resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017)**<sup>14</sup> and ICAO Annex 9 standards and recommended practices on the collection, analysis, use and sharing of API and PNR data by competent national authorities. It should therefore contribute to the detection of potential terrorists, including FTFs, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in line with the recommendations of the most recent review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.<sup>15</sup>

#### ***Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA***

As reflected in the **Council Conclusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia (2017)**<sup>16</sup> and the **Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism (2017)** the EU should pursue continued outreach, dialogue and cooperation with Central Asia on CT-issues. Furthermore, Central Asia is identified in the draft UN-EU Framework on Counter-Terrorism (to be signed in late April 2019) as one of the geographical areas for deepened engagement between the EU and the UN. In order for LE CENTRAL ASIA to effectively engage with the CA governments, it is important to take into account the specific deficiencies and variations across national policies on CT, Human Rights, and Rule of Law. Whereas Tajikistan has adopted a national comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, Kyrgyzstan addresses CT matters in a National Strategy for Sustainable Development, which highlights the different approaches to CT matters. Although several CA governments have introduced amendments to their criminal codes to criminalize recruitment, training, financing and other material support for terrorist activity, none of the CA governments has explicitly criminalized FTF travel as defined in **UN resolution 2178 (2014)**. In addition, most CA governments use overly broad, vague and open-ended definitions of terrorism that go beyond the definitions provided for in the international counter-terrorism instruments. However, CA governments have shown the will and ability to cooperate on CT-issues on a regional and international level e.g. as manifested in the **UN Ashgabat Declaration on Countering Terrorism in CA**<sup>17</sup> (2017) and the **Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) for implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in CA**<sup>18</sup> (adopted in 2011, reiterated in 2018<sup>19</sup>, funded by the EU). The CA governments have generally committed to UN resolutions on countering terrorism, recently reiterated at the High-Level Launch of the Third Phase of the **UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006)**<sup>20</sup> in CA in Ashgabat in April 2018. These commitments can prove useful as complementary tools for LE CENTRAL ASIA in its engagement with CA authorities.

#### ***Component 3: CT CLOSE II***

Overall, security is anchored in the EU's development and aid effectiveness commitments and the

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13138.doc.htm>

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/284](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/284)

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23991/st10387en17-conclusions-on-the-eu-strategy-for-central-asia.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/adoption-ashgabat-declaration-countering-terrorism>

<sup>18</sup> [https://www.un.org/es/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/3rd\\_expert\\_meeting\\_report\\_almaty\\_english.pdf](https://www.un.org/es/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/3rd_expert_meeting_report_almaty_english.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> <https://unrcca.unmissions.org/united-nations-launches-regional-counter-terrorism-project-ashgabat>

<sup>20</sup> [http://www.un.org/es/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/centr\\_asia\\_implementing\\_concept\\_note\\_eng.pdf](http://www.un.org/es/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/centr_asia_implementing_concept_note_eng.pdf)

2030 Agenda (primarily under sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies), while they are also framed within the strategic perspective of the 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security policy (priority areas; security; resilience; global governance; interconnection) and aim at contributing to President Juncker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor).

More recently, and in response to attacks within the EU since 2015, the European Council has emphasised the importance of cooperation within and beyond the EU on countering and preventing terrorism. In 2015 and in 2017 European Council members committed to ensuring the safety of citizens preventing radicalisation and safeguarding values, and cooperating with international partners to do this. Measures agreed in included more data and information collection and sharing, deepening cooperation between security and intelligence services, further efforts to counter money laundering and terrorist finance, and enhancing cyber security to guard against potential cyber-terrorist threats.

#### ***Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML***

Money laundering and terrorist financing are frequently carried out in an international context.

The proposed action would therefore support the application of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) rules internationally as well as global efforts to improve AML/CTF regimes and their effective enforcement.

This is in line with actions undertaken in international fora and international bodies active in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, such as the FATF and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies

In 2017 **Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism** stressed the need to continue prioritising efforts to counter terrorist financing and money laundering. As outlined in the **Action plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing**, the Commission is committed to assisting third countries and to exploring the provision of technical assistance to support implementation of EU requirements, FATF recommendations and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – which is relevant especially for low capacity countries.

According to **Article 9(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849**, third country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes that pose significant threats to the financial system of the Union ('high-risk third countries') must be identified in order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. Article 9(2) of the Directive empowers the Commission to adopt delegated acts in order to identify those high-risk third countries, taking into account strategic deficiencies, and lays down the criteria on which the Commission's assessment is to be based. According to Article 9(4) of the Directive, the Commission shall take into account relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field. When such countries are identified by the Commission as having strategic deficiencies, obliged entities are called by Article 18a of Directive (EU) 2015/849, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843, to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures when establishing business relationships or carrying out transactions involving high-risk third countries.

On 30 May 2018, the European Parliament and Council adopted Directive (EU) 2018/843, which amended **Directive (EU) 2015/849** and entered into force on 9 July 2018. The new Directive notably revised and broadened the criteria to be considered by the Commission when making its assessment of high-risk third countries under **Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849**. In particular, a criterion related to the availability and exchange of beneficial ownership information was added, going beyond FATF criteria in this regard. The new criteria further cover the existence of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in case of breaches of AML/CFT obligations, as well as the third country's practice in cooperation and exchange of information with Member States' competent authorities.

On 22 June 2018, the methodology for identifying high risk third countries was issued in order to have an objective, fair and transparent process. This methodology provides for the main milestones, the assessment criteria and follow-up process

#### ***Component 5: STRIVE GCERF***

The proposed intervention will support the strategic objectives of targeted national governments to prevent and countering violent extremism. In particular, STRIVE GCERF will contribute to the implementation of national PVE action plans at the local level where existing.

#### **1.4 Stakeholder analysis**

##### ***Component 1: API-PNR***

The action will build on the UNCCT API project, completed in December 2017, and on the Travel Information Portal (TRIP) software solution, which has been developed by the Dutch Government with EU support. At the partner country level, stakeholders include national Governments and competent national authorities, relevant ministries responsible for internal security matters, police, airports, air carriers and existing PIUs.

The project will be implemented by UNOCT through an 'All-of-UN' approach, in close partnership with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office of Information and Communication Technology (OICT), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

During implementation engagement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Office of the High Commission for Human rights (OHCHR), the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) will also be ensured.

##### ***Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA***

The main target group for this component is government institutions with specific CT-mandates, including Ministries of justice/interior/security, the police, judicial authorities, penitentiary services etc. However, increased regional cooperation is also an objective for LE CENTRAL ASIA, especially in terms of strategic and operational information sharing. This overall approach envisages engagements in an arena with many international stakeholders, including the UN, OSCE, INTERPOL and neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan, China and Russia, including taking into account participation of CA countries in regional organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has shifted CA economic interests towards the east. However, a long-lasting conflict between the Chinese government and the Turkistan Islamic Movement, and ongoing detentions of thousands of Uyghurs (a Turkic minority) in so-called "re-education" camps in Xinjiang, have sparked some anti-Chinese sentiment in CA. For CA governments, CT efforts are thus important in order to ensure the stability and economic development of the region.

