Democratic engagement is increasingly mediated by digital technology, from campaigning to election results transmission. These technologies rely on collecting, storing, and analysing personal information to operate. They raise novel issues and challenges for all electoral stakeholders on how to protect our data from exploitation.
Elections are about more than voting and the entire election cycle is increasingly data dependent. Voter registration, voter authentication, voting and results transmission all involve the the collection of at least some personal data. Political parties depend on data to drive their campaigns, from deciding where to hold rallies, which campaign messages to focus on in which area, and how to target supporters, undecided voters and non-supporters, including with ads on social media.
Data exploitation during the election cycle, therefore, risks undermining fundamental democratic processes.
Our democratic institutions are under threat today and the groundwork is being set to destabilise them into the future. Private, political, and state actors are creating an environment that is rife for the manipulation of democratic outcomes, and the loss of confidence in democratic institutions and processes. We need laws or regulations enforced, changes in technologies and industry behaviour, and expert allies to understand the role data exploitation plays in heightening this threat.
Personal data is central to this emerging way of seeking to influence democratic processes. Through the amassing and processing of vast amounts of data, individuals are profiled based on their stated or inferred political views, preferences, and characteristics. These profiles are then used to target individuals with news, disinformation, political messages, and many other forms of content aimed at influencing and potentially manipulating their views. This campaign environment presents novel challenges due to the scale and range of data available together with the multiplicty, complexity and speed of profiling and targeting techniques. All of this is characterised by its opacity. Existing legal frameworks designed to curtail this exploitation often also fall short, either in substance or enforcement.
Much recent debate has focussed on the content of election-related digital communications, e.g. ‘fake news’ and disinformation, particularly in the form of political adverts and messages we see on social media. At PI, we are interested in what is "behind the curtain" - what data has been collected and inferred about you that has resulted in you seeing this piece of content. The companies that make this their business model need to be exposed and scrutinised as do the political parties buying their services.
In addition, the deployment of technology used to conduct elections needs to be scrutinised. Biometric voter registration, authentication and results transmissions systems are expensive to implement and often complex. Procurement needs to be transparent and myths busted about how the technology actually works, what it can realistically do and what problem its use is trying to solve. Technology should reinforce trust in elections and the democratic process, not undermine it.
International election observers are increasingly called upon to consider the role of personal data and the digital technologies that are used by all main actors in democratic elections. This is not an easy task. It will require updating existing election observers’ methodologies and acquiring new technical skills.
We need effective safeguards that reflect changes in digital campaigning now and looking into the future. We also need to see actors around the world, from governments, regulators, platforms to political parties, taking measures to resist the current race to the bottom. As a starting point:
Protecting the Election Cycle: PI supports international, regional and local election observer missions to consider the role of personal data and the digital technologies that are used by all main actors in democratic elections.
Targeting Political Exploitation: PI exposes and challenges the political data exploitation industry by investigating and challenging companies and those that use them. PI seeks to improve regulatory safeguards against political data exploitation by pushing for enforcement of exisiting safeguards and the introduction/reform of others.
Political Ad Transparency: PI works prevent companies that facilitate the exploitation of data by advertisers by allowing opaque and invasive targeting from continuing to do so globally.
In recent years, the use of online political campaigning has gained significant traction, with regulatory bodies often struggling to catch up. The unregulated use of political ads can pose threats to transparency, and all the more so when online platforms fail to play their part.
We at PI
When it comes to elections around the world, we find ourselves in a terrain that is more and more populated by digital technologies, which have an increasingly critical impact upon the realisation of democracy. Digital technologies used in the context of elections offer new opportunities to support voter participation, whilst simultaneously posing increasing challenges for voters and those who manage and oversee elections. The introduction of technologies into electoral systems in countries across the globe further presents risks which can pose challenges to modern democracy itself, and in turn to the preservation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy.
This context requires the modification of norms and practices to ensure that elections are free, fair and transparent. Election observers are also having to develop new methodologies and skills to adapt to the shifting democratic terrain.
This short article will draw from our recently launched tech explainer, "Kenyan Voting ICTs - Biometric Voter Registration, Voter Identification, Results Transmission, and Candidate Management Systems", which provides a detailed case study on the uses of data and technology as a response to Kenya's highly contested and violence-marred elections of 2007. The piece aims to draw upon lessons learnt in this Kenya case study, and highlight key considerations, challenges and recommendations when it comes to specific uses of data and techonologies for elections (read the case study in full here).
It will also draw from our "Technology, Data and Elections Checklist" which aims to give electoral observers and civil society the necessary tools to understand and assess the role of technologies in the electoral process.
Finally, these recommendations reflect lessons we have learned as a result of our work on biometric identity systems, of which the voter register is a subset.
All or some of the below listed technologies that can be used during elections may be contained within the same device or system, as with the case of the Kenyan Integrated Elections Management System (KIEMS).
It is essential that the following is carried out before introducing a new scheme or technology into the electoral process:
Although we caution that the failure or misuse of the above technologies for the conduct of an election could have grave, or even catastrophic, consequences for individuals whose data is implicated or for democratic mechanisms, it is also important to recognise the potential of these technologies to offer advantages to the electorate and the democratic process as a whole if used responsibly, safely and in a manner that upholds human rights.
As in the case of Kenya, technology was put in place for the management of elections in part due to serious violence erupting in the wake of the 2007 elections in the country, which resulted in the deaths of over 1000 people and the displacement of over 600,000 people. In Kenya, the deployment of election technologies was an attempt to foster trust in the voting process by partially eliminating the potential for human corruption. However, other instances where similar technologies have been used, such as in Mozambique's 2024 election, have led to irregularities around voter registration and a decrease in confidence and independence of the election administration.
These technologies bring with them their own risks and challenges, including to privacy and equality, which must be properly addressed. The implementation of the above recommendations by states would be concrete steps towards addressing said challenges and ensuring that technology is used to galvanise, rather than undermine, the democratic process.