Due to the risk of CA governments (and other regional powers) perceiving LE CENTRAL ASIA as foreign interference into a sensitive area, their early involvement and buy-in is imperative. In order to ensure this buy-in, and to maximise gains from project resources, LE CENTRAL ASIA will engage with (but not limited to) the EUSR for CA and conduct formal consultations with CA representatives during the inception phase of the project. The project will continue to consult with relevant CA partners consistently throughout the implementation phase on a regular basis. The coming deployment of a CT/security expert to EUDEL Bishkek will also contribute to strengthening EU engagements on CT with CA authorities.

##### ***Component 3: CT CLOSE II***



The threat picture is evolving fast. The EU and partner countries have to face new security challenges and adapt quickly. The EU engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility. The challenging global security environment involving complex conflicts (e.g. Syria, Yemen, Da'esh, Boko Haram, Ukraine, etc.) is putting the traditional concept and implementation of our development policy under unprecedented pressure, with increasing needs to address new issues such as the root causes of terrorism, violent extremism, threats from new modus operandi such as cyber-attacks, bio agents, new forms of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's), etc. The global security situation is also under stress in various regions due to climate change effects which may increase or create new sources of conflict.

As terrorism is fundamentally a crime, at the heart of CT is law enforcement and criminal justice, comprising police, prosecutors, the judiciary, prisons, probation services etc. Law enforcement is complemented by intelligence activity, which may be the responsibility of several types of organisation. In many countries the main CT intelligence organisation is a security service, which takes primary responsibility for state ('homeland') security; in several countries the security service is part of or has been merged with the police, although it is more common for the police and security intelligence services to be distinct.

#### ***Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML***

The fight against terrorism necessarily includes the implication of a large number of actors. In consequence, this issue can be understood in a broader framework. A **close link between the crimes related to money laundering and the threat of terrorism financing** can notably be established. The illicit proceeds used to support Organised Criminal Groups (OGC) may also be used to support terrorism cells. The channels used by OCGs appear to be also used to finance terrorism. In consequence, countering the finance of terrorism (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML) are two notions closely interconnected. Many of the same tools, including corporate vehicles, financial streams, important typologies etc. are used for both money laundering and financing of terrorism.

#### ***Component 5: STRIVE GCERF***

The intervention will proactively engage across all activity areas wider society as represented by civil society organisations, including non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations such as youth organisations, movements and networks, women's and human rights organisations. Young people should also benefit from the programme in a myriad of ways including building their capacity to participate as citizens and to realise opportunities to contribute to society. Country ownership is one of GCERF's core principles therefore all activities support strategic PVE objectives of national governments who are important key stakeholders of the action. Final beneficiaries are vulnerable communities at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremist agendas, in countries that are both afflicted by violent extremism and lacking in government and civil society capacity to prevent violent extremism.

### **1.5 Problem analysis/priority areas for support**

#### ***Component 1: API-PNR***

Collecting, processing and sharing passenger data is essential to the timely identification, detection and interception of FTFs and other high-risk passengers, including those that are otherwise unknown to authorities, both before and after international travel. One of the important challenges for partner countries is the cost of ensuring compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions on API/PNR. Most of these Governments lack a full knowledge of the use of passenger data to identify and detect FTFs, as well as the necessary steps required to develop and implement API/PNR capability. A particular challenge is the cost and complexity of creating an effective and secure system to receive and process passenger data.



Additionally, legal systems differ on key issues pertaining to the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of passenger data. The processing of PNR data also entails substantial interferences with fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and to data protection.

Moreover, there is a significant potential for conflict of laws, where air carriers may be legally required by the country of destination to disclose passenger data, but prohibited by the country of departure from sending it. Unresolved, these conflicts of law prevent the optimal use and sharing of PNR data. The engagements with partner countries undertaken through the first UNCCT API project showed the need for guidance on compliance. Many UN member states are still looking for support in setting up PIUs, their own PNR systems and acquiring the necessary hard- and software to receive data from the air carriers.

### ***Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA***

According to recent CTED reports<sup>21</sup>, CA governments have introduced a number of CT measures at the national and regional level. Despite differences between CA countries, there remain a number of shared challenges and shortfalls. This includes a lack of a clear definition of terrorist offences; a lack of due process in accordance with international human rights standards; a lack in transparent and accountable procedures and actors in CT investigations, prosecutions and trials including cases of politically motivated misuse of CT legislation; insufficient inter-agency coordination; and deficiencies in regional and international cooperation. LE CENTRAL ASIA aims at addressing (not limited to) these shortfalls through technical assistance aimed at judicial and law-enforcement practices. Furthermore, LE CENTRAL ASIA aims at iterating to CA governments that a Rights Based Approach and the Rule of Law is not undermining, but rather enhancing effectiveness of CT policies. Taking into account the rapidly evolving threat picture and in order for LE CENTRAL ASIA to engage with CA governments, a tailor-made and demand-driven approach to such cooperation is essential.

### ***Component 3: CT CLOSE II***

In CT, an intelligence investigation usually occurs before a violent crime is committed – its purpose is usually to prevent a terrorist act from being carried out. It is not, therefore, the same thing as a police investigation, which usually occurs after a crime has been committed and focuses on evidence (as opposed to intelligence). Nevertheless, there is no simple separation between evidence and intelligence, or between police and intelligence work: evidence (such as a DNA profile) may be of value to an intelligence investigation, while intelligence (such as a recorded conversation between two conspirators) may be usable as evidence in a court of law.

It is, therefore, important for law enforcement/criminal justice organisations, and security and intelligence agencies, to cooperate with each other, and with counterparts overseas – as has been recognised by the United Nations in UNSCR 2322 (2016), which aims to strengthen cooperation on CT between judicial, law enforcement and intelligence organisations. The most successful CT responses involve genuine partnership and collaboration, rather than transactional exchanges of information. Such partnerships require structures, protocols, ways of working and organisational cultures that facilitate cooperation and collaboration. It is imperative that these are compliant with national and international laws, including human rights and gender equality.

### ***Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML***

The Commission is mandated to identify high-risk third countries in accordance with the 4AMLD. According to the Directive, banks and other gatekeepers (called "obliged entities" in the language of the Directive) are required to apply enhanced vigilance in transactions involving high-risk third countries. Identification of a country as a high-risk third country does not entail sanctions or trade restrictions; nor is it aimed at naming and shaming of countries. The only objective is to protect the

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<sup>21</sup> [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Concept-Note\\_Open\\_briefing\\_on\\_Central\\_Asia\\_2Jul18.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Concept-Note_Open_briefing_on_Central_Asia_2Jul18.pdf)

integrity of the EU financial system and, ultimately, to safeguard the security of the EU and its partners.

The Commission published on 22 June 2018 a methodology in order to ensure a robust, fair and objective process for making this assessment. In accordance with this methodology, the assessment will be done in a staged approach. The Commission has identified countries that should be assessed. This pre-selection was conducted in accordance with objective and factual "selection indicators".

The objective of the EU list of high-risk third countries described above is not "name and shame", but to protect the Union internal market through application of enhanced due diligence measures. The list will in addition help to maintain and intensify a dialogue in view of helping to ensure that the jurisdictions concerned remove identified deficiencies. The objective is not to limit the economic or financial relations with the listed countries; on the contrary, such a list will contribute to increase the confidence of obliged entities dealing with these countries by enabling them to adopt appropriate controls. The Commission is committed to supporting the countries that are listed.

### **Component 5: STRIVE GCERF**

In 2015, emphasis on P/CVE reached unprecedented heights, with a new understanding of the critical role of local communities. Drivers of violent extremism are predominantly context specific and require local approaches. While there is a growing consensus that factors such as marginalisation, injustice, alienation, weak state-society relations, and social exclusion contribute to violent extremism, the specific combination of factors that result in violent extremism is less clear and can differ substantially between geographies and populations. When communities are more resilient to violent extremism, the risk of violence is reduced, contributing to a society that is peaceful and inclusive. Community actors are best placed to strengthen resilience as they are closest to, and understand, the challenges in more detail. Local actors understand what drives recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in their communities and may have some of the solutions, but are often unable to access the funding they need to start to make a difference. Local P/CVE initiatives may be overlooked by traditional development funding, or they may lack the capacity to access and manage international donor funds where they are available. Traditional development donors have tended to focus on communities at risk of poverty, not at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism – and often these communities are not the same. GCERF aims to fill this funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Indeed, as a funding mechanism, the primary objective of GCERF is to provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas. In order to do that, GCERF has established two funding mechanisms: the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM) and the Accelerated Funding Mechanism (AFM).

Through its Core Funding Mechanism, GCERF is committed to working in partnership and consultation with governments, civil society, and the private sector in beneficiary countries to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism, taking into consideration the features of specific target groups, including among others the gender dimension. The AFM provides micro, small and medium-size grant awards to support projects of non-governmental organisations, primarily national and locally based organisations, of up to 12 months duration.

The EU has been a strong supporter of GCERF since the beginning of its establishment in 2014. GCERF currently manages more than USD 27 million in grants in Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, and Nigeria, and intends to make additional investments in 2019 in the Philippines and Tunisia. The new EU contribution should indicatively target Bangladesh and Philippines, to be confirmed in the inception phase.

## **2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

Risks	Risk level	Mitigating measures
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	(H/M/L)	
Differing legal requirements across States on how personal data are collected and processed may prevent air carriers from transferring PNR data to the requesting authorities	M	The project will raise awareness among partner countries that a national legal mandate for PNR is not sufficient for an airline to transmit PNR data to national authorities. From an EU perspective, the Union has negotiated international agreements on PNR with specific third countries. The Commission will review this approach to address the increasing third country requests in a clear and coherent way. The project will provide legal assistance to countries setting up their national PNR frameworks.
Tensions with other regional stakeholders in the Central Asia region perceiving the project as an interference	M	In order to ensure buy-in from regional stakeholders, and to maximise project output, LE CENTRAL ASIA will conduct formal consultations with CA representatives during the inception phase of the project and will continue to consult with relevant regional stakeholders throughout the implementation phase.
Supported partner countries wish to use API/PNR data for purposes that are not in conformity with human rights and non-discrimination.	M	The project will include a strong human rights and gender component and the goTravel software will not be provided to States where there are concerns about human rights compliance.
Doing more harm than good in the area of P/CVE.	M	Comprehensive and rigorous needs assessment will be carried out prior to commencing any work. The recipients will be carefully selected and supported in designing and developing strong programmes.
Lack of gender awareness, gender sensitivity, gender understanding increase existing gender inequality.	M	Include gender analysis and gender desegregated data. Make sure there is gender balance among beneficiaries of the action.
Security risks for GCERF's grantees and programme participants, including for women and girls involved in P/CVE activities.	L	GCERF will pay extreme care in external communications and safeguard the anonymity and safety of grantees and programme participants. Guidance will be sought from local CSOs and women on how to label their CVE activities and on necessary security measures.
<b>Assumptions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recipient States are willing to engage on API/PNR and provide implementing partners with relevant information to facilitate capacity building.</li> <li>• Recipient States are willing to strengthen their national laws to ensure that the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of API/PNR data complies with international human rights standards.</li> <li>• Necessary political will at the national and regional level to engage on CT issues with the EU.</li> <li>• Willingness of community actors to cooperate with GCERF.</li> </ul>		

### 3 LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

#### 3.1 Lessons learnt

Overall, a recent evaluation of the EU external engagement on CT and P/CVE found that the EU has become a major actor in CT and P/CVE external assistance, and the scale and speed of investment (from a standing start in 2011) has been impressive. In addition to its global actions, the EU's CT and P/CVE interventions financed via the external instruments cover around 40 countries in all high-threat regions and many areas where the threat may be lower, incipient or in abeyance, but significant nonetheless. The EU succeeds in balancing operational priorities and opportunities with comprehensive coverage. The EU's ability to mobilise resources on such a scale demonstrates re-

sponsiveness, while the geographical scope of its actions speaks of reach. The evaluation confirms that the EU has responded to the thematic and geographic priorities outlined in the Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism (2015 and 2017).

### ***Component 1: API-PNR***

The identification and design of this intervention takes into account the experience acquired in the UNCCT API project, completed in December 2017, which delivered five regional workshops in (i) South and Southeast Asia, (ii) North Africa and the Middle East, (iii) Europe, (iv) Central Asia and the Caucasus, and (v) the Sahel, Maghreb, West Africa, Central Africa and East Africa. The project aimed at raising awareness and building capacity of partner countries on the benefits and implementation of API systems. Some of its outputs included the development of national API programme roadmaps and the analysis of existing gaps in each beneficiary country's capacity to achieve an API system.

This engagement showed the need to build/strengthen capacity to collect and use API-PNR, namely in the countries most affected by the FTF phenomenon. Addressing these needs should include:

- guidance on how to ensure legal compliance to relevant UN Resolutions, which will contain the necessary safeguards in terms of fundamental rights, in particular respect to privacy and data protection;
- support in setting up Passenger Information Units or the specific entities responsible to collect, store and process API and PNR data as received from the air carriers;
- acquisition and use of the necessary hard - and software to receive data from air carriers.

### ***Component 2, 3 and 4***

Initiatives with similar intervention logic to LE CENTRAL ASIA (e.g. CT MENA) have demonstrated the benefits of providing agile technical assistance that balances the changing needs of partner countries with the identified thematic and geographical priorities and interests of the EU<sup>22</sup>. Technical assistance has proven to be inherently advantageous in terms of enhancing donor coordination, strengthening complementarity and reducing the risk of duplicating efforts in the partner countries. Furthermore, CA governments have historically proven willing to work constructively with international and EU-funded projects on issues such as migration management (CPGC), CBRN management, combatting heroin routes (EU ACT), boarder management (BOMCA) and more. Hence, LE CENTRAL ASIA will build on an existing record of EU cooperation with CA governments.

In addition, the above mentioned evaluation underlines that **Technical assistance facilities** are a useful model for delivering targeted, responsive and sustainable support. The proposed intervention for components 2, 3 and 4 foresees the model of a facility that can quickly adapt to a changing environment and an evolving need and threat picture. Such demand driven facilities are already in place for similar programmes covered under the topics of the three components notably CT MENA, CFT/AML and CT CLOSE I.

### ***Component 5 STRIVE GCERF***

Main lessons learned from previous EU programming on P/CVE calls for this to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. These aspects have been taken into account in the design of the STRIVE GCERF. In addition, the proposed action seeks to develop further knowledge throughout the implementation to facilitate learning in this complex and challenging domain, and to ensure that steps taken are coherent with the other endeavours and interventions. The proposed STRIVE action builds on the good practices and lessons learned identified during almost three years of GCERF's work in focus communities with EU support among others.

<sup>22</sup> <http://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/cu-ct-evaluation-v7-final.pdf>



### 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

The "CT MORSE" project under IcSP, is designed to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among all EU funded CT/PVE projects. CT MORSE will contribute to address the coordination challenges stemming from the significant increase in EU engagement on Counter-Terrorism more broadly.

#### **Component 1 API-PNR**

EU coordination is ensured with DG NEAR actions in the Western Balkans and by the participation of the DG DEVCO, DG HOME and EEAS in the recently created *Expert Group on the Prevention, Detection and Investigation of Terrorist Offences by using API and PNR Data*. This Expert Group, organised by the UNOCT, brings together representatives from other UN offices, the EU, ICAO, INTERPOL, WCO, IOM, IATA, and the United Kingdom, USA, The Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, facilitating international coordination and strengthening existing partnerships in this area. Activities of the Expert Group include: 1) API/PNR Global Mapping Exercise; 2) Alignment of Global and Regional Capacity-Building Initiatives on API/PNR; 3) Joint Initiative on Development of Training and Certification Packages.

Experience and expertise of countries implementing or having implemented API/PNR systems will also be leveraged to avoid duplication of efforts and improve the provision of capacity building.

#### **Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA**

A number of actors are currently engaged in implementing a range of programmes focussed on CT in CA. Partners of the JPoA for countering terrorism in CA are logging all CT-related activities conducted by regional and international organisations in a so-called Rolling Matrix<sup>23</sup>. Currently, CT-related projects are being implemented by a number of UN agencies, SCO, OSCE and others. In order not to duplicate efforts, LE CENTRAL ASIA will engage (among others) with the JPoA partners to consolidate the rolling matrix and maximize complementarity, synergy and coordination. The general added value of EU technical assistance to CA partners is expected to be the sharing of EU MS LEAs' methodologies and practises on countering terrorism. The concrete added value will depend on the specific areas of shortcomings and demands from CA governments.

#### **Component 3: CT CLOSE II**

The EU response to the terrorist threat has evolved.

Most EU actions focus on the law enforcement/criminal justice aspects of CT and there is a need as underlined by partner countries wishing to partner with the EU to improve CT related capabilities to enhance and support the rule of law function of intelligence agencies, notably through the provision of equipment.

Intelligence Services in partner countries are, generally speaking, skilled in tackling the domestic threat of terrorist groups. However, they can benefit from capability building in terms ensuring that their CT procedures are standardized and fully in line with human rights provisions. Sharing experiences and best practices on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of CT Intelligence may also have significant repercussion in improving international collaboration. Improvements in these three aspects will greatly improve regional mutual aid and interoperability with EU MS Intelligence Services in the field of CT.

On fulfilling their functions, Intelligence Services will provide the relevant authorities (judges, prosecutors, law enforcement agencies) with the necessary information if direct and immediate threat is detected, so that they can take the appropriate measures in accordance with the law to protect the rights and freedom of its citizens and institutions

<sup>23</sup> [https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final\\_updated\\_matrix\\_eng\\_2.pdf](https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_updated_matrix_eng_2.pdf)



#### **Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML**

Complementarity will be ensured with a limited number of projects in the area of CFT AML, notably with ongoing initiatives in Sahel and East of Africa. The programme has been built on the success of the East Africa programme that has managed to enhance AML/CFT capacities and to increase national, regional and international cooperation by supporting or creating networks and partnerships as well as reinforcing Financial Intelligence Units.

#### **Component 5: STRIVE GCERF**

Synergies and complementarity will be developed with existing and planned initiatives in the P/CVE area funded by the UE and other donors in relevant countries. In addition, GCERF is a multi-stakeholder global fund which complements other existing efforts to address VE by going beyond individual donors' reach and scope. Through the country support mechanism (CSM) established by GCERF in all beneficiary countries, GCERF creates or strengthens a national forum for conversation and coordination on the funding of P/CVE. Finally, the investment strategies that detail GCERF's vision for a given beneficiary country also provide an overview of the existing efforts and help to identify gaps and niches for GCERF's action.

### **4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

#### **4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities**

The **overall objective** of all components, in accordance with the IcSP Multi Annual Indicative programme 2018-20, is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and international law.

#### **Component 1: API/PNR**

The **specific objective 1** is that partner countries better collect and analyse passenger data, both API and PNR, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2396 (2017), ICAO Annex 9 standards and recommended practices (SARPs), as well as other international law obligations.

The **expected outputs** are as follows:

**Output 1.1:** Enhanced awareness of government agencies on the use of passenger data to stem the flow of FTFs and other serious criminals, as required by Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). Therefore, the relevant government agencies will have to understand the necessary steps to comply with these Resolutions.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Hold regional API/PNR awareness raising and capacity building workshops targeting several partner countries per workshop.
- Provide on-going expertise to partner countries and regions to raise awareness and build capacity on API/PNR.
- Organise national API/PNR capacity-building consultations (deep-dive missions) to requesting partner countries, followed by the development of national API/PNR roadmaps.
- Promote bilateral and multilateral support between partner countries in implementation of API/PNR, including through the creation of a user group community.

**Output 1.2:** Strengthened legislative capacities for regulating the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of passenger data, in compliance with international human rights standards, and based on a universal open standard transmission protocol.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Develop a guidance note on how to address pertinent human rights issues including data protec-

tion and privacy concerns relating to API/PNR.

- Develop project guidelines for engagement with partner countries on capacity-building, including provision of UN version of TRIP, in light of human rights issues.
- Develop a model legislative provisions document to guide legislative development on API/PNR data collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing, in coordination with relevant regional actors to ensure a coherent regional approach.
- Undertake API/PNR legislative review consultations to provide legislative assistance on the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of API/PNR.
- Support the drafting or review of national legislative framework documents for requesting partner countries.

**Output 1.3:** Strengthened PIU/specific entities capacity to use an intelligence-led approach for conducting risk assessments, implementing appropriate targeting measures, as well as identifying, detecting and intercepting FTFs and other serious criminals.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Provide train-the-trainer (ToT) training, including e-learning tools, on-the-job mentorship to law enforcement officials stationed at the PIUs on data use and analysis, as well as undertaking targeting measures based on API/PNR data.
- Organise exchange visits with partner countries that already have functional and operational PIUs and facilitate short-term deployment of experts to newly established PIUs.
- Organise sessions to facilitate exchange of best practices and lessons learned among partner countries, including through lessons learned packages.
- Train PIU staff on the use of the UN goTravel software.]
- Support the engagement of partner countries with air carriers at the national level to raise awareness about the role of the PIUs and the obligations in terms of data transmission and protection, including through the distribution of standardised information packages.
- Establish an Expert Group to share good practice on data/carrier connection, operational cooperation, interoperability and information exchange.
- Facilitate information sharing between partner countries, including advice on MoUs and technical aspects.

**Output 1.4:** Effective and supported access to the UN goTravel software solution for Government PIUs.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Establish a core team of UN OICT staff to support the development, deployment, maintenance and support of the system.
- Draft and adopt Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for in-country system deployment.
- Deliver, install and ensure the effective operational use of the UN goTravel system in requesting partner countries for the duration of the project, on the condition that the necessary hardware is ready and available.
- Provide training and maintenance support to partner countries that adopt the UN goTravel system.

## **Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA**

The **specific objective 2** is improved criminal justice responses to terrorism in Central Asian coun-

tries in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law and with a particular focus on developing law enforcement capacities and enhancing judiciary procedures related to CT and strengthening regional CT cooperation.

The **expected outputs** are as follows:

**Output 2.1: Increased capacities of Central Asian Countries** to provide law enforcement and criminal justice responses to terrorism setting up a tailor made and demand driven technical assistance facility (TAF).

The assistance provided under this facility would cover a wide range of issues depending on need and context. The following specific topics should be considered for support in this regard (not limited to):

- Assistance with domestic implementation of international and regional conventions, protocols and resolutions in relation to counterterrorism (including the signature and implementation of relevant Council of Europe Conventions open to non-members of this organisation);
- assistance in developing and implementing rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism under a human rights based approach;
- assistance on the establishment and implementation of border controls related to the issuance of identity papers and travel documents, focussing on measures for the prevention of counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use, specifically targeting FTFs' travel;
- assistance for making better use of the I-24/7 global police communication system as well as systematic feeding and use of INTERPOL databases (e.g. SLTD, FTF, etc.) at border crossing points and in criminal investigations;
- assistance for improved international exchange of operational information by law enforcement aimed at preventing terrorist acts and bringing terrorists to justice;
- assistance for the development of procedures for counter-terrorism law enforcement and/or the identification, documentation and dissemination of good practices on judicial as well as operational information;

**Output 2.2:** Increased regional cooperation on CT-related issues among law enforcement, judiciaries and other CT-related institutions.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- **regional joint training exercises** to improve the preparedness of countries in the region to face the challenges posed by the current and future terrorist threats of all types.
- developing/improving **regional action plans** strengthening law, human rights and judicial cooperation on CT-related matters.

### **Component 3: CT CLOSE II**

The **specific objective 3** is to strengthen the rule of law function of intelligence bodies in countries in the MENA/Sahel region.

CT CLOSE II will enable the acquisition of relevant equipment (mainly IT and other equipment in full compliance with human rights) to selected countries based on the recommendations and technical grounds defined under CLOSE I.

The **expected outputs** are as follows:

**Output 3.1:** increased capacity of selected security services to fight against terrorism within a rule of law perspective

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- the acquisition of highly specialised material for security services to allow them to increase their effectiveness across the Counterterrorism related cycle.

#### ***Component 4: Global Facility CFT AML***

**The specific objective 4:** reduced access to funding for terrorist organisations through increased compliance with FATF recommendations and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) in partner countries.

The **expected outputs** are as follows:

**Output 4.1:** increased compliance of national AML/CFT frameworks with relevant UNSCRs, FATF recommendations and EU legislation on CFT/AML.

**Output 4.2:** enhanced national, regional and international cooperation on asset recovery.

**Output 4.3:** improved monitoring and regulation of the informal financial sector and the control of cash flows.

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Awareness raising and practical training on AML/CFT issues identified in relevant UNSCRs, international standards and EU requirements on AML/CFT, including the above mentioned Methodology.
- Support to FIU's and asset recovery offices and structures.
- Series of trainings on identifying and providing information that could facilitate the implementation of relevant UNSCRs, international standards and EU requirements on AML/CFT
- Crosscutting: Legislative drafting assistance to support the implementation of UNSCR 2170, 2178, 2199 and 2249 related to the countering of the financing of ISIL etc.
- Explore support to deploy and implement "goAML", the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) standard software system available for Financial Intelligence Units to counter Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering.

#### ***Component 5: STRIVE GCERF***

The **specific objective 5** is that the resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need is greatest.

The **expected outputs** are as follows:

**Output 5.1:** Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported.

As a funding mechanism, GCERF will provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

**Output 5.2:** Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.

GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

**Output 5.3:** Awareness and knowledge of good practices in P/CVE is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.

GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

#### **4.2 Intervention Logic**

In line with the IcSP MIP 2018-2020, the overall objective of the programme is to contribute to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cutting off terrorist funding and bringing terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

This is based on the assumption that if (1) the capacity of recipient States to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences, and other serious crimes, and related travel, by collecting and analysing passenger data, both Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record is built, (2) a partnerships with Central Asian countries to promote a rule of law based response to terrorism in the region across the CT cycle is created, (3) the capacities of targeted countries in terms of information collection, analysis and dissemination are strengthened, (4) effective AML/CFT frameworks in compliance with the AML/CFT international standards and the criteria under the Methodology for identifying high risk third countries are put in place in targeted countries, (5) communities' resilience to violent extremism will be increased, all this will result in a reduction of the terrorist threat and in levels of extremism-related violence and in a positive, sustainable contribution to increased stability in the areas in which the activities have been implemented.

The Action assumes that there is sufficient support and willingness from the relevant public authorities to engage with the EU in CT issues and to adopt and implement relevant international CT legal provisions, standards and best practices.

The design of the Action assumes also that community actors are willing and free to participate in P/CVE capacity building activities and to apply new knowledge in their communities.

The programme builds on the experience and lessons learned acquired by the EU in the field of CT and P/CVE and strong emphasis is put on capacity building as a key element for sustainability.

#### **4.3 Mainstreaming**

Actions in the area of CT and P/CVE cut across many different sectors and issues, ranging from gender equality, human rights, international humanitarian law, youth empowerment, good governance to rule of law.

With regards to **gender**, a key consideration in security-related actions is that in both developed and developing countries this is a traditionally male-dominated field. Increasing involvement of women in this field, as well as awareness raising of local authorities on such issues might have a progressive positive impact on their empowerment and inclusion in the relevant structures of their countries.

Furthermore, the Sixth Review Resolution of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy calls upon all Member States to highlight the important role of women in countering terrorism, given the increasingly complex global security environment we face today. Gender considerations will therefore be mainstreamed into the delivery of all interventions outputs and activities, thus ensuring that nothing in the project prevents equal access to the foreseen outputs and activities.

For the API-PNR component (SO1), as it foresees the provision of advice to partner countries on recruitment policies for their PIUs, the designation of women as team leaders and members of such Units will be strongly encouraged. MoUs concluded with partner countries will also include a paragraph on gender mainstreaming to facilitate the equal participation of men and women in training and other capacity-building activities. Training tools and materials developed within the framework of the project will include a gender-based analysis and relevant gender-based responses. Finally, the



project's monitoring, reporting and evaluation system will include the disaggregation of data by gender to properly take stock of its gender-mainstreaming component.

In the specific P/CVE area (SO5), it has been recognised by many different sources that women can be powerful agents of change and can play a crucial role both in detecting early signs of radicalisation, intervening before individuals become violent, and delegitimising violent extremism narratives. They are well placed to develop credible counter narratives that debunk the recruitment messages of violent extremists. At the same time women and young girls are also increasingly active as enablers, supporters or perpetrators of violent acts and this needs to be adequately addressed. Preventative efforts focused on women and women's organisations are believed to have special advantages when building resilience at the community level. In many instances, women's organisations are also found to be non-polarising and hence efficient conduits for expressing and addressing grievances that may arise within communities. In order for them to do so, it is important to build up their skills and capacity. Support to these organisations can also ensure the needed strengthening and empowering of women and girls to build their resilience against violent extremism. This will directly help women and girls affirm their role within communities. A significant proportion of funding under STRIVE GCERF will be allocated for local projects focused on empowering women and girls, and monitoring and evaluation for these projects focus in particular on their success in promoting gender equality and women's rights.

To ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 of the IcSP Regulation ("Human rights"), a clear **human-rights-based approach** will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission ([https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en)). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen. Also, Pillar IV of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy reaffirms that the promotion and protection of human rights is essential to all measures against terrorism. It also recognises that counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but rather complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The use of API/PNR systems and data presents special challenges with respect to the rights to privacy, the protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination, and, in some cases, the presumption of innocence. The project includes several activities designed to assist partner countries in the protection and promotion of human rights. Namely, a Guidance Note to address pertinent human rights issues, such as data protection and privacy concerns; and Model Legislative Provisions to guide the development of legislation on API/PNR data transmission, use, sharing and retention. In the case of STRIVE GCERF, respecting human rights is central to the code of conduct signed with every recipient of GCERF funding.

**Youth mainstreaming** throughout STRIVE GCERF will be important, as a democratic and demographic imperative. Young people should have a say and be involved as much as possible in the programme/project cycle and be consulted meaningfully at all stages.

Grantee beneficiaries under STRIVE GCERF shall integrate a **conflict-sensitive approach** into the design and implementation of GCERF-supported activities so that they do not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aim to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

The proposed action will also contribute to the promotion of a **participatory approach** on direct involvement of civil society and the private sector and of good governance issues.

#### 4. 4 Contribution to SDGs

This intervention is relevant for the 2030 Agenda. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDGs 16 "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all lev-

sio", and 5 "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls".

## **5 FINANCING ACTION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 66 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures<sup>24</sup>.

#### **5.3.1 Grants: (direct management)**

##### **Component 3: CT CLOSE II**

This action will be implemented with a direct award to the Spanish Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 3 is to enable the acquisition of relevant equipment (mainly IT and other equipment in full compliance with human rights) to selected countries based on the recommendations and technical grounds provided under CLOSE I.

In case negotiations do not conclude with CNI the Contracting Authority will seek to conclude an agreement with a relevant not for profit organisation/public sector administration that can deliver the requested services.

#### **(b) Justification of a direct grant**

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Centro Nacional De Inteligencia.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

##### **Component 5: STRIVE GCERF**

This action will be implemented with a direct award to GCERF (direct management).

#### **(a) Purpose of the grant(s)**

The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 5 is to work with civil society partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radi-

<sup>24</sup> [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu) Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

calisation and recruitment to terrorism.

As the main purpose of the actions under component 5 is financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The Description of the Action for this grant shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Action.

(b) Type of applicants targeted

GCERF was established as an independent legal entity formed under the law of Switzerland in 2014 and enjoys all privileges and immunities equivalent to those given to international organizations which can be granted by way of a Host State Agreement. GCERF is governed by a board which includes country representatives from both recipient and donor nations as well as other constituencies.

(c) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

**5.3.2 Procurement (direct management)**

**Component 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA**

The implementation method will be direct management through the signature of a service contract with International and/or Public organisations including not for profit organisations, or consortia thereof to achieve the results outlined above.

Subject	Indicative type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Component 2 Law Enforcement in Central Asia	services	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2019

**5.3.3 Indirect management with a Member State Organisation**

**Component 4: Global Facility CFT/AML**

This action may be implemented in indirect management with Expertise France. This implementation entails to manage and be responsible for the execution of the programme.

This implementation is justified due to the combined nature of the activities foreseen (provision of capacity building and technical assistance to strengthen relevant actors against terrorism in accordance with the principles of rule of law as well as budget-implementation tasks) but also in order to reinforce the nexus between the internal and the external dimensions of the EU's security policy and to avoid duplication and overlap with similar activities.

Expertise France, supported by other EU Member States agencies, is best placed to cover the wide range of fields of expertise required to perform interventions in the diverse fields of information sharing, capacity building, law enforcement, and regional cooperation.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: acting as contracting authority concluding, monitoring and managing contracts, carrying out payments, and recovering moneys due; management of procurement procedures for hiring staff, purchasing goods and

equipment, hiring consulting services, and any other relevant transactions.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission's services may select another entity using the same criteria.

### **5.3.4 Indirect management with an international organisation**

#### ***Component 1: API-PNR***

API-PNR will be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), **part of the UN Secretariat** as established in the General Assembly resolution 71/291.

This implementation entails to support key Government (executive and its security agencies and legislative bodies, where appropriate) and non-Government actors in being better prepared to contribute to CT objectives in targeted regions and countries. This implementation is justified because of the nature of the activities foreseen (provision of capacity building and technical assistance). The UN is best placed to cover the wide range of fields of highly specialised expertise required to perform interventions in the diverse fields of capacity building, law enforcement, and regional cooperation while ensuring confidentiality. The proposed project is an initiative of the UNOCT in close partnership with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Office of Information and Communication Technology (OICT), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). UNOCT was established through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/291 on 15 June 2017 as the main focal point of the United Nations system for the prevention of violent extremism. The EU welcomed that the Office of Counter-Terrorism is addressing P/CVE as a core part of its responsibility for the balanced implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which also resonates with the overall prevention agenda of the Secretary-General which the EU and its Member States fully endorse.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: carrying out the necessary procurement and grant award procedures and awarding, signing and executing the resulting procurement and grant contracts (in line with the rules foreseen in the Special Conditions) for services and other benefits to be provided to the beneficiary countries. UNOCT will be in charge of the overall designing, planning, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the proposal for both substantive and administrative matters.

The entrusted international organisation (UNOCT through the UN Secretariat) is currently undergoing the assessment in accordance with Article 154(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046. The Commission's authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and long-lasting problem-free cooperation, the international organisation can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

### **5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

## 5.5 Indicative budget

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)	Indicative third party contribution, in cur- rency identi- fied
5.3.1 Component 5 STRIVE GCERF- grants (direct management)	4 000 000	N.A.
5.3.1 Component 4 CT CLOSE- grants (direct management)	3 000 000	N.A.
5.3.2 Component 2 Law Enforcement in Central Asia- procurement (direct management)	6 500 000	N.A.
5.3.3 Component 3 CFT/AML global facility- Indirect management with Expertise France	4 000 000	N.A.
5.3.4 Component 1 API/ PNR- Indirect management with UNOCT as part of the UN Secretariat	5 000 000	45 000 000 (TBC)
Grants – total envelope under section 5.3.1	7 000 000	N.A.
Procurement – total envelope under section 5.3.2	6 500 000	N.A.
Evaluation, (cf. section 5.8)– Audit (cf. section 5.9)/Expenditure verification	Covered by an- other decision	N.A.
Communication and visibility (cf. section 5.11)	N.A.	N.A.
Contingencies	0	N.A.
<b>Total</b>	<b>22 500 000</b>	

## 5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The implementation of this action will be coordinated and led by the European Commission. During the inception phase, an appropriate management structure will be established to ensure the coherence of all components.

## 5.7 Performance and Results monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators disaggregated minimum by sex (when pertinent), using as reference the logframe matrix. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The implementing partners will provide a completed logframe with revised indicators, baselines, targets and specific sources for each indicator. In each progress report, an update on the logframe including current values for each indicator will be provided. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to be established under each component, will allow for the identification of good practices and lessons learned among other.

In the case of component 5, STRIVE GCERF, surveys and mappings are expected to be carried out in the beginning and at the end of the project as part of the M&E framework. M&E is a necessary part of strong and effective governance and knowledge management at GCERF, both of which are essential for learning, institutional development, accountability, and policy-making. It focuses on the expected and achieved outcomes, examining the results chain, implementation processes, contextual factors, and causality, in order to understand the range of factors that contribute to or constrain the achievements of a specific intervention. M&E provides evidence-based analysis of data and information that is credible, reliable, and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations, and lessons into strategy, policy, and decision-making. Furthermore, M&E prac-



tice creates the space and opportunity for reflection, sharing lessons and emerging best practices, as well as building M&E capacity.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

### **5.8 Evaluation**

Having regard to the importance of the proposed actions, a final evaluation will be carried out via independent consultants. In the case of STRIVE GCERF, the lessons drawn during the implementation could allow the awareness raising of best practises to international, regional, national and local stakeholders in the P/CVE area. The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 30 days in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities. The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project. During evaluation attention will be given to the human rights and gender equality issues (effects and impacts). The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

### **5.9 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

### **5.10 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU. This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation. In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)<sup>25</sup>

	<b>Results chain: Main expected results (maximum 10)</b>	<b>Indicators (at least one indicator per expected result)</b>	<b>Sources of data</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Impact Overall Objective</b>	To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.	- Levels of compliance with international criminal justice and law enforcement standards in countering terrorism as per UNCTED reports. - Country score according to the Global Terrorism Index	- UNCTED reports - Annual Global Terrorism Index report	
<b>Out-come(s) Specific Objective(s)</b>	<b>SO1:</b> Partner countries better collect and analyse passenger data, both API and PNR, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2396 (2017), ICAO Annex 9 standards and recommended practices (SARPs), as well as other international law obligations. <b>SO2:</b> Improved criminal justice responses to terrorism in Central Asian countries in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law. <b>SO3:</b> Strengthened rule of law	1.1 Number of new legislative frameworks adopted in partner countries regulating the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of passenger data in compliance with international human rights standards. 1.2 Number of PIUs established in partner countries. 1.3 Frequency of access to and use of UN goTravel software solution by partner countries. 2.1 Number of successful counter-terrorism actions, e.g. arrests, prosecutions, sentences etc. 2.2 Number of FTFs departing from/returning to Central Asian-countries. 2.3 Level of compliance with various UN resolutions including UNSCR 2178. 2.4 Number of recorded human rights violations related to CT e.g. arbitrary arrests, use of repression, torture in interrogation, confession-based convictions etc. 3.1 Number of CT related incidents in the target	1.1 Mission and project reports, complemented by CTED assessments 1.2 Mission and project reports, complemented by CTED assessments 1.3 UN goTravel system data 2.1 Government criminal records 2.2 Government migration records 2.3 UN (CTED) and peer review assessments 2.4 Reports from Human Rights and UN organisations. 3.1 Official data	- Partner countries are willing to engage on API/PNR - Partner countries are willing to strengthen their national laws to ensure that the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of API/PNR data complies with international human rights standards. - Necessary political will at the national and regional level - No substantial deterioration in the current security situation - Access to relevant information despite its sensitivity - No further deterioration of the

<sup>25</sup> Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with "\*" and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with "++".

	function of intelligence bodies in countries in the MENA/Sahel region.	targeted regions that are investigated / prosecuted.	from targeted countries	current (very difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions Monitoring data is robust and evaluation is possible.
<b>SO4:</b>	Reduced access to funding for terrorist organisations through increased compliance with FATF recommendations and relevant UN-SCRs in partner countries.	4.1 Increased compliance with FATF recommendations 4.2 Increased compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing 4.3 Increased number of risk assessment	4.1 FATF evaluations 4.2 UN reports 4.3 Central Bank report	Identified beneficiary countries are willing to engage on CFT/AML.
<b>SO5:</b>	Increased resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas in countries where the threat and need is greatest	5.1 Percentage of targeted individuals from beneficiary communities who feel marginalised, disaggregated by sex and age (percentage). 5.2 Number of individuals and CSOs from targeted communities who engage in activities aiming to counter and prevent violent extremism, disaggregated by sex and age.	5.1 GCERF monitoring reports 5.2 Survey and mapping to be conducted before and at the end of the action	- "At risk" communities are properly selected.
<b>Op1. 1</b>	Enhanced awareness of government agencies on the use and share passenger data to stem the flow of FTFs and other serious criminals, as required by Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017).	1.1.1 Number of people reached through awareness raising and capacity-building workshops held by the project, disaggregated by sex. 1.1.2 Percentage of participants who consider the awareness raising and capacity building workshops useful, disaggregated by sex. 1.1.3 Number of government officials trained on API/PNR systems implementation, disaggregated by sex. 1.1.4 Number of 'All-of-UN' deep-dive missions undertaken throughout project duration. 1.1.5 Number of comprehensive national API/PNR roadmaps developed for partner countries in receipt of a deep-dive mission.	1.1.1 Reports from pre- and post-training/workshop tests 1.1.2 Project reports 1.1.3 Workshop Evaluation Questionnaires 1.1.4 Mission reports 1.1.5 National API/PNR Roadmaps	Partner countries appoint relevant staff for capacity building support provided by the project. Trained staff has the authority and freedom to use the new skills and knowledge gained through this project in their workplace.
<b>Op1. 2</b>	Strengthened legislative capacities for regulating the collection, transmission, use,	1.2.1 Number of new legislative frameworks drafted in partner countries regulating the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of	1.2.1 Draft laws drafted with project support	Partner governments are willing to engage on legislative reform on the collection, transmission,

	<p>retention and sharing of passenger data, in compliance with international human rights standards, and based on a universal open standard transmission protocol.</p> <p><b>Op1.3</b> Strengthened PIU/specific entities capacity to use an intelligence-led approach for conducting risk assessments, implementing appropriate targeting measures, as well as identifying, detecting and intercepting FTFs and other serious criminals.</p>	<p>passenger data in compliance with international human rights standards.</p> <p>1.2.2 Status of the Guidance Note on human rights issues pertaining to API/PNR.</p> <p>1.2.3 Status of the Model Legislative Provisions Document</p> <p>1.3.1 Number of PIUs established in partner countries with support of the Action.</p> <p>1.3.2 Percentage of participants who increased their knowledge of passenger data collection and use after training, in-the-job mentorship support and exchange visits, disaggregated by sex.</p>	<p>1.2.2 Guidance note document</p> <p>1.2.3. Model Legislative Provisions document</p> <p>1.3.1 Progress reports</p> <p>1.3.2 Pre- and post-intervention test results to be conducted by the Action</p>	<p>use, retention and sharing of API/PNR data.</p> <p>Partner countries appoint staff with relevant work experience for training, mentoring and exchange visits.</p>
	<p><b>Op1.4</b> Effective and supported access to the UN goTravel software solution for Government PIUs.</p>	<p>1.4.1 Frequency of access to and use of UN goTravel software solution by partner countries.</p> <p>1.4.2 Number of partner countries having deployed the UN goTravel software thanks to support of this Action.</p> <p>1.4.3 Percentage of partner countries (based on above indicator) reporting that access to the UN goTravel software enhanced their collection, analysis, use and sharing of API/PNR data.</p>	<p>1.4.1 UN goTravel system data</p> <p>1.4.2 Progress reports</p> <p>1.4.3 Survey of PIUs to be conducted by the Action</p>	<p>Partner countries have an API/PNR legislative framework in force.</p>
<p><b>Outputs (SO2)</b></p> <p><b>Op2.1</b> Increased capacities of Central Asian Countries to provide law enforcement and criminal justice responses to terrorism in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, through setting up a tailor made and demand driven technical assistance facility (TAF).</p>	<p>2.1.1 Number of trained CA officials who increased their knowledge of possible criminal justice responses to terrorism.</p> <p>2.1.2 Number of national initiatives undertaken by CA governments to implement UNSCR2178 and similar instruments</p> <p>2.1.3 Percentage of assisted/ trained CA officials who assess assistance/trainings as impactful at an institutional level.</p>	<p>2.1.1 Pre- and post-training survey reports</p> <p>2.1.2 UN reports</p> <p>2.1.3. Project progress reports</p>	<p>- Partner governments are willing to further incorporate Human Rights and rule of law principals into their criminal codes with regards to CT.</p> <p>- Agreement from one or more CA governments to host the TAF platform.</p> <p>- Willingness of EU Member State(s) to provide experts to the TAF (Precondition).</p>	

	<p><b>Op2. 2</b> Increased regional cooperation on CT-related issues among law enforcement, judiciaries and other CT-related institutions.</p>	<p>2.2.1 Percentage of participants perceiving regional joint training exercises as impactful at an institutional level. 2.2.2 Number of agreements in discussion or signed with support of this action between partner countries on CT-related issues. 2.2.3 Number of CT-related arrests, prosecutions and convictions based (at least partly) on information shared between partner countries.</p>	<p>2.2.1 Post-exercise survey reports 2.2.2 Project reports 2.2.3 Government criminal records</p>	<p>- Interest of government institutions/officials to engage in increased regional collaboration.</p>
<p><b>Output (SO3)</b></p>	<p><b>Op3. 1</b> Increased capacity of selected security services to fight against terrorism within a rule of law perspective</p>	<p>3.1.1 Number of pieces of equipment provided by this Action (disaggregated by type of equipment, agency and country)</p>	<p>3.1.1 Progress report.</p>	
<p><b>Output (SO4)</b></p>	<p><b>Op4. 1</b> Increased compliance of national AML/CFT frameworks with relevant UN-SCRs, FAFT recommendations and EU legislation on CFT/AML.</p>	<p>4.1.1 Number of AML/CFT relevant legislation drafted/revised with support of this Action to align it with UNSCRs/FAFT recommendations and EU standards</p>	<p>4.1.1 Project progress reports - FAFT's reports</p>	<p>Political will and security stability</p>
<p><b>Op4. 2</b> Enhanced national, regional and international cooperation on asset recovery.</p>		<p>4.2.1 Number of countries present at meetings and trainings on asset recovery organized by this Action 4.2.2 Number of relevant legislation developed and implemented through EU support.</p>	<p>4.2.1 Progress reports 4.2.2 legal publications</p>	<p>Willingness of national administrations to cooperate with project team and to share potentially sensitive information at regional levels.</p>
<p><b>Op4. 3</b> Improved monitoring and regulation of the informal financial sector and the control of cash flows.</p>		<p>4.3.1 Number of specific financial sectors identified, mapped and evaluated through a risk based approach. 4.3.2 Number of staff from non-specialised law enforcement units with increased knowledge on CFT/AML issues</p>	<p>4.3.1 Progress report 4.3.2 Reports from pre-and post-training tests.</p>	<p>-Willingness of the private sector to cooperate with law enforcement in order to reduce the permeability of financial flows between the formal and informal sector. -Ability and willingness of local law enforcement to tackle the informal economy linked to terrorist organisations</p>
<p><b>Output (SO5)</b></p>	<p><b>Op5. 1</b> Community focused and driven initiatives for the pre-</p>	<p>5. 1.1 Number of men and women reached by the CSOs through local CVE actions (dis-</p>	<p>5.1.1 Project progress reports;</p>	<p>Security situation in targeted communities does not deterio-</p>



	<p>vention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported</p> <p><b>Op5.2</b> Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.</p> <p><b>Op5.3</b> Awareness and knowledge of good practices in the field of preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.</p>	<p>aggregated by country and age)</p> <p>5.1.2 Number of collaboration / partnerships with think tanks / major actors involved in P/CVE work and research established/ developed during the implementation.</p> <p>5.2.1 Number of CSOs reporting increased capacities in PVE thanks to GCERF support.</p> <p>5.2.2 % of CSO representatives trained by GCERF who can provide at least one example of using these skills &amp; knowledge in their work within the following year</p> <p>5.3.1 number of stakeholders reached through workshops/events where findings/ good practices/ lessons learned where disseminated, disseminated, aggregated by sex, sector and country</p>	<p>5.1.2 GCERF reports</p> <p>5.2.1 Project progress reports and GCERF's financial documentation;</p> <p>5.2.2 Survey of CSOs</p> <p>5.3.1 Database of event participants</p>	<p>rate and allows partners to operate appropriately</p> <p>CSOs at community level are free to participate in P/CVE capacity building activities and to apply new knowledge in their communities</p> <p>A robust M&amp;E system which allows for the identification of good practices and lessons learned is in place.</p>
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